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Abstract
The thesis is concerned with Digital Rights Management (DRM), and in particu-
lar with DRM for networks of devices owned by a single individual. This thesis
focuses on the problem of preventing illegal copying of digital assets without
jeopardising the right of legitimate licence holders to transfer content between
their own devices, which collectively make up what we refer to as an authorised
domain.
An ideal list of DRM requirements is specified, which takes into account the
points of view of users, content providers and copyright law. An approach is
then developed for assessing DRM systems based on the defined DRM require-
ments; the most widely discussed DRM schemes are then analysed and assessed,
where the main focus is on schemes which address the concept of an authorised
domain. Based on this analysis we isolate the issues underlying the content
piracy problem, and then provide a generic framework for a DRM system ad-
dressing the identified content piracy issues. The defined generic framework has
been designed to avoid the weaknesses found in other schemes.
The main contributions of this thesis include developing four new approaches
that can be used to implement the proposed generic framework for managing
an authorised domain. The four novel solutions all involve secure means for cre-
ating, managing and using a secure domain, which consists of all devices owned
by a single owner. The schemes allow secure content sharing between devices
in a domain, and prevent the illegal copying of content to devices outside the
domain. In addition, each solution incorporates a method for binding a domain
to a single owner, ensuring that only a single consumer owns and manages a
domain. This enables binding of content licences to a single owner, thereby
limiting illicit content proliferation.
In the first solution, domain owners are authenticated using two-factor authenti-
cation, which involves “something the domain owner has”, i.e. a master control
device that controls and manages consumers domains, and binds devices joining
a domain to itself, and “something the domain owner is or knows”, i.e. a bio-
metric or password/PIN authentication mechanism that is implemented by the
master control device. In the second solution, domain owners are authenticated
using their payment cards, building on existing electronic payment systems by
ensuring that the name and the date of birth of a domain creator are the same
for all devices joining a domain. In addition, this solution helps to protect con-
sumers’ privacy; unlike in existing electronic payment systems, payment card
details are not exposed to third parties. The third solution involves the use
of a domain-specific mobile phone and the mobile phone network operator to
3
authenticate a domain owner before devices can join a domain. The fourth so-
lution involves the use of location-based services, ensuring that devices joining
a consumer domain are located in physical proximity to the addresses registered
for this domain. This restricts domain membership to devices in predefined geo-
graphical locations, helping to ensure that a single consumer owns and manages
each domain.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Contents
1.1 Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
1.2 Contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
1.3 Organisation of the Thesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
This chapter gives an overview of the thesis. We provide the motivation for
the research and describe the contributions of this thesis. We also present the
overall structure of the thesis.
1.1 Motivation
Copyrighted digital asset protection is one of the most pressing current chal-
lenges in information security, as most elements of society have converted their
content from physical to digital form. In the past, content piracy was limited
to distribution via physical media. The recent digitisation of information, the
development of communications technologies such as broadband and mobile net-
works, and the spread of the Internet have increased digital content piracy [19],
18
1. Introduction
as content can be shared and transferred instantly with no loss of quality.
The simultaneous rapid growth of electronic commerce has opened a huge new
market for digital goods, such as books, software, and music. However, content
providers have concerns about the protection of their valuable content, especially
since, as stated above, the Internet makes copying content very simple, resulting
in increased digital content piracy [19]. Content providers therefore want to
ensure that their content is protected against unauthorised use. Because of the
concerns of content providers, DRM technologies have been introduced to help
to prevent unauthorised use and distribution of content. DRM can be defined
as the technologies that collectively support all stages in the lifecycle of digital
content creation, manipulation, distribution and consumption, by preventing
illegal copying and allowing the imposition of fees, processing of payments, and
protection of principal rights and profits [43]. Whilst devising an effective DRM
solution is clearly in the interests of the owners of content, the advantages to
the consumer are much less clear. Indeed, if solutions prevent consumers using
purchased copies of content in ways that they deem fair and reasonable, then
the technology is likely to become very unpopular.
In this thesis we focus on ways of preventing the unauthorised copying of con-
tent without jeopardising the right of licence holders to transfer content between
their own devices, which collectively make up what we refer to as an authorised
domain. In addition, this thesis addresses a number of other fundamental DRM
requirements, such as content backup and recovery, privacy, content mobility,
and ease of use. One important issue that is not addressed in this thesis is
the provision of a detailed analysis of copyright law requirements. The pro-
posed schemes satisfy many copyright law requirements; however, some require-
ments have not been fully analysed, such an analysis would be an interesting
19
1. Introduction
topic for future research. Most existing DRM solutions have significant security
shortcomings and usability limitations in addressing the problem of illegal copy-
ing and simultaneously allowing free content sharing between devices belonging
to a single user. In addition, many previously proposed DRM solutions have
problems in addressing other fundamental DRM requirements, such as content
backup and recovery, ease of use, and performance.
1.2 Contributions
This thesis includes the following novel contributions supporting the implemen-
tation of a successful DRM system.
• It defines an ideal list of DRM requirements from the points of view of
users, content providers and copyright law.
• Using the list of DRM requirements, it analyses and assesses six of the most
widely discussed DRM schemes that incorporate the authorised domain
concept. We then isolate the main security issues constituting the content
piracy problem.
• It defines a generic framework incorporating measures for addressing the
main security elements that give rise to content piracy.
• It develops four approaches for the management of an authorised domain,
based on the defined generic DRM framework. Each approach incorpo-
rates a method for binding a domain to a single owner, ensuring that
a single consumer owns and manages all the devices in a domain. This
enables binding of content licences to a single owner, thereby limiting il-
licit content proliferation. The general approach developed in the thesis
20
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could also be useful for various other applications requiring strong user
authentication, as it strongly binds consumers to their domains.
1.3 Organisation of the Thesis
The remainder of this thesis is organised as follows.
Chapter 2 and 3 are preliminary chapters. Chapter 2 introduces the secu-
rity services and mechanisms used throughout this thesis. Chapter 3 provides
background information about Trusted Computing technology, as necessary to
understand the protocols and security analyses described in this thesis.
Chapter 4 provides an overview of DRM; it gives the main entities and workflow
in a typical DRM system, and two examples of rights expression languages.
Finally, it provides a comprehensive list of DRM requirements from the points
of view of users, content providers and copyright law; this list is then used
throughout this thesis to assess and evaluate DRM schemes.
Chapter 5 develops an approach for assessing DRM systems based on the ideal
list of DRM requirements, and this approach is then used to analyse six of the
most recently discussed schemes for protecting digital assets within authorised
domains. Based on this assessment, we provide our own analysis of the main
threats underlying the content piracy problem.
Chapter 6 provides a high level architecture for authorised domain management
for a DRM system. It gives a set of requirements for devices in an autho-
rised domain, and how such requirements could be satisfied using the Trusted
21
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Computing Group specifications. It then describes a framework incorporating
a general workflow designed to solve the content proliferation problem. Finally,
it illustrates how to control the membership of a domain in the context of the
defined framework.
Chapters 7–10 specify systems implementing the generic authorised domain
management framework provided in chapter 6. Chapter 7 describes a means
of managing an authorised domain using a master control device that authen-
ticates a domain owner using either a password/PIN or a biometric authenti-
cation mechanism. It also presents the pros and cons of these two approaches
for user authentication, and gives possible countermeasures to the issues iden-
tified. Chapter 8 describes a means of managing an authorised domain using a
Trusted Authority, which authenticates a domain owner using his/her payment
card details. Chapter 9 describes a means of managing an authorised domain
using a mobile device and a mobile network operator, where domain owners
are authenticated based on the generic authentication architecture mechanism
provided by the mobile network operator. Finally, chapter 10 describes a means
of managing an authorised domain using a Trusted Authority, where domain
owners are authenticated using location based service mechanisms. Chapters
7–10 also provide analyses of system security requirements, threats, and ser-
vices for the systems described, and how the schemes help to prevent illicit
content proliferation.
Chapter 11 assesses the four proposed schemes given in chapters 7–10. This
analysis is based on the ideal DRM requirements list provided in chapter 4.
Finally, chapter 12 gives the conclusions of this thesis, and outlines directions
for future work.
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This chapter introduces the security threats, services, and mechanisms that are
relevant to this thesis. This chapter is based on definitions given in a variety of
sources, including [26, 46, 50, 51, 79].
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2.1 Security Threats
A security threat is a potential violation of the security of a system. The
following are generic security threats which could potentially affect the systems
proposed in this thesis.
1. Impersonation, in which an attacker pretends to be an authorised entity
which is entitled to participate in a transaction.
2. Unauthorised reading, whereby an attacker obtains sensitive information
whilst it is being stored, transferred, or executed.
3. Data manipulation, where an attacker inserts, deletes, or reorganises the
content of data whilst it is being exchanged, stored, or executed.
4. Data replay, where a previous message, in its entirety or in part, is re-
transmitted after interception.
2.2 Security Services
To counteract the threats outlined in section 2.1, we identify the following se-
curity services.
1. Authentication, of which there are two types:
(a) Entity authentication provides assurance in “real time” of the identity
of an entity, and that it is currently active in a communication session.
(b) Data origin authentication provides assurance that a given entity was
the original source of a message.
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2. Confidentiality protects a message against being read by an unauthorised
entity whilst it is being transferred or stored.
3. Data integrity protects a message against alteration by an unauthorised
entity whilst it is being transferred or stored.
4. Message freshness protects a message against being replayed between com-
municating parties.
5. Memory protection protects data against being read or altered by an unau-
thorised entity whilst it is being processed [34].
6. Access control provides controlled protection for a resource against unau-
thorised access, including: unauthorised usage, unauthorised disclosure,
unauthorised alteration, unauthorised destruction, and unauthorised ex-
ecution. Access control to a resource is determined by a security policy,
typically defined by the resource owner.
2.3 Security Mechanisms
In this section we identify security mechanisms that are used by the schemes
described in this thesis to provide the security services described above.
2.3.1 Cryptographic Hash Function
A cryptographic hash function (for example, MD5 [81] or SHA-1 [27]) maps a
bit string of variable length to a bit string of fixed length [47]. It must also
satisfy the following three properties.
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• Pre-image resistance: It must be computationally infeasible to find, for a
given output, an input which maps to this output.
• Second pre-image resistance: It must be computationally infeasible to find,
for a given input, a second input which maps to the same output.
• Collision resistance: It must be computationally infeasible to find two
different inputs which map to the same output.
2.3.2 Symmetric Cryptography
Symmetric cryptographic techniques use a key which must be kept secret. Classes
of symmetric cryptographic technique include symmetric encryption algorithms
and Message Authentication Code (MAC) schemes, which are briefly outlined
in this section; for further details see, for example, [26, 51, 79].
2.3.2.1 Symmetric Encryption
Symmetric encryption techniques (for example, AES [31] or DES [30]) are used
to provide confidentiality for data whilst it is stored in a device or whilst it is
in transit. Data is encrypted using an encryption key to produce ciphertext. A
decryption key is used to decrypt the ciphertext. The encryption and decryption
keys are the same or can be easily computed from each other, and need to be
known to all parties requiring access to the data.
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2.3.2.2 Message Authentication Codes
MACs (for example, CBC-MAC [48] or HMAC [56]) are used to provide data
integrity and data origin authentication services. A MAC is computed using
a MAC-function that takes two inputs, namely, a secret key and an arbitrary-
length message, and outputs a MAC value. A verifier can check the integrity
and authenticity of a message by recomputing the MAC value using the same
MAC-function and secret key, and comparing it with the value associated with
the message.
2.3.2.3 Authenticated Encryption
Authenticated encryption techniques (for example, OCB 2.0 or Key Wrap [51])
can be used to provide data confidentiality, data integrity, and data origin au-
thentication services. A mechanism of this type typically involves either a com-
bination of a MAC algorithm and a symmetric encryption scheme, as outlined
above, or uses an encryption algorithm in a special way so that it provides both
integrity and confidentiality protection [51].
2.3.3 Asymmetric Cryptography
Asymmetric cryptography involves the use of pairs of related keys, made up of
a public key and a private key, where it is practically impossible to deduce the
private key from the public key. The private key should be known only by its
owner. The public key, however, needs to be made known to all parties requiring
to communicate with the holder of the private key, and the authenticity of a pub-
lic key needs to be guaranteed to any user. This can be achieved, for example,
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by using a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) (see [26], Chapter 13). Asymmetric
cryptographic techniques include asymmetric encryption algorithms and digital
signature schemes, which are briefly outlined in this section; for further details
see, for example, [26, 46, 50, 79].
2.3.3.1 Asymmetric Encryption
Asymmetric encryption techniques (see, for example, ElGamal [28] or RSA [82])
are used to provide data confidentiality. Data is encrypted using a public key
to produce ciphertext, which can only be decrypted using the corresponding
private key.
In the reminder of this thesis we require asymmetric encryption techniques to
provide non-malleability, which means that “it should be hard to transform a
given label/ciphertext pair (L,C) encrypting a plaintext M into a different pair
(L′,C′), such that the decryption of C′ with label L′ is related in some “in-
teresting” way to M ” [50]. For the purposes of this definition, a label is “an
octet string that is input to both the encryption and decryption algorithms of an
asymmetric cipher, and of a data encapsulation mechanism. A label is public
information that is bound to the ciphertext in a non-malleable way” [50].
2.3.3.2 Digital Signatures
Digital signature techniques (see, for example, DSA [29] or ElGamal [28]) can
be used to provide data integrity and data origin authentication services. When
using such a mechanism, a sender signs a message using his/her own signing key
(the private key) to generate a signature. The sender then sends the message
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with the signature to a receiver, who needs to possess a reliable copy of the
corresponding verification key (the public key), e.g. as obtained via a PKI. The
verification key is used by the receiver to verify the signed message.
2.3.4 Nonces
Nonces provides message freshness. A nonce must be a value that has never been
used before, and will never be used again (within a specific security context).
2.3.5 Process Isolation
Process isolation provides protection for a message against being read or al-
tered by an unauthorised entity whilst being executed [34]. This service can be
provided using trusted computing technology, discussed in chapter 3.
2.4 Public Key Infrastructures
For the purposes of this thesis, a PKI is the infrastructure necessary to support
the distribution of public keys to those entities which need to use them, in such
a way that the user of a public key can be sure of its integrity and authenticity.
A PKI can be made up of a variety of different elements, depending on the
technology and organisational structure used to distribute and guarantee the
correctness of public keys. However, by far the most common form of PKI is
one based on the generation and distribution of public key certificates.
More specifically, most practical PKIs consist of one or more management en-
tities responsible for generating, distributing and providing ongoing support
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for public key certificates. This includes a variety of different types of entity,
including, most importantly, Certification Authorities (CAs), which are respon-
sible for generating public key certificates. A CA validates the identity of a user,
validates the content of a public key certification request, digitally signs a pub-
lic key certificate for a validated request, and maintains a certificate revocation
mechanism. Users relying on a PKI need to have a trusted copy of the public
key of the CA in order to verify public key certificates signed by that CA.
The most widely used format for public key certificates is X.509 [41], an ITU-T
(ITU Telecommunication Standardisation) recommendation. An X.509 certifi-
cate is issued by a CA to bind a public key to a particular Distinguished Name,
or to an Alternative Name such as an e-mail address or a DNS-entry. It is com-
posed of various fields, including: the certified public key, the certificate serial
number, the certificate issuer, the certificate validity period (start and expiry
dates), the entity associated with the certified public key, and the revocation
list URL [41].
A certificate might have been revoked, and hence the status of a certificate may
need to be checked prior to use, e.g. by querying an Online Certificate Status
Protocol (OCSP) service. An OCSP service ‘ ‘enables applications to determine
the (revocation) state of an identified certificate. OCSP may be used to satisfy
some of the operational requirements of providing a timely revocation informa-
tion and may also be used to obtain additional status information. An OCSP
client issues a status request to an OCSP responder and suspends acceptance of
the certificate in question until the responder provides a response. This protocol
specifies the data that needs to be exchanged between an application checking
the status of a certificate and the server providing that status” [70].
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This chapter provides a very brief introduction to Trusted Computing technol-
ogy. More specifically it covers the following topics: the importance of Trusted
Computing; the relationship between Trusted Computing and DRM; the main
building blocks of Trusted Computing as given in Trusted Computing Group
specifications; and the mechanisms used for performing platform integrity mea-
surement, reporting, and verification. Finally, this chapter briefly outlines the
main challenges for applying TCG specifications to currently available devices,
operating systems and applications. The material in this chapter is mainly de-
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rived from [33, 84, 91, 92, 93, 94].
3.1 The Importance of Trusted Computing
Users typically have full access to their personal computers (PCs), providing
them with full control and flexibility over their own environment. PC data trav-
els between storage devices, memory, CPUs, audio chips, loudspeakers, video
chips, and display devices. Data transferred within a PC is subject to poten-
tial interception or modification attacks. Also, it could be copied as it passes
through the system, enabling the creation of an unlimited number of perfect
copies.
When PCs and PC operating systems (OSs) were first designed, security was
not a major concern. This is because PCs were designed to work in a standalone
mode or within a small workgroup; not in the way they are used today. However,
since the early stages of the Internet era, PCs have been connected to larger
networks, such as the Internet. This has made them vulnerable to various
kinds of attacks, such as viruses, worms, phishing, pharming, etc. Software-only
techniques cannot provide a high degree of protection for secret keys stored in
a device; for example, Apple FairPlay, which uses software-only techniques, has
been hacked multiple times, as discussed in chapter 5. This and other problems
raise the need for a trusted computing technology that can enforce policy-neutral
access control mechanisms.
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3.2 Trusted Computing and DRM
Trusted computing systems are platforms whose state can be remotely tested,
and which can be trusted to store security-sensitive data in ways testable by a
remote party. Trusted computing technology can enforce access control policies
associated with a resource in such a way that a user cannot bypass these policies,
whilst maintaining access to the resource.
A number of critiques of the technology (see, for example, [12, 14]) assert
that trusted computing is designed to support DRM. However, Kuhlmann and
Gehring [57] distinguish between DRM and trusted computing; the following
list summarises their arguments.
• Trusted Computing is not DRM; however, trusted computing offers func-
tionalities that can be used to help build both DRM systems and many
other applications which require the verification of the trustworthiness of
running machines.
• Trusted Computing is policy-neutral and could be used to enforce any ac-
cess control policy; however, DRM is policy-specific and enforces content
owner/distributor policies.
• Trusted Computing is not specially protected by copyright laws; however,
digital content is protected by copyright laws.
• Trusted Computing has a hardware-based off switch; however, DRM has
no hardware-based off switch.
• Trusted Computing is a standardised technology; however, DRM uses a
variety of systems from different vendors.
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• Trusted Computing can be used to undermine as well as to protect users’
privacy; however, DRM might undermine user privacy, as content providers
could collect and process information regarding user content consumption,
and thereby create profiles for their customers.
3.3 Trusted Computing Group
The Trusted Computing Group (TCG1) was established in April 2003. It is
the successor to the Trusted Computing Platform Alliance (TCPA), that was
founded in January 1999 by a group of major technology vendors, including
AMD, IBM, Intel, HP, Microsoft, and Sun Microsystems. The mission of the
TCG is to develop solutions to increase the trustworthiness of computers. TCG
compliant platforms are not expensive, and are currently available from a range
of PC manufacturers, including Dell, Fujitsu, HP, Intel and Toshiba [35]. In
addition, since early 2006, all Intel-based Apple computers are TCG compliant
[96].
The TCG specifications require that Trusted Platforms (TPs) have the following
functionalities.
• Confidentiality and integrity protection of the OS and underlying hard-
ware.
• Confidentiality and integrity protection of application code and data dur-
ing execution and storage.
• Confidentiality and integrity protection of data travelling to and from
input/output devices.
1www.trustedcomputinggroup.org
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• Confidentiality, integrity, and authenticity of data travelling between de-
vices and applications.
• Platform attestation to external entities.
3.4 Trusted Platform Module
The TCG specifications [92, 93, 94] require each TP to include an additional
inexpensive hardware chip to establish trust in that platform. This chip, which
has protected storage and protected capabilities, is referred to as the Trusted
Platform Module (TPM). In order to reduce TPM cost, the TCG specifications
only require the TPM to be used for functions requiring protected storage and
capabilities. Functions that do not require protected storage and capabilities
can run using the platform main processor and memory space. TPMs are cur-
rently produced by a range of microelectronics manufacturers, including Atmel2,
Broadcom3, Infineon4, ST-Microelectronics5 and Winbond6.
A TPM incorporates various functional components and features including:
I/O; a cryptographic co-processor that supports the following operations: asym-
metric key generation, asymmetric encryption/decryption, hashing and random
number generation; generation, storage and protection of cryptographic keys; an
HMAC engine; a SHA-1 engine; power detection; non-volatile memory; volatile
memory; platform configuration registers (PCRs), i.e. shielded locations inside
the TPM used to store integrity measurements; and an opt-in component that
allows the TPM to be turned on/off, enabled/disabled, activated/deactivated.
2www.atmel.com/dyn/resources/prod documents/doc5010.pdf
3www.broadcom.com/press/release.php?id=700509
4www.infineon.com/tpm
5www.st.com/stonline/products/literature/bd/10926.pdf
6www.winbondusa.com/
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No remote entity should be able to change the TPM status without either the
knowledge of the TPM Owner or the physical presence of an Operator at the
platform.
Every TPM has a statistically unique endorsement key pair (EK), which is gen-
erated and stored in the TPM at the time of production by the manufacturer.
This key can be generated either internally or using an external key generator.
It is used only for encryption/decryption purposes. The private decryption en-
dorsement key is known only to the TPM and never revealed outside the TPM.
The EK can only be used when assigning TPM ownership, and to support the
creation and verification of Attestation Identity Keys (AIKs). AIKs (which are
signature key pairs) function as aliases for the TP; they are generated by the
TPM, and the public part is included in a certificate known as an Identity Cre-
dential, signed by a trusted third party called a privacy certification authority
(privacy CA). The identity credential asserts that the (public part of the) AIK
belongs to a TP with specified properties, without revealing which TP the key
belongs to. Before generating an identity credential, the privacy CA verifies a
series of signed credentials belonging to the platform, including the endorsement
credential, conformance credential and platform credential. These latter creden-
tials are used to guarantee that an EK belongs to a particular TPM, attest that
a TP design meets the TCG specifications, and that a particular platform is
an instantiation of a TP design as described in the conformance credentials,
respectively. AIKs are used to sign data generated inside the TPM, including
the values of PCRs which hold measurements of platform state. AIKs can also
be used to sign other keys.
A Privacy CA generates certificates for a TPM, while preserving the privacy
of the user of the platform that contains the TPM. The use of a Privacy CA
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gives rise to certain operational and privacy concerns, as discussed in [18]. A
Privacy CA needs to be as secure as any other certification authority, including
those that normally operate off-line. In addition, if a privacy CA and a verifier
collude, then they can link requests coming from the same platform. As a result
of this latter privacy concern, the TCG has adopted the Direct Anonymous
Attestation technique (DAA), which has the following features, as discussed in
[18]: “DAA can be seen as a group signature without the feature that a signature
can be opened, i.e., the anonymity is not revocable. Moreover, DAA allows for
pseudonyms, i.e., for each signature a user (in agreement with the recipient
of the signature) can decide whether or not the signature should be linkable to
another signature. DAA furthermore allows for detection of known keys: if the
DAA secret keys are extracted from a TPM and published, a verifier can detect
that a signature was produced using these secret keys. The scheme is provably
secure in the random oracle model under the strong RSA and the decisional
Diffie-Hellman assumption”.
Once a TPM has been assigned an owner, it generates a new Storage Root
Key pair (SRK), which is used to protect all TPM keys, apart from the EK.
The private part of the storage root key pair is stored inside the TPM, and is
never disclosed by the TPM. Other TPM objects (key objects or data objects)
are protected using keys that are ultimately protected by the SRK in a tree
hierarchy.
A TPM can generate two types of keys, known as migratable and non-migratable
keys. Migratable keys can be transmitted to other TPs if authorised by both a
selected trusted authority and the TPM owner. A non-migratable key, on the
other hand, is bound to the TP that created it, and cannot be cloned.
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Each object protected by a TPM includes a secret, which is known as AuthData.
Proving the knowledge of the value of the AuthData associated with an object
grants access to that object.
3.5 Establishment of Trust
An important step in the establishment of trust in a TP is to know the origin
and history of the components that make-up a TP. Such knowledge can be
derived from statements made by trustworthy entities, whose authors stand to
lose, for example, their reputation, brand name, revenue, etc., if they do not
implement a TP according to the claimed specifications. The following entities
are involved in establishing trust.
• A trusted platform module entity (TPME) attests that a particular TPM
is genuine by digitally signing an endorsement credential containing the
public EK belonging to a particular TPM. The TPME is likely to be the
TPM manufacturer.
• A conformance entity (CE) attests that a TP design, i.e. the design of
the TPM and other trusted platform building blocks, when integrated
into a particular design of platform, meets the TCG specifications. This
is achieved by digitally signing conformance credentials. The method of
integrating a TPM into a platform must also satisfy the requirements
outlined by the TCG.
• A platform entity (PE) guarantees, through the generation and signing
of a platform credential, that a particular platform is an instantiation of
a TP design, as described in specified conformance credentials. The PE
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may be the equipment manufacturer.
• A validation entity (VE), typically a component supplier, produces vali-
dation certificates, each of which certifies a software component’s integrity
measurements. The integrity measurements correspond to a correctly
functioning platform component (i.e. a piece of software). These valida-
tion certificates are used by a challenger wishing to evaluate the state of
a challenged TP.
• A privacy CA is responsible for certifying AIKs, i.e. generating Identity
Certificates confirming that a particular AIK belongs to a genuine TP.
3.6 Roots of Trust
A TP incorporates three roots of trust: a root of trust for measurement (RTM),
a root of trust for storage (RTS), and a root of trust for reporting (RTR). The
TCG defines roots of trust as “something that we accept as trustworthy because
we have to do so for practical purposes and because we accept that its author
or creator has properly designed and implemented it. We also accept a Root of
Trust because its author or creator stands to lose (e.g. brand name, revenue,
legal, etc.) if they did not implement it according to its specifications” [91]. We
next outline the roles of these three roots of trust.
The RTM is a computing engine capable of making reliable integrity measure-
ments (i.e. measurements of the code running on the TP), and is controlled by a
particular instruction set, i.e. the core root of trust for measurement (CRTM),
which is, ideally, stored inside the TPM. The CRTM is responsible for measur-
ing the first piece of software to be executed during system boot, passes the
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measurement result to the RTS that records the result in the TPM PCRs, and
then passes control to the next piece of software to be executed, which has a
measurement agent (MA) embedded within it. This MA measures the next
piece of software to be executed, passes the result to the RTS that records the
result in the TPM PCRs, and passes control to the next piece of software to be
executed, and so on. MAs are used to build up a chain of trust in the form of
a series of integrity measurements. The results of integrity measurements made
by the CRTM and MAs are known as measurement events; these are made up
of two classes of data: measured values, which are representations of embed-
ded data or program code, and measurement digests, which are hashes of the
measured values. The measurement digests are stored in the TPM PCRs. The
measurement values are stored in the stored measurement log (SML), which is
stored outside the TPM.
The RTS provides confidentiality for, and integrity protection of, keys and data
that are held on external untrusted storage devices. The RTS also provides
mechanisms to ensure that the release of information only occurs if the current
platform state matches that are associated with the stored object. The RTR
is a computing engine capable of reporting a TP integrity state, protecting
reported values, and establishing a context for attesting to the reported values,
as described in the next section.
3.7 Integrity Reporting and Verification
Establishing trust in a TP is based on the mechanisms used for measuring,
reporting and verifying platform integrity metrics. TCG defines integrity man-
agement as “the management of component-information throughout the supply
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chain to ensure their integrity (tamper-free state) and also to the management of
the runtime integrity of the entire Trusted Platform through the correct manage-
ment of its components, both at load-time and at runtime” [91]. As described in
section 3.6, TP measurements are performed using the RTM, which measures
software components running on a TP. The RTS stores these measurements
inside TPM shielded locations. Next, the RTR mechanism allows TP mea-
surements to be reliably communicated to an external entity in the form of an
integrity report. The integrity report is signed using an AIK private key, and is
sent with the appropriate identity credential. This enables a Verifier to be sure
that an integrity report is bound to a genuine TPM. The term measurement is
used in various ways, as described below.
1. Loadtime measurements refer to integrity measurements of TP compo-
nents made whilst the platform is booting-up.
2. Runtime measurements refer to integrity measurements of TP components
that are generated during the operation of the platform, i.e. after the end
of a boot-up sequence.
3. Reference measurements refer to a collection of digest values of TP compo-
nents, each of which must be collected from the component manufacturer.
This provides an authoritative source of component integrity information,
which can be read by a verifier of the state of a TP.
For example, assume a requestor TP is seeking a service from a verifier. The
requestor sends a request to the verifier. The verifier then asks the requestor to
perform an integrity measurement of the entire platform (using the requestor’s
RTM). The requestor returns a platform integrity report to the verifier (using
the RTR). The verifier also gets the authoritative information, i.e. the Reference
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Measurements, for each component of the requestor’s platform from its manufac-
turer. The integrity metric provider, e.g. the hardware manufacturer or software
vendor, makes these Reference Measurements accessible. In this way, the ver-
ifier knows both the current integrity-status of the component making-up the
Requestor’s platform, as well as the source-authenticity of those components
(as coming from the manufacturer). The verifier then needs to identify each
component of the requestor’s platform and compare the reported measurement
against the expected reference measurement value (for each component). If the
result is positive, the verifier can provide the requested service.
The integrity measurements stored in a TPM’s PCRs are also used in the pro-
tected storage mechanism. This is achieved by comparing the current PCR
values with the intended PCR values stored with the data object. If the two
values are consistent, access is then granted and data is unsealed.
3.8 Challenges in TCG Specifications
The TCG specifications, as discussed in this chapter, are based on certain as-
sumptions. Building a system that can satisfy these assumptions using today’s
hardware devices and operating systems is a technical challenge, and is the sub-
ject of ongoing research. The following list, based on that given by Sadeghi [84],
summarises these challenges.
• The TCG specifications assume that platform configurations cannot be
manipulated after the corresponding hash values have been computed and
stored in the TPM’s PCRs. Satisfying this assumption requires a secure
operating system that is especially designed to consider this requirement.
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Currently available operating systems can easily be modified, e.g. by ex-
ploiting security bugs.
• As discussed earlier in this chapter, a verifier can determine the trustwor-
thiness of code from hash values (binary measurements of running code).
Such a binary based attestation mechanism has the following shortcom-
ings.
– It reveals information about the platform’s hardware and software
configuration to a verifier.
– It allows remote parties to exclude certain system configurations.
– It requires the verifier to know all possible trusted configurations of
all platforms.
– Most importantly, updates in firmware or software, or hardware mi-
grations, result in changed hash values for the updated components.
This, in turn, prevents access to data bound to the previous config-
uration.
In principle attestation should only determine whether a system/component
configuration has a desired property. Several methods have been proposed
to meet this requirement, such as property-based attestation [1, 59, 85],
anonymous property-based attestation [22], and semantic remote attesta-
tion using language-based trusted virtual machines [38].
• The TCG specifications implicitly require the establishment of secure
channels between hardware components. TPM chips integrated into cur-
rently available devices are connected to the I/O board with an unpro-
tected interface that can be eavesdropped upon and manipulated [61].
Secure channels between hardware components can be established using
cryptographic mechanisms supported by an appropriate PKI.
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In [58, 66] many of the above problems are addressed. However, some of the
proposed solutions require changes to the TPM specifications. The challenge re-
mains to reduce the complexity of the TPM, but still have appropriate solutions
to the problems discussed in this section.
3.9 Summary
Current PCs possess major security vulnerabilities, as their original design did
not take into account their connection to large networks. Therefore, there is a
need to design a trusted platform for which a verifier, locally or remotely, can
verify its running state. A trusted platform complying with the TCG specifica-
tions enforces a policy-neutral access control mechanism, which could be used
to help build a secure application. For example, trusted platforms could be used
to help build a secure DRM system, although a trusted platform is not itself a
DRM system.
In this chapter we outlined the main functionality of trusted platforms based
on the TCG specifications. The TPM, which is the core component of a TCG
compliant platform, can be conveniently integrated into consumer devices as it
is not expensive, does not result in increased device size, and does not intro-
duce new vulnerabilities into end user computing equipment. Moreover, in this
chapter we outlined the mechanisms behind platform integrity reporting and
validation. This chapter also outlines the main challenges underneath the TCG
specifications.
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This chapter provides an overview of Digital Rights Management (DRM). We
introduce the main entities and workflow in a typical DRM system; this model
underlies the discussions throughout the remainder of the thesis. We then give
some examples of languages that are used to construct licence files. Finally, we
develop a comprehensive list of DRM requirements from the points of view of
users, content providers and copyright law.
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4.1 What is DRM?
DRM can be defined as the technologies that collectively support all stages in the
lifecycle of digital content creation, manipulation, distribution and consumption,
by preventing illegal copying and allowing the imposition of fees, processing of
payments, and protection of principal rights and profits [43].
The problem of piracy of digital content is expected to escalate with time, so
finding a solution in the near future is essential [16, 37]. However, for a DRM
solution to succeed it should satisfy consumer expectations, and it should not
prevent users from freely using content that they have legitimately obtained
rights to access. In addition, a DRM system should satisfy requirements imposed
by copyright law.
The INformed DIalogue about Consumer Acceptability of DRM Solutions in
Europe (INDICARE) project [40] has found that applying 100% protection is
not always the objective of content providers, for two main reasons. First,
security and convenience are often opposing concepts, and many consumers
choose convenience over security. Second, in many cases there are sound business
reasons for allowing some users to use pirated copies of content. For example, in
the case of software products, businesses may believe that some classes of user
may not be able to afford to pay for their product; in such a case not preventing
such users from using pirated versions will not significantly affect sales revenue.
Indeed, through use of the product the pirate users may become accustomed to
it, and, as a result, are both more likely to pay for a legitimate copy when they
are able, and less likely to use a competitor product.
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4.2 DRM Model
There is no common standard for DRM based solutions, as different DRM ven-
dors employ different systems (see, for example, [69, 62, 74, 88]). However,
most DRM systems incorporate five main types of entity: content owners, con-
tent distributors, rights issuers, electronic payment processors, and consumers,
who are the ultimate users of content. In this section we briefly outline the role
of each of these entities.
A content owner is the entity which holds the rights to the content, and is the
party most interested in protecting and enforcing copyright law. The content
owner may be the content creator, or may have purchased rights to the content
from the creator. A content owner will typically need to negotiate an agreement
with a content distributor and rights issuer in order to establish content usage
rules and charges. This enables a content distributor to sell content on behalf
of the content owner with some means of obtaining a return.
A content distributor is typically responsible for the following functions; this
list is based on that given in [88].
• Generating packaged content in a form that is suitable for consumption.
• Uniquely identifying content by associating it with a unique identifier.
• Facilitating the delivery of content oﬄine, e.g. using CDs and DVDs, or
online, e.g. using the Internet.
• Supporting an appropriate e-payment method for content usage, e.g. using
different tariffs for different types of content consumption and a variety of
means for pricing and payments (e.g., including micropayments).
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• Facilitation of the customisation of content to the preferences of the con-
sumer, to enable interoperation, and to support multiple content formats
in a transparent manner.
• Acting as an intermediary in communications between consumers, content
owners, rights issuers and electronic payment processors.
A rights issuer is responsible for protecting content from misuse by associating
each copy of the content with a licence file, also known as a rights object.
This rights object specifies the access rights available to the consumer for the
associated content. A rights object syntax and semantics for specifying rights
objects needs to be chosen, in the form of a Rights Expression Language (REL),
as discussed in section 4.4.
A content distributor and a rights issuer might be a single entity or two separate
entities. In the latter case, they need to have an agreement that covers the terms
and conditions for issuing content rights objects.
An Electronic Payment Processor arranges the transfer of an agreed fee
from the consumer to the content distributor. The payment processor software
agent is typically either integrated into a content distributor website, or a con-
tent distributor redirects consumer browsers to a third party payment processor
to handle the required financial transactions.
4.3 DRM Workflow
In this section we describe the workflow in a typical DRM system; we give
the description in the context of a scenario for selling content, as outlined in
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Figure 4.1: A DRM System Workflow
Figure 4.1. A content owner creates content C. If C is not in digital form, then
the content owner needs to digitise it. This can be done either by the content
owner itself, or, alternatively, by a content distributor (possibly for an agreed
fee). The content owner transfers C to the content distributor. The content
distributor generates a unique identifier, say id, and binds it to C. In order to
track unlawful use, the content distributor may also add a label to the content
itself by some means, so that the content is indelibly associated with the licence
holder, e.g. using watermarking and/or fingerprinting (see, for example, [77]).
Next, the content distributor protects C, for example by symmetrically encrypt-
ing C using a content-specific secret key, which is added to a “trial” rights object
R. R is created by the rights issuer, and incorporates: a content identifier id, the
content-specific encryption key, and content consumption rules. The content-
specific encryption key is protected inside R, for example by encrypting it with
a key that is protected with either software or hardware mechanisms at the
destination device. Content consumption rules defined in R should be enforced
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by a trusted agent running on a consumer device. These rules enable consumers
to use C for a trial period, e.g. a consumer can play a song three times and/or
cannot forward it to others, the rights expire after one month of first use, or
printing is disabled. The content distributor publishes a protected version of
C, typically via a web server. A consumer browses content by contacting the
content distributor web server, and then sends a request to download a trial
version of C, as identified by id. The content distributor checks the consumer
device to ensure it is trusted enough to enforce the usage rules of the rights ob-
ject. If the validation succeeds, the content distributor authorises the consumer
to download C associated with R. The consumer can then download C and R.
Later on, if the consumer decides to buy a usage licence for C, he/she contacts
the content distributor and request a licence for C, as identified by id. The con-
tent distributor collects payment from the consumer, as outlined in section 4.2,
either by redirecting the customer browser to a third party payment processor,
or by using a payment service integrated into its web server. At some later time
(or perhaps even in advance) a financial transfer is made from the distributor
to the owner for the sale of some number of copies of the content. Once pay-
ment is collected from the consumer, the content distributor instructs the rights
issuer to generate a rights object for this consumer. The rights issuer creates a
rights object containing appropriate rights, and then authorises the consumer to
download it (note that the consumer does not need to re-download C). Ideally,
the consumer should now be able to use C on all devices he/she owns.
However, only encrypted content can be transferred to devices owned by some-
one else. In this case, the receiver must contact the corresponding rights issuer
to either download a trial rights object or buy a usage licence, as described
above. This concept is known as Superdistribution, as proposed by the Open
50
4. Fundamentals of Digital Rights Management
Mobile Alliance (OMA) [74]. OMA is a standards body which develops open
standards for the mobile phone industry.
OMA defines Superdisribution as “a mechanism that (1) allows a User to distrib-
ute Protected Content to other Devices through potentially insecure channels and
(2) enables the User of that Device to obtain a rights object for the superdistrib-
uted Protected Content”. The separation of content from rights objects allows
the content to be distributed or downloaded freely. However content cannot be
consumed without a valid rights object. The rights object specifies the ways in
which the associated content is permitted to be accessed.
4.4 Rights Expression Languages
A Rights Expression Language (REL) is used to specify the syntax and seman-
tics of rights objects, which contain rules governing the use and distribution of
associated content. Two commonly discussed RELs are the Open Digital Rights
Language (ODRL1), and the Extensible Rights Markup Language (XrML2). A
rights object file consists of content consumption rules written using such a
REL. Examples of REL elements are as follows.
• Agreement expresses the permissions granted over content.
• Permission specifies the rights over a piece of content, such as display,
print, play, execute, lend, modify, or delete.
• Constraints set restrictions on the permissions by providing fine-grained
consumption control for content, e.g. by specifying a count, specifying the
1http://odrl.net/
2http://www.xrml.org/
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number of times a permission is granted, and/or date/time, specifying a
time limit for permission. For example, the REL may specify that a piece
of music can be played a maximum of 10 times (i.e. a count constraint)
for a period of one month (i.e. a time constraint).
4.5 DRM System Requirements
In order for a DRM system to succeed it should be acceptable from the points
of view of consumers, content distributors and copyright law. This section
presents an ideal list of DRM requirements, which are derived from those given
in [16, 69, 40, 80, 86].
1. Minimum cost, especially on low-cost devices. Digital rights management
is not a feature required by consumers. When purchasing a digital render-
ing device, a consumer is not interested in paying more for DRM technol-
ogy. Consequently, the cost of this functionality should be covered by the
main beneficiaries of the DRM systems, namely digital content distribu-
tors.
2. Ease of use. A DRM system should be designed to be transparent from
the user’s point of view; consumers are likely to reject systems that add
extra complexity.
3. Performance. The system should work reasonably quickly; an excellent
but slow DRM system is likely to be rejected by end users.
4. Content mobility. It should be possible to move content between consumer
devices without requiring new licences for every device.
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5. Lack of dependence on network infrastructure. A DRM solution should not
require continuous network connectivity across domain devices. Typically,
it will not be the case that all user devices are interconnected. For exam-
ple, car CD players, MP3 players and other mobile devices are unlikely to
be permanently interconnected.
6. Lack of dependence on a secure clock. A DRM system should not require
the presence of secure clocks in devices. Some devices, such as CD players,
do not always have an integrated clock. In addition, adding clocks to all
devices increases system cost.
7. Cryptographic robustness. The cryptographic algorithms used in the sys-
tem should be cryptographically strong, to provide robust protection against
attacks such as brute force, dictionary analysis, reverse engineering, etc.
8. Ease of recovery. Recovering after a DRM system failure should be conve-
nient and incur minimal cost. System failures could arise both accidentally
and as a result of malicious software (e.g. viruses).
9. Robust content protection. Content owners need to be assured that their
digital assets are protected, in order to be convinced to release their con-
tent to end user devices. Satisfying this requirement automatically implies
satisfying requirement (7).
10. Flexible rights structure. Content providers need to be able to control
content consumption based on licence files provided by a rights issuer.
The licence file format should support flexible content management; for
example a rights issuer should be able to specify content expiry time, how
frequently and how long content can be used, and if content can be lent
or re-sold, etc.
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11. Simple key management. A DRM solution will typically use cryptographic
keys to protect content while it is stored and transferred. Key management
— including creation, update, validation and revocation of keys — should
be easy to use and almost transparent to consumers, who generally have
very limited knowledge of the subject.
12. Flexible Revocation Mechanism. If required, a key revocation mechanism
needs to be designed in such a way that it does not require all devices to
be connected to the network. Most devices are unlikely to be connected to
the network all the time. A key revocation mechanism should be capable
of adapting to varying device characteristics and network connectivity. In
addition, a revocation list should be accessible, and should not require the
download of large volume of data into consumer devices.
In addition to the above requirements, additional requirements can be derived
from copyright law; we summarise those given in [40].
13. Access to and Usage of Content. A DRM system should respect the usage
expectations that consumers have, or that are given by copyright laws,
such as “fair use”. Fair use is a doctrine in United States copyright law3,
which means4 Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 106A,
the fair use of a copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in
copies or phonorecords or by any other means specified by that section, for
purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including
multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an in-
fringement of copyright. In determining whether the use made of a work in
3http://www.copyright.gov/title17/92chap1.html
4The fair use definition is extracted from United States copyright law, which can be found
at http://www.copyright.gov/title17/92chap1.html
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any particular case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall include:
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is
of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work. The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself
bar a finding of fair use if such finding is made upon consideration
of all the above factors.
14. Consumer Privacy. A DRM system may enable content providers to mon-
itor private consumption of content, create reports of consumption, and
profile users. In addition, some revocation mechanisms only work if in-
tensive monitoring of consumer use of devices and content is possible. As
a result, privacy protection for end users is a serious issue. Implementing
anonymous access can reduce the impact of this problem. In addition,
DRM systems should comply with data protection legislation in the rele-
vant countries (e.g. the UK Data Protection Act5).
15. Interoperability. Content should be accessible on different platforms and
devices belonging to the same owner, and a DRM system should avoid
platform lock-in.
16. Security and Hardware Issues. DRM system software should not limit
the use of other protection software on consumer computers. In general,
consumers should not be required to use immature DRM technology. Also,
a DRM system should not introduce new vulnerabilities into end user
5http://www.opsi.gov.uk/ACTS/acts1998/19980029.htm
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computing equipment. In addition, a DRM system must enable consumers
to set their own policy and level of security for their machines.
4.6 Summary
Currently there are many DRM systems, which do not adhere to any single
standard. Nevertheless, these systems have certain common components, and
in most cases have much the same workflow. In this chapter we have described
the basic components of a typical DRM system. We started by defining what
we mean by DRM. We then defined the main roles in a DRM system, and
described the interactions between them. Next, we provided two examples of
rights expression languages, used to express rules governing content use and
management.
For a DRM-based solution to have a future depends not only on the acceptance
of the system by content owners, but also, and probably most importantly,
its acceptance by consumers. Hence, in this chapter we have proposed a list of
requirements for an ‘ideal’ DRM system from the points of view of users, content
owners, and copyright law. This list covers the fundamental requirements that
need to be met if a DRM system is to be successful. In the remainder of this
thesis we use this list to assess both existing and novel DRM schemes.
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This chapter assesses DRM systems using the ideal list of DRM requirements
given in chapter 4; we analyse six of the most widely discussed schemes for
protecting digital assets within authorised domains. Based on this analysis, we
provide our own definition of content piracy, and conclude that all the analysed
schemes have problems in addressing the fundamental DRM requirements. In
addition, all the analysed schemes have major security and usability limitations
in addressing the authorised domain concept. Most of the material in this chap-
ter was previously published in [8].
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5.1 Analysis of Existing Schemes
A number of schemes have been proposed to try to solve the problem of pro-
tecting proprietary content in personal networks. In this chapter we summarise
and analyse six of the most widely discussed such schemes. The primary crite-
rion that was used to select these schemes was whether or not they implement
the concept of an authorised domain. There are a large number of other DRM
schemes; however, many such schemes do not address the authorised domain
concept, and only focus on binding a licence to a single device. Such schemes
are not considered here, as they do not address the core theme of this the-
sis. Nevertheless, such schemes (including some of the schemes discussed in this
chapter) could be integrated with the systems proposed in later chapters, to pro-
vide means for downloading content from content distributors to an authorised
domain.
5.1.1 OMA DRM
The OMA DRM v2 system was proposed by the Open Mobile Alliance (OMA)
[74]. It provides mechanisms for secure authentication of trusted DRM agents
running on consumer devices; these agents are trusted to enforce the DRM
policies associated with the content they render. In addition, it provides secure
packaging of content, and transfer of content and usage rights to the trusted
DRM agent.
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5.1.1.1 System Overview
A part of the OMA specifications that relates to this thesis is that concerned
with the “Domain Concept”. In each domain, copyrighted content can be ren-
dered on any device in that domain, and only one licence per domain is required.
Domain owners must register all their devices with all the rights issuers (RIs)
whose content they wish to access. The device may join multiple domains
managed by one or more RIs. A domain is associated with a unique domain
identifier and a domain generation number.
Each RI is in charge of creating domains, managing domain keys, and control-
ling which and how many devices are included in a domain. Once a device has
successfully joined a domain, the RI sends to the device the domain key, the
domain identifier, and the domain expiry time. If a domain key has been com-
promised or a device is revoked, then the RI increments the relevant domain
generation number and changes the domain key.
The system has the following operational requirements:
1. Each device has a public/private key pair certified by a certification au-
thority (CA), and which is installed at the time of manufacture. In ad-
dition, the integrity of the key pair and the confidentiality of the private
key must be protected when stored on the device.
2. Each RI has a public/private key pair certified by the CA.
3. The CA must provides an online certificate status protocol (OCSP) ser-
vice, [70].
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Content is transferred from distributors to a domain as follows:
1. A content distributor packages content in a secure content container using
the DRM Content Format (DCF). Each item of content is encrypted using
a secret content encryption key (CEK).
2. The RI generates a rights object that contain the permissions, constraints
and CEK associated with the corresponding item of content. The rights
object is cryptographically bound to the target domain by encrypting the
CEK using the domain secret key, and then signing the rights object using
the RI signing key.
3. The rights object and the DCF can be delivered to the target device either
together or separately.
5.1.1.2 Analysis
We now analyse the OMA DRM scheme using the list of requirements given in
section 4.5.
1. Minimum cost. Each device needs to securely store the domain keys,
domain identifiers and domain expiry time provided by the RI for each
domain that it joins. Extra secure storage is needed to store these keys,
which potentially increases the cost and complexity of a device.
Each RI is required to define domains, manage domain keys, and control
which and how many devices are included in a domain. This in turn
increases the overall complexity and maintenance costs imposed on RIs.
2. Ease of use. In order for domain devices to use all content in a domain,
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they must join all the relevant RIs. This is not user friendly, and makes
administration complex from the user’s perspective.
If a device in a domain is hacked, new domain keys are generated by all RIs
from whom content has been obtained. These keys must be transferred
to all registered domain devices (except, of course, for revoked devices).
This means that the domain owner must update the keys on all devices
for all RIs, which is not user friendly.
3. Performance. Content is encrypted using a secret key, which is itself en-
crypted using the domain key associated with the corresponding RI. This
means that the bulk of encryption is done using a symmetric algorithm,
that is typically much faster than an asymmetric algorithm.
4. Content mobility. Each item of content is encrypted using a key stored
inside an associated rights object, which is itself encrypted using the do-
main key associated with the corresponding RI. Therefore, content can be
freely moved between domain devices, as long as they are registered with
the RIs who have provided the content.
5. Lack of dependence on network infrastructure. Network key distribution
requires all devices to be connected to all the RIs which have provided
content, but not simultaneously.
6. Lack of dependence on a secure clock. Nonces are used to provide message
timeliness.
7. Cryptographic robustness. OMA uses the RSA-KEM-KWS asymmetric
encryption scheme, as defined in ISO/IEC 18033-2 [50].
8. Ease of recovery. The case of hacking of a device is addressed in point
(2). Backup and recovery of domain keys does not need to be done by the
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consumer, as all domain keys are stored by RIs. However, recovery does
require connecting all domain devices to all the RIs from which content
has been obtained.
9. Robust content protection. There is no mechanism to control who owns
the devices assigned to a domain. For example, a set of devices belonging
to a number of different users might join domain A, and the same devices
could also join domain B. This means that a device owner could access
protected content in unauthorised ways by adding the device to multiple
domains.
10. Flexible rights structure. A rights object containing content usage rules is
associated with each piece of content.
11. Simple key management. This requirement is addressed in points (1) and
(2).
12. Flexible Revocation Mechanism. An OCSP server can be queried to check
whether device certificates have been revoked.
13. Access to and Usage of Content. This requirement is not addressed.
14. Consumer Privacy. All RIs store sensitive information about consumer
domains, such as device public keys and digital content usage. This enables
RIs to track the usage patterns of domain owners, which potentially raises
major privacy concerns.
15. Interoperability. The scheme can run on a variety of platforms.
16. Security and Hardware Issues. The scheme does not interfere with device
security settings.
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5.1.2 eXtensible Content Protection (xCP)
The eXtensible Content Protection (xCP) scheme was proposed by IBM [44].
This scheme is designed to enable proprietary digital content to move freely
around a home network, without the need to purchase separate licences for each
device.
5.1.2.1 System Overview
The xCP content protection mechanism uses a technique known as broadcast
encryption, proposed by Fiat and Naor in 1994 [32]. Broadcast encryption
allows a set of devices to share a common secret sent by a broadcast centre to a
group of privileged devices, using a one-way communication method. Broadcast
encryption is based on symmetric encryption, and thus may be up to 1000
times less resource expensive than public key encryption techniques; however, it
requires more storage at both the transmission centre and on user devices [64].
In xCP, only compliant devices (e.g. players, recorders) can join a consumer
domain, where compliant devices are those that always enforce the DRM policies
associated with the content they render. Each piece of content is encrypted with
a unique key called a title key. Title keys are encrypted using a domain Master
Key (MK). The MK is calculated as a cryptographic hash of the media key,
network binding ID, and network authorisation table.
The network binding ID is generated by the first device that establishes a
consumer domain. The network authorisation table is a file designed to pro-
tect against man-in-the-middle attacks [44]. Adding a new device to a domain
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changes the network authorisation table, which in turns changes the MK.
A Media Key Block (MKB) is a table of encrypted values that is provided by
licensed media manufacturers. A compliant device is given a unique set of keys
by licensed media manufacturers, which enables it to calculate the media key
from the MKB by performing a complex sequence of mathematical operations.
Whenever a device is revoked (i.e. becomes non-compliant), licensed media man-
ufacturers distribute a new MKB to exclude the revoked device’s set of keys.
As a result, a non-compliant device will be unable to calculate the media key.
Whenever a new MKB is introduced into a personal domain, the media key
changes, which in turns changes the MK.
When a device is instructed to join a consumer domain, it indicates its type,
calculates the media key, and then computes a Message Authentication Code
(MAC) using the media key as the MAC algorithm secret key. The domain
authoriser checks the MAC, checks the network authorisation table, and checks
whether the maximum number of allowed devices has been reached. If the device
is accepted, it is sent the MK. As a result, at this point all the content title keys
need to be re-encrypted.
5.1.2.2 Analysis
We now analyse the xCP scheme using the list of requirements given in section
4.5.
1. Minimum cost. The broadcast encryption protocol requires a licensing
agency to produce the MKB and assign device keys [64]. Moreover, devices
must be capable of processing the MKB to produce the MK. Each device
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in the domain requires tamper-resistant storage to store the MK and the
set of keys assigned by licensed media manufacturers. These requirements
have the effect of increasing the overall cost of the system.
2. Ease of use. Limiting the number of devices that can be added to a
domain makes the system less flexible for the consumer, who may not
be able to add as many devices as he/she might wish. More specifically,
it is potentially very inconvenient for a consumer who already has the
maximum number of devices in his/her domain, if he/she is required to
remove a device from the domain before a new device can be added.
3. Performance. The MKB is a large data structure, and hence moving it
between devices and using it to generate the media key imposes a signifi-
cant overhead, especially on devices that have limited capabilities. Every
time the domain membership changes, or a new MKB is released, the MK
must be changed. Consequently, the content title keys will need to be
re-encrypted with the new MK, which means that all content and associ-
ated title keys must be tracked. One possibility is to have a database on
each device showing the location of all encrypted content. This imposes
additional administrative, storage and processing costs. This could result
in a significant overhead if the number of items of content is large.
4. Content mobility. Each piece of content is encrypted with a content ti-
tle key, which is encrypted with the MK that is shared between domain
devices. Hence, content can be rendered on all domain devices.
5. Lack of dependence on network infrastructure. Every time the domain
membership changes, or a new MKB is released, the MK must be changed.
All devices must be online to obtain the new MK. It is potentially difficult
for some devices to be online (e.g., a car CD Player).
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6. Lack of dependence on a secure clock. The xCP scheme does not require
a secure clock.
7. Cryptographic robustness. The published description of the scheme [44]
does not provide enough information to evaluate this requirement. For ex-
ample, the encryption algorithm and the MK and content title key lengths
are not specified.
8. Ease of recovery. If the system is hacked, a new MKB is released that
excludes keys for non-compliant devices. However, a method for recovery
of domain keys and content in the event of a system failure has not been
proposed.
9. Robust content protection. Devices in a domain exchange content by en-
crypting it with the content title key, which is then encrypted with the
MK. There is no binding between the MK and a domain owner. This
means that a device not owned by the domain owner could be added to
the domain, as long as this device has not been revoked and the maximum
number of devices in the domain has not exceeded a pre-specified limit.
It is not clear from the description of the scheme how domain keys are
stored on domain devices. If the domain keys are not protected, then this
could enable the MK to be revealed, which would enable unauthorised
access to unprotected content.
10. Flexible rights structure. This requirement is not addressed.
11. Simple key management. Key management is transparent to users.
12. Flexible Revocation Mechanism. This requirement is discussed in point
(8).
13. Access to and Usage of Content. This requirement is not addressed.
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14. Consumer Privacy. It is not clear whether this requirement is addressed.
15. Interoperability. The scheme can run on a variety of platforms.
16. Security and Hardware Issues. The scheme does not interfere with device
security settings.
5.1.3 SmartRight
The SmartRight scheme [89] is a copy protection system for digital home net-
works that is combined with a Conditional Access System (CAS), i.e. a DRM
system. SmartRight security involves use of a smart card that is attached to
presentation functionality, and that enables or disables de-scrambling of digi-
tal content transferred from the producer to the consumer. This presentation
functionality is used to access the received digital content.
5.1.3.1 System Overview
The SmartRight system has two protection domains: the first domain protects
content while it is being delivered to the Personal Private Network (PPN), while
the second domain protects content after it enters the PPN. The operation of
the first domain is outside the scope of this thesis. The second domain has three
main functionalities: protection of content while it is being accessed, protection
of content while it is being presented and exported to other systems in the PPN,
and protection of content while it is stored in the PPN devices. The three sets
of functionality could coexist on a single device or be implemented separately
on two or more device(s). The SmartRight system uses smart cards that hold
the necessary secret keys. Two types of smart cards are available: Converter
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cards for the content access role, and Terminal cards for the presentation role.
Each Terminal card holds a card-specific unique public/private key pair, the
SmartRight certification authority public key, and a secret network key. The
network key is generated using a random number generator by the first device
joining the PPN that possesses presentation functionality. The network key is
securely transmitted to each Terminal card joining the PPN, in such a way that
the network key is transmitted only by the most recently installed Terminal
card. It is not clear from [89] whether the network key is fixed, or is updated
every time a Terminal card is added to, or removed from, the PPN; and thus, in
section 5.1.3.2 we analyse the pros and cons of the scheme both if the network
key is fixed and if the network key is changeable. Content cannot be shared
between different PPNs, as each PPN has a different network key.
SmartRight domain control involves limiting the number of Terminal cards join-
ing a PPN. This is controlled using a counter that is stored in each Terminal
card and that is initialised to the default maximum value. Every time a new
Terminal card joins the PPN, the value of the counter is decremented by one,
and the new counter value is transferred to the joining Terminal card. When
the value of the counter is zero, no more Terminal cards can join the PPN.
A data structure called the Local Enforcement Copy Management (LECM),
carries information relevant to content protection and usage.
For each item of locally held content, the LECM holds a distinct key (the LECM
key), generated using a random number generator. The LECM key is encrypted
with the network key, and is used to encrypt content-specific de-scrambling in-
formation used to access content, and, in addition, to encrypt a specific infor-
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mation used to handle view-only content. Whenever a new Terminal card joins
the PPN, the LECM key is changed.
A LECM contains the following information for each item of content: version
information, content type (video, audio), SmartRight usage state (copy-free,
private-copy or view-only), content protection rules, the encrypted value of the
LECM key, content de-scrambling information, and specific information used to
handle view-only content.
The presentation functionality extracts the LECM from the stream and passes
it to the Terminal card. The Terminal card extracts the encrypted LECM key
from the LECM and decrypts it using the PPN network key. The LECM key is
used to decrypt the content de-scrambling information. To render content, the
Terminal card securely transmits the de-scrambling information to the presen-
tation functionality.
5.1.3.2 Analysis
We now analyse the SmartRight scheme using the list of requirements given in
section 4.5.
1. Minimum cost. In order for a device to join a PPN, it must be SmartRight
device compatible (in particular it must possess a smart card reader) and
needs to be equipped with a Terminal module smart card and/or a Con-
verter module smart card. These requirements increase the total system
cost, especially the costs of using and maintaining smart cards. Moreover,
it may be inconvenient to add smart card readers to small devices. If the
system is hacked, the current smart cards must be replaced [89], which is
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a potentially expensive and time-consuming process.
2. Ease of use. A user must have converter smart card(s) in order to add new
content to the PPN. In addition, he/she needs to have multiple Terminal
smart card(s) to render digital content on a SmartRight device. It may
not be convenient for a user to manage a smart card for each device he/she
owns.
Limiting the number of Terminal cards that can be added to a domain
using the PPN counter makes the system inflexible for consumers, espe-
cially those having many devices. In addition, once the value of the PPN
counter reaches zero, it cannot be increased, and the only means of adding
devices to the PPN is by reinitialising the domain. This would mean that
all currently held content, encrypted with the old network key, would need
to be re-downloaded, and a new network key generated.
The network key is stored on the Terminal card. If all the Terminal cards
are lost or fail, then all existing content will be unusable, and will need to
be downloaded again from content distributor sites.
The network key must be transferred by the Terminal card that most
recently joined the network. If the end user forgets which Terminal card
most recently joined the domain, then he/she must try all Terminal cards.
This could pose a serious usability issue in networks with a large number
of Terminal cards.
3. Performance. All the existing LECM keys are changed every time a Ter-
minal card joins or leaves the network. Therefore, the greater the number
of items of content in a domain, the longer it will take to encrypt all the
new LECM keys with the network key.
Because all LECM keys must be changed, this also means that all content
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in a domain must be tracked, as a LECM key is stored encrypted inside
a content-specific LECM data structure stored with the content. One
possibility is to have a database on each device showing the location of
all encrypted content. This imposes extra administrative, storage and
processing costs.
4. Content mobility. Each piece of content is protected with an LECM key.
The LECM key is encrypted with the network key that is shared by domain
devices. Hence, content can be rendered on all domain devices.
5. Lack of dependence on network infrastructure. Network key distribution
requires all Terminal cards to be connected to a local network, but not
simultaneously.
6. Lack of dependence on a secure clock. This requirement is not discussed
in the SmartRight specifications.
7. Cryptographic robustness. SmartRight uses RSA with a 1024-bit key.
8. Ease of recovery. A backup and recovery policy for network keys and
content has not been proposed. If all Terminal cards are lost or fail,
then all existing content will be unusable, and will need to be downloaded
again from content distributor sites. Moreover, if the system is hacked, the
current smart cards must be replaced [89], which is a potentially expensive
and time-consuming process.
9. Robust content protection. There is no binding between the network key
and the domain owner. This means that any device can be added to a
domain, as long as the device has not been revoked and the value of the
PPN counter is not zero. It is not clear from the SmartRight documenta-
tion whether or not the network key is changed when a device is added or
removed. Assuming that a network key is fixed for the life of a domain:
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(a) If a Terminal card is revoked, then it will still be able to access newly
delivered content by eavesdropping on the network connection.
(b) It is suggested in [89] that the LECM key can be changed whenever
a device is added to, or removed from, a domain. The network key
is used to encrypt the LECM key, and so, given the assumption that
the network key is fixed, devices removed from a domain can still
decrypt the updated LECM key and access content. Therefore there
is no point in changing the LECM keys.
10. Flexible rights structure. The LECM contains content protection rules.
However, it is not clear from the description of the scheme how flexible
these rules are.
11. Simple key management. Although the PPN network key management
system is transparent to an end user, the key can only be transmitted by
the Terminal card most recently added to the network. If this Terminal
card is lost or stolen, then no devices can be added to the network.
12. Flexible Revocation Mechanism. It is claimed that the scheme supports
the revocation of terminal cards, presentation functionality, and the entire
PPN. However, [89] does not described how this can be achieved.
13. Access to and Usage of Content. This requirement is not addressed.
14. Consumer Privacy. It is not clear from the description of the scheme
whether consumer privacy is protected.
15. Interoperability. The scheme can run on any platform with a smart card
reader.
16. Security and Hardware Issues. The scheme does not interfere with device
security settings.
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5.1.4 Apple Fairplay
The Apple Fairplay1 system was proposed by Apple Inc. [13]. It provides a
means to protect digital music and video files bought from Apple’s iTunes Music
Store using software only mechanisms. It also allows a consumer to define a
domain consisting of five computers and an unlimited number of iPods2, within
which the consumer’s content can be freely used.
5.1.4.1 System Overview
The Apple Fairplay system is only concerned with digital music and video files,
which must be bought from Apple’s iTunes Music Store (iTMS), and can only
run on iPods and on platforms running one of two operating systems, i.e. Mac
OS X and Microsoft Windows.
The process of adding the first device to a consumer domain is performed using
a copy of the iTunes application running on the joining device (iTunes is an
apple proprietary digital media player application, which plays and manages
digital music and video files). In order to add a device to a domain iTunes
sends a request to the Apple server, which includes a unique identifier for the
joining device. The Apple server then issues an Apple-ID/password that can be
used to authenticate the user to the server, enabling the user to manage domain
membership. Adding more devices to a domain follows the same procedure;
however, the user is authenticated using the provided Apple-ID/password and,
in addition, Apple restricts the total number of devices that can simultaneously
be in a domain to five computers and an unlimited number of iPods.
1http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/FairPlay
2http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/IPod
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Removing a device from a domain requires the iTunes application to contact
the Apple server. It requests the removal of a device by specifying the device
unique identifier that was used in the joining request. Once the Apple server
has removed the unique identifier from its list, iTunes removes the content-
protection keys from the device.
When a consumer buy an audio stream from the iTMS, the audio stream is
protected using a content-specific Master Key, which is generated by the iTMS.
iTunes then generates a Master Key specific user key, which is used to encrypt
the content-specific Master Key. The encrypted Master Key is then associated
with the encrypted content. The user key is protected using a key hardcoded
inside the iTunes application. The user key is also transferred to the Apple
server, and, when a device joins a domain, the Apple server transfers all the
user keys to that device. Every time a consumer downloads a protected audio
stream, iTunes generates a new user key to protect the audio stream Master Key.
Content can be backed up into a standard Audio CD in unencrypted form.
5.1.4.2 Analysis
We now analyse the Apple Fairplay scheme using the list of requirements given
in section 4.5.
1. Minimum cost. The proposed scheme protects domain secrets using a soft-
ware only technique, which is cheaper than using hardware mechanisms.
2. Ease of use. The domain size is restricted to five computers; this is po-
tentially very inconvenient for a consumer who already has the maximum
number of computers in his/her domain, since he/she will be required to
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remove a computer from the domain before a new one can be added.
3. Performance. Symmetric encryption is used to protect audio streams on
consumer devices, which is much faster than using asymmetric encryption.
This should help increase system performance. However, each protected
audio stream is encrypted with a content-specific Master Key, which is
itself encrypted with a user key. The user key is protected with a key
hard coded inside iTunes; i.e. to use an audio stream, the user key needs
to be decrypted, which is itself used to decrypt the Master Key that is in
turn used to decrypt the content.
4. Content mobility. User keys, which are used to protect domain audio
streams, are stored inside the server. These keys are transferred from the
Apple server to devices joining a domain, which ensures content mobility
within each domain. However, content can only be accessed via iPods or
platforms running either Mac OS X or Microsoft Windows.
5. Lack of dependence on network infrastructure. Every time a new audio
stream is bought, a new user key is generated by iTunes and transferred
to the Apple server. Therefore, in order for all other devices to use that
content, they must be connected online to obtain the updated user key
list, which may be inconvenient for some devices.
6. Lack of dependence on a secure clock. This requirement is not discussed
in the Apple Fairplay specifications.
7. Cryptographic robustness. This requirement is not discussed in the Apple
Fairplay specifications.
8. Ease of recovery. Content can be backed up unencrypted to a CD, as
described by Carden [20].
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9. Robust content protection. This scheme fails to bind devices in a domain
to the domain owner. Adding a device to a domain simply requires the
domain owner to be authenticated using an Apple-ID and password that
can be shared with others (there is no binding between the domain key
and the domain owner).
The domain key is protected using software techniques only, unlike other
schemes that use hardware measures, and the software protection has been
hacked many times; see, for example, the Hymn project3. In addition,
content can be backed up to a standard CD in unencrypted form, or
transported elsewhere via email or FTP, enabling content proliferation, as
described by Carden [20].
10. Flexible rights structure. This requirement is not addressed in this scheme;
a consumer device either has full access to content or no access at all.
11. Simple key management. Key management is based on sharing a list of
secret keys between all devices in a domain. Every time a consumer buys
new content, a user key is generated to protect the added content. This
key is also transferred to the Apple server so that it can be used by other
devices in the same domain. This requires all devices to be online to
retrieve the new key. In addition, if the number of pieces of content is
large, this might cause a key management problem.
12. Flexible Revocation Mechanism. This requirement is not addressed in this
scheme.
13. Access to and Usage of Content. This requirement is not addressed.
14. Consumer Privacy. The Apple server and iTMS could jointly track con-
sumer content usage, and this raises a potentially major privacy issue.
3http://hymn-project.org
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15. Interoperability. Only iPod devices and platforms running Mac OS X or
Microsoft Windows can join a domain, limiting interoperability. As stated
by Rowell [83], “Apple Fairplay is allowing Apple to lock iPod owners into
its proprietary store”.
16. Security and Hardware Issues. The scheme does not interfere with device
security settings.
5.1.5 DRM in a 3G Mobile Phone and Beyond
A DRM system for a 3G mobile phone was proposed by Dabbish and Messerges
[69]. The proposed scheme requires the mobile phones to possess the features
of a trusted system, as defined by Stefik [87].
5.1.5.1 System Overview
The part of the Dabbish and Messerges [69] scheme that relates to this thesis is
the “Family Domain” concept, which allows a consumer to transfer copyrighted
digital content between his/her own devices without requiring further licences.
The system requires the establishment of a trusted Domain Authority (DA)
that has the following functionality.
1. It registers consumer devices, to allow protected digital content to be
moved freely between registered devices in the same domain (owned by
the same consumer).
2. It creates and installs a domain unique public/private key pair in a device
immediately after registration. This enables registered devices to have
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access to all content in the family domain.
3. In order to control family domain membership, DA enforces registration
policies that limit the number of devices in the domain and the number
of times a device can join and leave a domain.
4. It detects fraud by tracking devices that join or leave registered domains.
For example, if a device joins and leaves multiple domains frequently, then
this gives an indication of possible system abuse.
5. Devices are removed from a domain by creating a new domain pub-
lic/private key pair, and then installing this new key pair on all the re-
maining devices in that domain.
Each item of content is encrypted using a unique secret key, and is associated
with a licence file that holds both the associated secret key and the consumption
rules for this content. Licence files are encrypted using the domain public key,
which is installed by the DA on all registered devices, as described above.
Dabbish and Messerges [69] suggest using a password shared between the do-
main owner and the DA in order to control domain membership. Users could
potentially share domain passwords to add non-family members to a domain;
to reduce the scope of this problem it is suggested that each domain password
is bound to user private information, or an ability to spend money (thereby
providing a disincentive to password sharing).
5.1.5.2 Analysis
We now analyse the DRM in a 3G Mobile Phone and Beyond scheme using the
list of requirements given in section 4.5.
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1. Minimum cost. The use of a DA requires the establishment and main-
tenance of a complex infrastructure that increases the overall cost and
complexity of the system.
2. Ease of use. Every time a device is revoked or removed from a domain,
the domain key pair has to be changed, which requires the user to con-
nect all devices to the Internet in order to install the new domain key.
For devices that do not have direct access to the Internet, Dabbish and
Messerges [69] suggest using other devices to act as a proxy while regis-
tering the new device. Moreover, all domain content licence keys must
be re-encrypted with the new domain key. Users are likely to find such a
procedure inconvenient.
3. Performance. As discussed immediately above, every time a device is
revoked or removed from a domain, a new key pair is generated, which
necessitates re-encryption of all content encryption keys. These keys are
stored within domain devices, and must therefore be tracked. One pos-
sibility is to have a database on each device showing the location of all
encrypted content. This requires extra administration, in addition to re-
quiring more storage and processing. This results in a significant overhead
if a large quantity of content is present.
A Family Domain is protected against abuse in two ways:
(a) The frequency with which a device is added to or removed from do-
mains is monitored. This requires a potentially complex and sophis-
ticated infrastructure, that processes and records potentially huge
numbers of events. Moreover, before authorising a device to join a
domain, the DA must parse the history log files to ensure the device
is not abusing the system. This is likely to adversely affect system
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performance.
(b) Domain creation is bound to owner private information or the abil-
ity to spend money. One major problem with this approach is user
privacy, as the DA must hold confidential user information. In addi-
tion, it does not prevent abuse of the system, as the owner can add
devices that he/she does not own to his/her domain without giving
the password to other entities.
4. Content mobility. This requirement is met by the use of a unique pub-
lic/private key pair shared by domain devices, which is used to encrypt
content encryption keys.
5. Lack of dependence on network infrastructure. Network key distribution
requires all devices to be connected to the Internet, but not simultaneously.
6. Lack of dependence on a secure clock. It is not clear whether or not the
system requires a clock.
7. Cryptographic robustness. Content is encrypted using a symmetric algo-
rithm, such as AES. The secret key used is stored in a licence file, which
is itself encrypted using a public-key scheme, such as RSA.
8. Ease of recovery. Part of this requirement is discussed in point (2). In
addition, key backup and recovery are handled by the DA.
9. Robust content protection. There is no binding between a domain pub-
lic/private key and the domain owner. This means that any device could
be added to the domain, regardless of ownership, as long as this device
has not been revoked and the DA authorises it.
10. Flexible rights structure. The scheme associates a licence file with every
item of content. This file can be customised to hold content usage rules.
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11. Simple key management. The DA is in charge of creating, installing and
managing the public/private key pair in all domain registered devices.
This creates a significant key management overhead, including the need
for a secure infrastructure for creating, storing, archiving and transferring
domain keys. Moreover, key revocation requires domain devices to be
connected online, as described in point (2).
12. Flexible Revocation Mechanism. This point is addressed in point (2).
13. Access to and Usage of Content. This requirement is not addressed.
14. Consumer Privacy. This requirement is discussed in point (3-b).
15. Interoperability. A platform can join a domain as long as it possesses the
features of a trusted system, as defined by Stefik [87].
16. Security and Hardware Issues The proposed scheme requires devices to
have trusted system features, as defined by Stefik [87].
5.1.6 DRM Security Architecture for Home Networks
The DRM Security Architecture for Home Networks was proposed by Popescu,
Kamperman, Crispo, and Tanenbaum [80]. This scheme includes a technique
for managing DRM in a home network. The main idea is to allow devices to
establish dynamic groups called authorised domains (ADs), where copyrighted
content can be freely copied between devices in a single AD.
5.1.6.1 System Overview
The system model involves the following main entities: content providers, con-
sumer electronics manufacturers, and a licensing organisation that certifies con-
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sumer electronics manufacturers and issues device revocation information. Fur-
ther details of the definition and functionality of the system components are
given in [80].
An AD consists of the following main components:
• Domain Manager: An AD must have a device with domain manager func-
tionality that is in charge of keeping track of all devices in the AD, adding
devices to the AD, and removing devices from the AD.
• Content Manager: An AD can have more than one device with content
manager functionality, as used to download content into the AD by in-
teracting with content providers. Different providers may choose different
types of device to supply their content.
• Compliant Devices: are devices that are certified by the consumer elec-
tronics manufacturers, which are trusted to enforce proprietary content
usage rules.
During the manufacturing process, each compliant device is given a public/private
key pair, certified by the consumer electronics manufacturer. Each device cer-
tificate include a unique Global Device ID (GDI), which is equal to the manu-
facturer prefix concatenated with the manufacturer serial number. Creating an
AD involves a compliant device with a domain manager functionality creating
a master device key list (MKL), containing a list of newly generated keys of
length equal to the maximum number of devices allowed to join an AD. This
limit is set by consumer electronic manufacturers and is difficult to change, as
all devices must be equipped in advance with the keys for all devices expected
to join an AD. The larger this limit, the more protected storage is required in
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each device. Once the MKL has been created, the domain manager creates a
domain identification (IDDomain), composed of the domain manager GDI and
the domain version number.
Adding a device to an AD involves two steps: first, compliance checking of the
device, and second, authorising the device to communicate with other devices
in the AD. The protocol used to add devices to an AD is described in [80]; it
assumes that devices know the domain manager’s GDI prior to joining an AD.
The domain manager selects the next unused key in its MKL to be used as the
device master key. The index of this master key in the MKL is referred to as
the local device identification (LDI).
In the authorisation procedure, the domain manager issues to the joining device
an authentication credential set consisting of a number of (authentication key,
authentication ticket) pairs. The credential set is sent to the joining device
together with the LDI and the master key. Authentication keys in the credential
set are symmetric keys shared between pairs of devices in the AD. Each device
is given authentication keys and corresponding authentication tickets for all
devices already part of the domain, as well as for all potential devices that
may join the AD in the future. The (authentication key, authentication ticket)
pair, allowing device A to authenticate itself to device B, has the following
form: (KAB ,WKB (KAB ||IDDomain||GDIA||LDIA||LDIB)), where KAB is the
authentication key for device A to communicate with device B,KB is the master
key for B, WKB (Y ) denotes the symmetric encryption of data Y using key KB ,
and X||Y is the result of the concatenation of data items X and Y in that
order. The authentication key and corresponding ticket can be used by device
A to prove to device B that it is a compliant device and that it is part of the
same AD. Device B is assured that the domain manager has created the ticket,
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because the ticket is encrypted with KB , that is known only to device B and
the domain manager.
Before exchanging content, the two devices must authenticate each other in
order to prove that they are part of the same domain. The authentication
protocol is described in [80]. Subsequently, both devices must generate a shared
key that is used to establish a secure channel to transfer the content encryption
key. The shared key is calculated as: h(KAB ||KBA||NA||NB), where h denotes
a globally agreed cryptographic hash-function, and NA and NB are random
nonces generated by devices A and B, respectively. The content itself is sent
encrypted using the content encryption key chosen by the content distributor.
Revocation information is associated with each item of content, in the form of
a list of GDIs called the Global Device Revocation List (GDRL). The content
manager downloads a copy of the GDRL with every piece of content from the
content provider. Subsequently, the content manager attempts to connect to
the domain manager to convert the GDRL into a local list contains LDIs for
the revoked devices in this AD. If the domain manager is reachable, the content
manager forwards it the GDRL; the domain manager processes the GDRL and
returns a Local Revocation List (LRL). An LRL is associated with each item
of content in the AD (this is referred to as lightweight content). The GDRL
contains a list of all revoked devices worldwide, and is expected to become
relatively large. One estimate for the potential size of the GDRL is around
40M bytes [80]. If the domain manager is not reachable, the content manager
keeps the original GDRL attached to each item of content (this is referred to as
heavyweight content).
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5.1.6.2 Analysis
We now analyse the DRM Security Architecture for Home Network scheme using
the list of requirements given in section 4.5.
1. Minimum cost. The scheme requires devices to possess a processor, mem-
ory, and protected storage to store secret domain information. This in-
creases the total costs. In addition, before devices can join a domain they
must know the domain manager’s GDI. This means joining devices must
possess an I/O component to insert the manager GDI value.
2. Ease of use. The scheme is not flexible in that the AD size is fixed. The
maximum number of devices that can join an AD depends on hardware
factors. These factors include the storage available for storing secure do-
main information, i.e. the credential set and the device master key on the
least capable device that is expected to join the AD. This is potentially
inconvenient for users, especially corporate users.
3. Performance. The global revocation list, GDRL, is associated with every
downloaded item of content, which has a serious impact on the overall
system performance. The size of the GDRL increases as more devices are
revoked. This causes the time to download content to increase. In addi-
tion, the local revocation list, LRL, is very difficult to maintain, because
it is associated with every item of content inside the AD rather than being
stored in a central location.
4. Content mobility. Each item of content is encrypted with a unique key
chosen by the content provider. The published description [80] does not
specify how the confidentiality of this key is assured. This key is trans-
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ferred via a secure channel from the sender to the receiver, also used to
exchange content between domain devices. This ensures content mobility.
5. Lack of dependence on network infrastructure. A key list is generated in
advance for all devices expected to join a domain, as described above. This
does not require all devices to be connected to the network simultaneously.
6. Lack of dependence on a secure clock. Nonces are used to provide message
timeliness.
7. Cryptographic robustness. The proposed scheme uses 128-bit AES keys.
8. Ease of recovery. If the system is hacked, the AD must be re-initialised
and all domain content re-encrypted. In addition, a backup and recovery
policy has not been proposed for domain keys and content. If an insecure
backup method is implemented, content and keys could be restored to a
hacker device. This could then mean that domain keys and credential sets
are revealed to the hacker. Alternatively, if backup is not allowed, then
end users are likely to reject the system.
9. Robust content protection. This scheme fails to bind devices in an AD to
the AD owner. Adding a device to the AD depends solely on the device
being compliant, and the number of devices in the AD not exceeding
the AD-specific limit. Moreover, the scheme does not specify where each
content encryption key is stored.
10. Flexible rights structure. This requirement is not addressed in this scheme.
11. Simple key management. This scheme uses secret keys shared between
each pair of devices in an AD. These keys are created and managed by
the AD manager, and are given to devices when they join the AD.
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12. Flexible Revocation Mechanism. This requirement is discussed in point
(3).
13. Access to and Usage of Content. This requirement is not addressed.
14. Consumer Privacy. This requirement is not discussed in [80].
15. Interoperability. Devices must have a processor and protected storage in
order to join an AD.
16. Security and Hardware Issues. The scheme does not interfere with device
security settings.
5.2 Content Piracy Problem Definition
In this section we attempt to identify the main issues that underlie content
piracy. Most current DRM systems recognise that consumers may have more
than one device, which they would like to use to access their content without
requiring multiple licences. As a result, many DRM system providers have
incorporated the concept of an authorised domain into their content protection
solutions. Such a domain is a collection of devices belonging to a single owner,
within which digital assets can be freely moved.
Devices in a domain can be divided into two categories, as illustrated in Figure
5.1, namely roots and leaves. The domain root (unique per domain) represents
a licensed content holder. The leaves in a domain receive content (and means
to access the content) from the domain root.
The content piracy problem can then be divided into two sub-problems. The
first is Root Distribution, where the root of the domain illegally distributes
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Figure 5.1: Illicit Content Proliferation
content and any associated passwords/keys to an unlimited number of users. For
example, the content holder could illegally distribute content and an associated
password to devices outside the domain, i.e. devices which are not leaves in
this domain. The second is Leaf Distribution, where an individual leaf in
a domain illegally redistributes content to devices outside the domain, as if it
is the licensed content holder. For example, after receiving content and any
associated passwords/keys, a leaf device could illegally re-distribute the content
and passwords/keys to user1, which in turn re-distributes them to user2, and so
on (where user1 and user2 are not leaves in this domain).
A fundamental authorised domain requirement for DRM is to restrict Root Dis-
tribution to legitimate devices owned by the domain owner, and to completely
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prevent Leaf Distribution. In addition, an authorised domain system for DRM
should satisfy other requirements, as discussed in chapter 4, such as: Ease of
Use, Content Mobility, Performance, Ease of Recovery, Privacy, Interoperability
and Robust Content Protection.
Other authorised domain management solutions for DRM, as discussed in this
chapter, typically attempt to address these problems by using a counter to
control the number of devices that can simultaneously access domain content.
However such counter-based mechanisms have significant security and usability
limitations. For example, in many schemes, devices can abuse the system by
joining and then leaving multiple domains to illegally use their content. More-
over, in many schemes, increasing the domain size limit requires re-initialising
and reconfiguring the domain, and, in some schemes, domains cannot be ex-
panded.
In addition, there is no binding between the domain key (content protection
key) and the domain owner. As a result, a leaf in a domain can redistribute
content associated with a password/PIN; i.e. the Leaf Distribution problem
arises. Also, all these schemes have additional problems in addressing other
fundamental DRM requirements, such as content backup and recovery, ease of
use, performance, etc. These issues are summarised in Figure 5.2.
5.3 Summary
This chapter contains an analysis and assessment of six of the most widely
discussed DRM schemes that incorporate the authorised domain concept. The
analyses and assessments were based on the 16 DRM requirements defined in
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Figure 5.2: Authorised Domain Content Protection Systems
chapter 4. The main conclusion of these analyses is that current schemes for
protecting digital assets in personal networks do not satisfy many user, content
owner, and/or copyright law acceptance criteria for digital content protection
and consumption, as shown in Figure 5.2. For example, OMA-DRM satisfies
the largest number of requirements, but even this scheme only meets ten of the
16 requirements.
Studying the shortcomings in the existing schemes enables us to isolate the issues
underlying content piracy, namely Root Distribution and Leaf Distribution.
This in turns helps us to devise new schemes which meet the requirements
given in chapter 4.
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This chapter presents a high level architecture for an authorised domain DRM
system. After introducing the notion of an authorised domain, we provide a
set of requirements for authorised domain devices. We then describe how de-
vices conforming to the Trusted Computing Group specifications satisfy these
requirements. Next, we specify a general workflow designed to address the two
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elements underlying content piracy, i.e. Root Distribution and Leaf Distribution,
as discussed in section 5.2. We then discuss and analyse the provided general
framework. Subsequent chapters describe specific implementations of the gen-
eral framework outlined in this chapter. Most of the material in this chapter
has previously been published in [8, 9, 10, 11].
6.1 Authorised Domain Concept
Most current DRM systems recognise that consumers may have more than one
device, which they would like to use to access their content without requiring
multiple licences. As a result, many DRM system providers (as described in
chapter 5) have incorporated the concept of an authorised domain into their
content protection solutions; see, for example, [13, 44, 74, 89]. Such a domain
is a collection of devices belonging to a single owner, within which digital assets
can be freely moved.
Chapter 5 provided an analysis of the sources of threats to content within an
authorised domain, and divides the devices in a domain into two categories:
roots and leaves. The domain root (unique per domain) represents a licensed
content holder. The leaves in a domain receive content (and means to access
the content) from the domain root. Content piracy can be divided into two
sub-problems, Root Distribution and Leaf Distribution. A fundamental DRM
requirement is to restrict Root Distribution to legitimate devices owned by the
domain owner, and to completely prevent Leaf Distribution. In addition, a
DRM system should satisfy other requirements, as discussed in chapter 4, such
as: Flexible Rights Structure, Ease of Use, Content Mobility, Performance, Ease
of Recovery, and Interoperability.
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6.2 Domain Device Requirements
Software-only techniques cannot provide a high degree of protection for domain
credentials; for example, Apple Fairplay, which uses software-only techniques,
has been hacked many times, as discussed in section 5.1.4. Also, all schemes
analysed in chapter 5, apart from Apple Fairplay, require devices to incorporate
trusted hardware components. These components are used to securely store
domain credentials and/or to enforce content usage rules. For example, the
SmartRight scheme requires the presence of a smart card reader on every device,
and the OMA-DRM scheme requires each device to possess secure storage for
domain credentials, and to incorporate a DRM agent trusted to enforce content
usage rules. As a result, many currently used devices do not satisfy all the
security requirements for existing domain-based DRM schemes.
Nevertheless, a DRM system must be designed in such a way that it imposes the
minimum cost on the device manufacturers and (hence) the end users. Thus, the
necessary hardware components should be simple and convenient to integrate
into consumer devices without resulting in increased consumer device size, and
they should not introduce new vulnerabilities into end user computing equip-
ment. These considerations motivate our requirement here that domain devices
must be trusted platforms (TPs), since TPs of this type appear likely to become
very common. TPs are assumed to possess the following properties.
1. Each TP must have a tamper-resistant module that is bound physically
and cryptographically to the TP.
2. The TP protects all the secret keys required by a domain device, typically
by storing them inside the tamper-resistant module. Secrets can be sent
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to a platform after the platform’s software state has been measured and
reported. Stored secrets are only released after the platform’s software
state has been measured and checked. Therefore, if a process relies on the
use of secrets, it cannot operate unless it and its software environment are
correct.
3. The TP must provide a protected execution environment, in which appli-
cations run in isolation, free from being observed or compromised by other
processes running in the same protected partition, or by software running
in any insecure partition [34].
In theory a TCG1 compliant platform possesses all of these properties, as dis-
cussed in section 6.3. TCG compliant platforms are not expensive, and are
currently available from a range of PC manufacturers, including Dell, Fujitsu,
HP, Intel and Toshiba [35]. In addition, since early 2006, all Intel-based Apple
computers are TCG compliant [96]. However, in practice, as discussed in section
3.8, many challenges remain to be solved in the TCG specifications, and these
issues are the subject of ongoing research. Also, it will take some time until
TCG functionality is integrated into all types of device, e.g. car CD players,
TVs, etc. We do not expect the above properties to be available in all types
of devices in the near future. This is because current operating system designs
are insecure, and they possess many vulnerabilities; without a secure operating
system, trusted applications can be subject to various attacks [84].
Nevertheless, this is not to say that the proposed DRM schemes are not practical
for today’s devices and operating systems. The primary purpose of requiring
devices to possess the above TP properties was to protect the means for accessing
1www.trustedcomputinggroup.org
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content, which is not main thrust of the work described in this thesis. The
main novel contribution of this thesis is the specification of the four different
schemes for strongly authenticating a domain owner. This authentication is
used for binding an authorised domain to a single domain owner. These schemes
can utilise existing techniques for protecting the domain credentials, including
the means for accessing content. Hence, by relaxing the strong TP security
assumptions described above, the proposed schemes can be implemented using
today’s devices. In this case, the difficulty of breaking one of the DRM schemes
would be equivalent to the difficulty of hacking other schemes using current
protection techniques (essentially this is a trade-off between security and cost).
Also, we have designed the DRM schemes so that if a device is hacked, it might
reveal the content stored in that device but it does not cause a global problem.
Most importantly, hacked devices can be revoked, and hence cannot receive new
content.
There are always trade-offs between security and cost, security and usability,
and security and performance. Hence, the above TP security requirements
can be relaxed or strengthened depending on the intended application that
will use the proposed authorised domain management schemes. For example,
protecting sensitive content in an enterprise network typically requires higher
security assurance than protecting sensitive content in a personal network, as
revealing an enterprise’s sensitive content is likely to have a greater impact and
affect more people than compromising content belonging to a personal network.
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6.3 Using TCG-conformant Devices
In this section we summarise how a system conforming to the TCG specifications
can satisfy the requirements described in section 6.2; these issues are discussed in
greater detail in chapter 3. In this section we do not discuss problems associated
with the TCG specifications in practical life, as these have been discussed in
section 3.8.
1. The TP has a hardware component referred to as Trusted Platform Mod-
ule (TPM), that is physically and cryptographically bound to the TP. It
is a self-contained processing module with specialist security capabilities
such as random number generation, asymmetric key generation, digital
signing, encryption capabilities, hashing capabilities, an HMAC engine,
monotonic counters, as well as memory, non-volatile memory, power de-
tection and I/O. Support for platform integrity measurement, recording
and reporting is also provided. The TPM is typically implemented as a
processing engine that is separate from the TP’s main processing environ-
ment.
2. An asymmetric encryption Storage Root Key (SRK) pair is securely asso-
ciated with each TPM. The SRK private key is statistically unique, and
is created and stored inside the TPM. The public part of the SRK acts
as the root for encrypting sub-tree key objects that are used as data or
signing key objects. The private part of the SRK is used for decrypting
sub-tree objects.
3. A certification authority, the privacy CA, certifies public identity keys
belonging to TPMs. The generated certificate binds an identity of the
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TPM together with a description of the platform’s security properties to a
public key used for the verification of digital signatures. A TPM requests
such a certificate from a privacy CA by providing its platform credentials.
These credentials are generated by the Trusted Platform Module Entity
(TPME), that vouches that a TPM is a genuine TPM, the Platform Entity
(PE), that attests to the correct incorporation of a particular TPM into a
platform, and the Conformance Entity (CE), that attests that the design
of the TPM in that class of platform meets the TCG specifications, and
that the way that the platform incorporates that type of TPM also meets
the TCG specifications.
4. A TPM can generate two types of keys, known as migratable and non-
migratable keys. Migratable keys can be transmitted to other TPs if
authorised by both a selected trusted authority and the TPM owner. A
non-migratable key is bound to the TP that created it. Data encrypted
under non-migratable keys can leave the TP if and only if the software
agent authorises the release of the data to other platforms. We assume
that software agents that are authorised to read data encrypted using
non-migratable keys will not release the data outside the TP boundaries.
5. A TP can perform integrity challenge and response exchanges with other
TPs. One TP can verify the trustworthiness of the state of another TP by
computing an expected set of trustworthy integrity metrics and comparing
them with the current platform software state obtained from the integrity
response. This enables an entity to verify that the DRM agent is running
correctly on a remote TP.
6. A TP can protect secret keys (e.g. as required to support DRM) by en-
crypting them using a non-migratable key, as described in point (4). The
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TP associates the current platform software state, as stored in the Plat-
form Configuration Registers (PCRs), with the non-migratable key, and
then protects them using the SRK. Stored secrets are only released after
the current values in the platform’s PCRs have been compared with the
values associated with the stored key. Reporting, storage, and retrieval
are carried out by the TPM. Therefore, if a process relies on the use of
secrets, it cannot operate unless it and its software environment are cor-
rect. The system assumes that if the operating system and application
are as expected, then the integrity and secrecy of data is subsequently
guaranteed.
6.4 Role Model
The role model used in the framework involves the following main entities.
• The domain owner. It is assumed that a domain will always be associ-
ated with a single individual, referred to as the domain owner.
• A scheme-specific certification authority (CA). This CA could be dis-
tributed across multiple locations and needs to be trusted by domain de-
vices, content distributors and rights issuers. TPM manufacturers could
play the role of the CA. The CA is required to maintain and disseminate
a revocation list.
• A domain device, which is assumed to be a TP, possesses the properties
described in section 6.2. In addition, a domain device is assumed to have
the following properties.
1. Each domain device is assumed to be pre-equipped with a DRM-
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scheme-specific signature key pair, the public key of which is cer-
tified by the scheme-specific CA. The certificate contains a general
description of the tamper-resistant security module in the domain
device and its security requirements. The private part of the key
is stored within the module, and is used for entity authentication.
Domain devices are required to possess the public key of this CA.
2. Each domain device is assumed to possess a DRM agent, which must
be trusted to perform the DRM scheme correctly. In addition, each
domain device can verify that the DRM agent is running correctly in
another device, using TP functionality.
3. Each domain device is assumed to possess an asymmetric encryp-
tion key pair certified using the signature key described in point (1).
The corresponding private decryption key is bound to a particular
environment configuration state. We assume that the DRM software
agents that are authorised to read data encrypted using this key will
not release the data outside the domain device; even the domain
owner should not be able to retrieve these data in clear.
• The content distributor distributes items of protected digital content to
consumers. Each item of protected content is encrypted using a content-
specific key (KT ). This key is stored in the rights object associated with
this piece of content; this rights object also contains usage rules that apply
to the content. Content distributor devices, which distribute content to
consumers, must have the TP features described in section 6.2 and must
also satisfy the domain device assumptions described above.
• The rights issuer is in charge of issuing the rights object associated
with an item of content. The DRM agent in each domain device that
renders protected digital content enforces the rules inside the associated
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rights object. Rights issuer devices, which distribute rights objects to
consumers, must have the TP features described in section 6.2 and must
also satisfy the domain device assumptions described above.
• A trusted authority is responsible for managing the parameters con-
trolling the size of a domain and the total number of times that a device
can join a domain. Trusted authorities must be trusted by content dis-
tributors and rights issuers, and are required to possess the public key of
the scheme-specific CA. A trusted authority might also be responsible for
other functionality, such as domain key backup and recovery. The nature
and functionality of a trusted authority is implementation-dependent, and
specific examples of trusted authorities are provided in the implementa-
tions of the framework described in chapters 7–10. A trusted authority
might, for example, be a trusted third party of some kind.
• A trusted domain controller is responsible for managing the member-
ship of a domain; in particular it is responsible for authenticating a user
prior to allowing a device to join a domain. Trusted domain controllers
must be trusted by content distributors and rights issuers, and are re-
quired to possess the public key of the scheme-specific CA. The means by
which this user authentication is achieved is implementation-dependent;
the framework instantiations described in chapters 7–10 employ a variety
of approaches.
The nature of a trusted controller is also implementation-dependent; it
could, for example, be a trusted third party or a trusted agent running on
a user device. The software that implements the trusted domain controller
functionality is referred to as the ‘DRM agent’. Also, the trusted controller
and trusted authority could, in some circumstances, be implemented by
the same entity.
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6.5 General Framework
In this section we describe a general framework for the creation and ongoing
management of an authorised domain. This framework involves creating a do-
main owned by a single owner, where all devices joining the domain are bound
in some way to that domain owner. Each domain has a unique domain-specific
secret key KD that is securely generated and is given to a device when it joins
the domain (after the domain owner has been authenticated). This key, that
is used to encrypt content encryption keys, is not available in the clear even to
the domain owner, and cannot be copied between devices.
Each domain has two associated limits that are maintained and controlled by the
trusted authority, one to control the number of devices that can simultaneously
access domain content, and the other to control the total number of devices that
can join a domain. The latter limit is designed to stop domain owners abusing
the system by allowing multiple devices to join and then leave their domains.
In the remaining part of this section we present the workflow of the general
framework, which is divided into five main phases. The first covers the process
of domain creation. The second phase involves adding devices to a domain. The
third phase covers the removal of a device from a domain. The fourth phase
covers the exchange of content between domain devices and content distribu-
tors/rights issuers, between devices in the same domain, and between devices
in different domains. The fifth and final phase involves domain backup and
recovery.
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6.5.1 Domain Establishment
This phase covers the creation of a domain, and involves the following steps.
1. The trusted domain controller authenticates the domain owner. This could
be achieved in a variety of different ways. The four implementations of this
framework specified in chapters 7–10 incorporate a variety of approaches
to this step.
2. The trusted domain controller generates a domain-specific key KD using
a random number generator, securely generates two counters, cT and cC ,
initialised to zero, associates the two counters with the key KD, and binds
the result to the created domain. The counter cT represents the total
number of devices that have joined the domain, and cC represents the
number of devices currently present within the domain. The maximum
permitted values of these counters are maintained and controlled by a
trusted authority, as outlined above.
6.5.2 Adding a Device to a Domain
This phase covers the addition of a device to a domain. It involves the following
steps:
1. The DRM agent running in the trusted domain controller authenticates
the domain owner in some way, as described in section 6.5.1. If authenti-
cation fails, the agent exits with an appropriate error message.
2. If authentication succeeds, the joining device and the trusted domain con-
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troller validate each other’s trustworthiness by some means.
3. If the trustworthiness check succeeds, the trusted domain controller incre-
ments the values of both cT and cC . If the new value of cT or cC is greater
than the maximum permitted value for this domain, then the agent exits
with an appropriate error message. The maximum values of cT and cC
can be increased by an explicit authorisation from the trusted authority.
Domain owners could be charged more for higher maximum cT and/or cC
values.
4. If the new values of cT and cC are within the permitted ranges for this
domain, the trusted domain controller securely transfersKD to the joining
device. KD is securely stored in the joining device, using the functionality
described in section 6.2; as a result KD cannot be copied between devices,
and is only released from the trusted domain controller to a device after
successfully performing steps 1–4 above. Hence content owners will have
assurance that KD will not be released to third parties.
6.5.3 Removing a Device from a Domain
The third phase covers the case where a domain owner wishes to remove a
device from the domain. In order for a device to leave a domain, the domain
owner follows similar steps to those used for devices joining a domain, with the
exception that cT does not change, and cC is decremented. This process involves
the following steps.
1. The trusted domain controller authenticates the domain owner in some
way, as described in section 6.5.1. If authentication fails, the agent exits
with an appropriate error message.
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2. If authentication succeeds, the leaving device and the trusted domain con-
troller validate each other’s trustworthiness by some means. This step is
to ensure that the leaving domain device can be trusted to delete its stored
copy of KD.
3. If the trustworthiness check succeeds, the DRM agent decrements the value
of cC .
If a domain device is hacked or fails in some way (e.g. because of a hardware
failure), the domain owner must inform the scheme-specific CA, which can then
add the domain device public key to the revocation list. The trusted domain
controller then ensures that the hacked device public key has been revoked, and
decrements the value of cC . As described in the next section, hacked devices
cannot receive new content, and the value of cT is not decremented when a
device is removed from a domain, even if the device has failed or been hacked.
This ensures that the domain owner cannot abuse the system by adding devices
and then claiming that they have failed or been attacked in some way.
6.5.4 Exchanging Content
In chapter 4 we described the workflow for a typical DRM system, involving
digitising content, identifying and labeling content, associating content with us-
age rules stored inside a rights object, and protecting and downloading content.
The rights object contains the rules governing the use and the distribution of
associated content. These rules are expressed in a REL, as described in section
4.4. A rights object might contain two types of REL elements: permissions (e.g.
display, print, play) and constraints on permissions (e.g. play 10 times, display
for 1hr). A rights object that does not contain constraints on permissions we
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Figure 6.1: Exchanging Content Scenario
refer to as a static rights object, and a rights object that does have constraints
on permissions we refer to as a dynamic rights object.
In this section we briefly outline how such a DRM workflow can be integrated
into this general framework, in order to enable digital content and an associated
rights object to be downloaded from a content distributor/rights issuer to any
domain device. This workflow involves the following steps; we assume that a
domain device and a content distributor/rights issuer have a trusted copy of
each other’s public signature verification and encryption keys (e.g. as can be
achieved by exchanging certificates). One way in which the workflow could be
implemented is described in section 7.3.4.
1. A domain device downloads content and an associated rights object from
a remote content distributor (or rights issuer), where the content is en-
crypted using a content-specific secret key KT generated by the content
distributor. The rights object associated with the content holds a copy
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of KT , encrypted using the public key of the domain device. The rights
object is also signed by the rights issuer.
2. Once content has been downloaded to a domain device, the content en-
cryption key KT is decrypted by the domain device using its private key,
and then re-encrypted using the domain-specific key KD. The rights ob-
ject is then signed using the domain device signature key.
3. Encrypted content associated with a static rights object can be freely
transferred between domain devices. However, this should not be the
same case with a dynamic rights object. For example, if a rights object
has a constraint ‘play nine times’, then the domain owner should be able
to play the content nine times in total in the domain; i.e. the domain
owner could play the content three times on device1 and six times on
device2. The DRM agent running on a domain device can enforce such
a mechanism. The main threat to a dynamic rights object would involve
backing it up a rights object and then restoring it at a later time to reuse an
expired licence. To our knowledge, there is no solution for this problem,
for authorised domains. In this thesis we do not address this problem,
which remains a possible topic for future research.
4. All devices in a domain possess a copy of the secret key KD, and hence
the protected content associated with the rights object can be freely trans-
ferred between devices in the same domain (after verifying that the desti-
nation device public key has not been revoked). The DRM agent on each
domain device enforces the rules inside the associated rights object. Figure
6.1 shows a typical usage scenario for buying and exchanging content.
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6.5.5 Backup and Recovery
A DRM system must be capable of recovering digital content in the event of
system failure. For backup purposes, digital content encrypted using KD can
be stored in an oﬄine medium, for example a USB memory stick or a or CD-
ROM2. If the domain key KD is lost and cannot be recovered, it follows that the
domain content on the backup cannot be decrypted. Thus, backup provisions
for KD are needed.
Our backup strategy is based on the assumption that the trusted domain con-
troller has a trusted backup and restore agent that can backup and recover KD.
The way in which this is implemented depends on the nature of the trusted
domain controller. Chapters 7–10 describe four ways of backing up KD, as part
of the respective implementations of the framework.
6.6 Discussion and Analysis
In this section we consider how the framework controls content sharing, and
how domain membership is managed.
6.6.1 Controlling Content Sharing
The main goal of the proposed framework is to prevent content decryption keys
stored inside rights objects from being transferred unprotected to devices in
different domains. This is achieved, as described in section 6.5.4, by encrypting
2In this thesis we do not consider problems associated with dynamic rights objects, which
is explained in section 6.5.4
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each content-specific key KT with the domain-specific key KD, where KD is
only available to domain devices. This domain key is transferred to a device
only after the domain owner has been authenticated, the values of both domain
counters have been incremented, and the trustworthiness of the device has been
verified. Hence the only devices that can access content are those that are part
of the domain, and devices can only be added to a domain if the domain owner
is personally involved (as ensured by authentication of the user). The right to
access content in a domain is thus bound to the domain owner.
As explained in section 6.5.3, KD is removed from a device when it leaves a
domain, which prevents protected rights objects from being used by devices in
multiple domains. However, this does not stop legitimate controlled content
sharing; protected content can move between devices belonging to different do-
mains. A consumer could, for example, obtain protected content from anywhere;
however, he/she can only use protected content by contacting the corresponding
rights issuer and downloading a trial rights object, which will enable him/her
to temporarily use the protected content. If the consumer is interested, he/she
could then buy a full usage licence, as explained above. This concept is known
as super-distribution , and has been proposed by OMA [74] as a means of
allowing consumers to obtain digitally protected content from anywhere, and
to use a restricted licence. This allows consumers to use content for a limited
period, with lower quality and/or limited features. When the consumer is happy
with the protected content and decides to get a full licence, only then will he/she
need to download the rights object, which is much smaller than the encrypted
content.
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6.6.2 Controlling Domain Membership
The framework allows both the Root Distribution and the Leaf Distribution
problems to be addressed. The Root Distribution problem is solved by intro-
ducing the following two factors into domain management.
• The first is controlling both domain size and changes in domain mem-
bership by associating two limits with each domain, as discussed in sec-
tion 6.5, in such a way that these limits can be changed where necessary.
Changes to these limits are controlled by the trusted authority, and do
not affect domain content in any way, such as requiring content or content
encryption keys to be re-encrypted whenever a device joins or leaves a
domain.
• The second is by ensuring that the domain-specific key KD is generated
automatically, is bound to the domain owner, and is unavailable in the
clear, even to the domain owner. This prevents the domain owner from
disseminating the key KD. Consequently, distributing content to a device
outside the domain will not enable access to the content unless this device
joins the domain and thereby receives KD. When a device leaves a domain
it deletes its stored copy of KD.
The problem of Leaf Distribution is solved by ensuring the uniqueness and
confidentiality of the domain-specific key KD. In addition, as stated above,
KD is bound to the domain owner in such a way that only the domain owner
can authorise the transfer of the key KD to other devices, and this only occurs
when a device joins the domain. Although domain devices possess the key KD,
they are incapable of redistributing it to other devices; this addresses the Leaf
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Distribution problem.
6.7 Summary
In this chapter we have proposed a general DRM framework, designed to support
the authorised domain concept and which is also designed to address the two
main security issues described in section 5.2. That is, the scheme is designed to
restrict Root Distribution to devices owned by the domain owner and to prevent
Leaf Distribution.
A successful DRM solution is required to satisfy other fundamental DRM re-
quirements; see, for example, section 4.5. In chapters 7–10 we propose four
different instantiations of this general framework which are designed to address
these fundamental DRM requirements.
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In this chapter we describe an implementation of the generic authorised domain
DRM framework given in chapter 6. This scheme involves managing an autho-
rised domain using a master control device which supports: authentication of a
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domain owner; domain establishment; adding devices to and removing devices
from a domain; and backing up and recovering domain credentials. The sys-
tem security requirements, threats, and services are analysed. How the proposed
scheme counteracts the main content piracy threats is also discussed. Finally,
the pros and cons of two possible approaches to user authentication, i.e. the
use of a password/PIN and biometric authentication mechanisms, and possi-
ble countermeasures to the identified vulnerabilities in these two approaches are
discussed. Most of the material in this chapter has previously been published in
[10].
7.1 Introduction
The system described in this chapter is an implementation of the generic autho-
rised domain DRM framework given in chapter 6. The proposed system works
by binding all devices in a domain to a single master control device, which
is itself bound to a single owner. The unique domain key KD (introduced in
section 6.5) is securely generated and stored inside the master control device.
This device is implemented so that KD is not available in the clear even to the
domain owner. The domain key is transferred from the master control device
to a device joining a domain after the master control device has authenticated
the domain owner; this authentication uses either biometric or password/PIN
authentication techniques.
This chapter is organised as follows. Section 7.2 describes the master control
device functionality. Section 7.3 describes the proposed solution and the process
workflow. Section 7.4 describes how the proposed scheme controls domain mem-
bership. Section 7.5 analyses the system security requirements, threats, and
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services. Section 7.6 described how these security requirements can be met us-
ing TCG functionality. Section 7.7 discusses user authentication methods, and
section 7.8 provides conclusions.
7.2 The Master Control Device
In addition to the entities identified in chapter 6, the system model includes a
master control device that provides the trusted domain controller functionality.
The master control device is responsible for: securely storing a domain owner
authentication credential (a password/PIN or a biometric reference template)
that is used to authenticate the domain owner whenever an attempt is made to
add a device to the domain; securely generating and protecting a secret domain
key (KD), used to encrypt content encryption keys; and authorising devices to
join the domain by checking that their processing environment is trusted. Only
the master control device is permitted to transfer the domain key KD to devices
joining its domain, and this key cannot be copied between domain devices. The
master control device is not required to be a dedicated device; it could, for
example, be part of a domain device.
The master control device securely stores the authentication credential (the ex-
act nature of which could vary — see section 7.7) alongside KD and the two
counters cT and cC , as defined in section 6.5.1. The master control device is
required to have all the TP features described in section 6.2. The master con-
trol device is required to possess a software agent that implements the master
control device functionality. The master control device is also required to pos-
sess a signature key pair, used in managing the domain. The public signature
verification key is certified by the scheme-specific CA, as introduced in section
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6.4. The resulting certificate is called a domain certificate. Such a certificate
includes the following information: the fact that it is a domain certificate, a
general description of the master control device and its security properties, the
maximum number of devices that can be in the domain at any one time (i.e. the
maximum permitted value of cC), and the maximum number of devices that can
join the domain (i.e. the maximum permitted value of cT ). The CA that signs
the domain certificate provides the trusted authority functionality, as described
in section 6.4. This CA could be distributed across multiple locations and needs
to be trusted by content distributors and rights issuers. TPM manufacturers
could play the role of the CA.
The master control device is assumed to incorporate a trusted backup agent
that can backup and recover KD, the authentication credential, the current
values of both cT and cC , and the public key of every device that is a member
of the domain. This information (i.e. KD, the user authentication credential,
the current values of the two counters, and the public keys of all the domain
devices) is collectively referred to as the domain credentials.
7.3 Process Workflow
We now describe in detail how the five phases of the system workflow, as defined
in section 6.5, are implemented.
7.3.1 Domain Establishment
The domain establishment phase, defined in section 6.5.1, is implemented as
follows. The first time that a consumer uses the domain-specific master control
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device, or on resetting the master control device, the following initialisation
procedure must be performed.
1. The software agent in the master control deviceM executes, and instructs
the domain owner to provide his/her authentication credential. This cre-
dential is stored by M .
2. The software agent securely generates an asymmetric encryption key pair
(PM , RM ), where RM is protected using the functionality described in
section 6.2. Note that we use (PX , RX) throughout the remainder of this
thesis to denote the encryption/decryption key pair of entity X.
3. The software agent generates a secret keyKD. The software agent securely
associates the counters cT and cC , initialised to zero, with the stored
authentication credential and the key KD.
7.3.2 Adding a Device to a Domain
This phase, defined in section 6.5.2, is implemented as follows. Adding a new
device J to a user domain with master control device M involves the following
steps, as summarised in Figure 7.1.
J first sends a Join Domain request to M , of the form:
(1) J →M : PJ ||SJ ||N1||CertIJ ||SignJ(PJ ||SJ ||N1).
where SJ is the execution status of the DRM agent on J (the exact nature of SJ
is implementation dependent, see, for example, section 7.6), N1 is a fresh nonce
generated by J , CertIJ is a certificate signed by the CA for the public key IJ (as
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Figure 7.1: The Workflow for Adding a Device into a Domain
described in section 6.4, bullet 3), IJ is the signature verification key of J , and
SignJ(Y ) denotes a signature on data Y created using the private signing key
of J (note that we use SX , CertIX , IX and SignX(Y ) throughout the remainder
of the thesis to denote the corresponding objects associated with entity X).
M verifies CertIJ , extracts IJ from CertIJ and checks that it has not been
revoked, e.g. by querying an OCSP service. M then verifies J ’s signature using
IJ . M verifies that the DRM agent is running correctly in J by checking the
value of SJ . How this verification occurs is implementation-dependent; see,
for example, section 7.6. M then authenticates the domain owner using the
stored authentication credential. If authentication succeeds, M checks whether
the public key of J is already a member of the domain (a device might need
to rejoin a domain, for example, in the event of hardware/software failure, as
discussed in section 7.3.5). If the public key of J is not in the domain, M
temporarily increments the values of both cT and cC (it does not store the
incremented values at this stage). If the new value of cT or cC is greater than
the maximum permitted value given in the domain certificate held by M , then
the agent running on M exits with an appropriate error message.
Next, M generates a nonce N2, and then sends it, with other information, to J ,
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as follows:
(2) M → J : CertIM ||AJ ||N1||N2||SM ||SignM (AJ ||N1||N2||SM )
where AJ is an identifier for J , as contained in CertIJ (note that we use AX to
denote the identifier of X throughout), and CertIM is the domain certificate (see
section 7.2). J verifies CertIM , extracts IM from CertIM and verifies that it has
not been revoked, e.g. by querying an OCSP service, and then checks that this
certificate was issued for a master control device, as discussed in section 7.2. J
uses IM to checkM ’s signature, verifies AJ to ensure it is the intended recipient,
and verifies message freshness by comparingN1 with the value sent in (1). J then
verifies that the software agent is running correctly in M by checking the value
of SM . As above, how this verification occurs is implementation-dependent.
Next, J generates a nonce N3, and then sends a reply to M , as follows:
(3) J →M : AM ||N2||N3||SignJ(AM ||N2||N3)
M verifies J ’s signature, verifies AM to ensure that it is the intended recipient,
and verifies message freshness by comparing N2 with the value sent in (2). Steps
1–3 conform to the three-pass mutual authentication protocol specified in [46].
Each domain must have a single domain device assigned for use for backup
purposes, which is referred to as the backup device. There are two possible
cases for the next part of this phase, depending on whether or not a backup
device has already been assigned for the domain.
If J is the first device to join the domain, then it becomes the backup device.
M first securely stores PJ , and updates the stored values of the counters cT and
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cC . M then passes a backup request to J , as follows:
(4.a) M → J : ePJ (KD||A||cT ||cC ||PJ)||N3||SignM (ePJ (KD||A||cT ||cC ||PJ)||N3)
where A is the authentication credential, eX(Y ) denotes the asymmetric encryp-
tion of data Y using public key X, and where we assume that the encryption
primitive in use provides non-malleability, as described in section 2.3.3.1. J
verifies message freshness by comparing N3 with the value sent in (3), verifies
the signature of the received message and then decrypts it. The recovered secret
key KD is securely stored, as described in section 6.5.2. J also securely stores
and protects the received domain backup information consisting of the received
encrypted message and CertIM .
If, on the other hand, the domain already has an assigned backup device B, i.e.
J is not the first device to join the domain, then M first generates a random
nonce N4 and sends B the following request:
(4.b.1) M → B: N4||AB ||SignM (N4||AB)
B verifies the signature in the received message, and verifies that it is the in-
tended recipient by checking the value of AB . If the verifications succeed, B
generates a random nonce N5 and sends an acknowledgment to M , including
the nonce N4 received in (4.b.1).
(4.b.2) B →M : N4||N5||AM ||SignB(N4||N5||AM )
Next, M verifies the signature of the received message, and verifies it is the
intended recipient by checking the value of AM . If the verifications succeed,
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M sends B the following backup request, including the nonce N5 received in
(4.b.2):
(4.b.3) M → B: ePB (KD||A||cT ||cC ||D)||N5||SignM (ePB (KD||A||cT ||cC ||D)||N5)
where D is a string consisting of the public keys of all the devices that are
members of the domain. B verifies the signature in the received message, and
verifies message freshness by comparing N5 with the value sent in (4.b.2). If the
verifications succeed, then the received encrypted message replaces the existing
domain backup information. B then sends the following to M , including the
nonce N4 received in message (4.b.1):
(4.b.4) B →M : Result||N4||SignB(Result||N4)
M verifies the signature, and verifies that N4 equals the value sent in (4.b.1).
M then checks the value of the Result, that can be set to either success or fail.
If it indicates success, M securely stores PJ and updates the stored values of
the counters cT and cC . M then passes the domain key to J , as follows:
(4.b.5) M → J : ePJ (KD)||N3||SignM (ePJ (KD)||N3)
J verifies message freshness by comparing N3 with the value sent in (3), verifies
the signature of the received message and then decrypts it. The recovered secret
key KD is then securely stored, as described in section 6.5.2.
7.3.3 Removing a Device from a Domain
This phase is exactly as described in section 6.5.3.
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7.3.4 Exchanging Content
This phase, defined in section 6.5.4, involves transferring content from a content
distributor to a domain, and exchanging content between domain devices. In
this section we describe both these procedures.
7.3.4.1 Transferring Content from a Content Distributor
Transferring content from a content distributor to a device in a domain involves
the following steps. An existing domain device V sends a Get Content message
to the content distributor to request content C, as identified by id. The request
includes the payment details, e.g. credit card details, to be used to pay for access
to C. The content distributor and V mutually authenticate each other, and the
content distributor attests to the state of V , as described in section 7.3.2, steps
1–3. If these verifications succeed, the content distributor securely generates
a content-specific secret key KT , symmetrically encrypts C using the key KT ,
and sends a Generate RO request to the rights issuer, as follows:
(1) content distributor → rights issuer: PV ||KT ||h(EKT (C))||id
where we assume that a secure session has been pre-established between the
content distributor and rights issuer, h denotes a globally agreed cryptographic
hash-function, EX(Y ) denotes the symmetric encryption of data Y using key
X, and where we assume that E provides authenticated encryption, as defined
in section 2.3.2.3. The rights issuer generates the rights object R, where:
R = (C’s consumption rules ||ePV (KT )||h(EKT (C))||id)
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and where h(EKT (C)) is used to bind R to the content C. Subsequently, the
rights issuer sends the following message to the content distributor:
(2) rights issuer → content distributor: CertIRI ||R||SignRI(R)
The content distributor then associates message (2) with EKT (C) and forwards
the result to V , as follows:
(3) content distributor → V : CertIRI ||R||SignRI(R)||EKT (C)
V verifies that R is bound to C by recomputing h(EKT (C)), verifies CertIRI , ex-
tracts IRI , checks its validity, e.g. by querying an OCSP service, and then checks
the rights issuer’s signature. Finally, V decryptsKT using its private decryption
key, re-encrypts it using KD, and retains R||SignV (R)||EKT (C)||EKD (KT ).
7.3.4.2 Transferring Content between Domain Devices
Transferring content from a source device Vs to a destination device Vd in the
same domain involves the following steps. In the description below we implicitly
assume that Vd and Vs have a real-time communications link; if such connectivity
is not available, then the same messages can be exchanged using a portable
storage medium, e.g. a USB memory stick. In the protocol below, only Vs needs
to query an OCSP service; this means that not all domain devices need to be
connected to the Internet whilst exchanging content. For example, a domain will
typically contain at least one device with Internet access, as used to download
content from a content distributor. This Internet-connected device can also be
used to access an OCSP service, and to distribute downloaded content to other
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devices that do not have a real-time communications link.
Vd first sends the following Get Content message to Vs:
(1) Vd → Vs: CertIVd ||PVd ||id|| SignVd(PVd ||id)
On receipt of (1), Vs verifies CertIVd , extracts IVd , checks its validity, e.g. by
querying an OCSP service, and then checks Vd’s signature. If the verifications
succeed, Vs sends C, as identified by id, and the associated rights object, to Vd
in the following message:
(2) Vs → Vd: EKT (C)||ePVd (R||EKD (KT ))
Vd now decrypts ePVd (R||EKD (KT )) using its private key, and verifies that C
is bound to R, as described above. If the verification succeeds, Vd retains
EKT (C)||EKD (KT )||R||SignVd(R). When accessing the content, KD is used
to decrypt KT , as needed to decrypt the content.
7.3.5 Backup and Recovery Procedure
This phase, as described in section 6.5.5, is implemented as follows. The backup
strategy is based on the assumption that the master control device has a trusted
backup agent, and that a selected domain device has a trusted restore agent that
can backup and recover KD, the user’s authentication credential, the current
values of both cT and cC , and the public signature verification keys of all devices
in the domain. The master control device acts as a central point in backup and
recovery; specifically, the master control device decides whether or not to accept
a particular device for backup purposes. Moreover, restoration of the key KD
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can only be implemented via a certified master control device.
In this section we describe the procedure for recovering a copy of KD to a failed
device, the procedure for recovering a master control device, and the procedure
for changing a domain backup device.
7.3.5.1 Device Recovery
The procedure for recovering a copy of KD to a failed device is as follows. The
domain owner must first add the failed device back into the domain in order
to provide it with a copy of KD, as described in section 7.3.2. However, as
described in 7.3.2, before the master control device increments the values of cT
and cC , it checks whether the joining device public key is already a member of
the domain; if so, it does not increment the values of cT and cC .
7.3.5.2 Recovery of a Master Control Device
The procedure for recovering an existing master control device M1 to a new
master control device M2 is as follows.
1. Suppose M1 has a hardware failure and cannot be repaired. The backup
software running on the domain backup device first checks that the public
key certificate for M1 has been revoked, e.g. by querying an OCSP ser-
vice. If this certificate has not been revoked, then the recovery process
terminates with an appropriate error message.
2. The backup software then checks that the public key certificate forM2 has
not been revoked, e.g. by querying an OCSP service, and checks whether
123
7. Authorised Domain Management using a Master Control Device
M2 is a device capable of acting as a master control device. As described
in section 7.2, we assume that M2’s domain certificate contains a field to
show that it corresponds to a master control device.
3. IfM2 is trusted and possesses a master control device certificate, then the
backup software releases to M2 the string (KD||A||cT ||cC ||D), encrypted
with M2’s public key.
4. M2 securely stores the received information. The backup device stores the
new domain certificate (i.e. M2’s certificate, as described in section 7.2)
in its trusted storage.
7.3.5.3 Changing Backup Device
As discussed above, only a single domain device is used for backup. As described
in section 7.3.2, the first device that joins a domain is defined to be the default
backup device (B1). However, the domain owner could assign a different device
(B2) to act as the backup device, although it must be a member of the domain.
A domain device is always in one of the following four states:
1. ‘active-backup’ is the state indicating a current domain backup device; a
device in this state holds a valid copy of the domain backup information.
2. ‘removed-pending’ is the state to which a domain backup device is switched
when it is in the process of being replaced with a new domain backup de-
vice. Whilst a device has this state, it keeps the existing domain backup
information. This copy of the information can be used if there is a hard-
ware failure before the state of the new domain backup device changes to
‘active-backup’.
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3. ‘removed-permanent’ is the state of a device that does not store any
backup information. Normally, all but one of the devices in a domain
will be in this state.
4. ‘pending-backup’ is the state to which a newly nominated domain backup
device is transferred while it is in the process of replacing an existing
domain backup device. A device in this state will have a valid copy of the
domain credentials; however, it will not respond to a request to update its
copy of the backup credentials, i.e. it will ignore messages of type (4.b.1)
specified in section 7.3.2.
The process for changing the nominated backup device from B1 to B2 is split
into three phases. The first involves updating the state of B1 from ‘active-
backup’ to ‘removed-pending’. The second phase involves updating the state
of B2 from ‘removed-permanent’ to ‘pending-backup’. The last phase involves
updating the state of B1 to ‘removed-permanent’, and updating the state of B2
to ‘active-backup’. These phases are implemented as follows.
1. The master control device M generates a random nonce N1 and sends B1
the following request:
(a) M → B1: N1||AB1 ||SignM (N1||AB1)
2. B1 verifies the signature of the received message, and verifies that it is
the intended recipient by checking the value of AB1 . If the verifications
succeed, B1 generates a random nonce N2 and sends an acknowledgment
to M , including the nonce N1 received in (a).
(b) B1 →M : N1||N2||AM ||SignB1(N1||N2||AM )
3. M verifies the signature of the received message, and verifies it is the in-
tended recipient by checking the value of AM . If the verifications succeed,
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M sends a Remove Backup Pending request to B1, including the nonce
N2 received in (b), as follows:
(c) M → B1: PB2 ||N2||SignM (PB2 ||N2)
4. On receipt of message (c), B1 verifies the signature, and verifies message
freshness by comparing N2 with the value sent in (b). If the verifications
succeed, B1 updates its state to ‘removed-pending’; however, it does not
delete its stored backup information at this stage. B1 then sends the
following message to M , including the nonce N1 received in message (a):
(d) B1 →M : N1||SignB1(N1)
5. When M receives message (d), it verifies the message signature, and ver-
ifies that N1 equals the value sent in (a). If the verifications succeed, M
updates its stored domain information so that B1 is no longer registered
as the domain backup device. M then generates a random nonce N3 and
sends B2 the following request:
(e) M → B2: N3||AB2 ||SignM (N3||AB2)
6. B2 verifies the signature of the received message, and verifies that it is
the intended recipient by checking the value of AB2 . If the verifications
succeed, B2 generates a random nonce N4 and sends an acknowledgment
to M , including the nonce N3 received in (e).
(f) B2 →M : N3||N4||AM ||SignB2(N3||N4||AM )
7. When M receives message (f), it verifies the signature, and verifies that
N3 equals the value sent in (e). If the verifications succeed, M sends a
Backup Domain request to B2, as follows:
(g) M → B2: ePB2 (KD||A||cT ||cC ||D)||N4||SignM (ePB2 (KD||A||cT ||cC ||D)||N4)
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8. When B2 receives message (g), it verifies the signature, and verifies mes-
sage freshness by comparing N4 with the value sent in (f). If the veri-
fications succeed, B2 sends a Backup Domain Pending instruction to M ,
including the nonce N3 received in message (e), as follows:
(h) B2 →M : N3||SignB2(N3)
9. When M receives message (h), it verifies the signature, and verifies that
N3 equals the value sent in (e). If the verifications succeed, M replaces
the stored domain backup device public key with PB2 , and then sends a
commit message to both B1 and B2, as follows.
(i) M → B1: N2||SignM (N2)
(j) M → B2: N4||SignM (N4)
10. On receipt of message (i), B1 verifies the signature, and checks message
freshness by comparing N2 with the value sent in (b). If the verifica-
tions succeed, B1 permanently deletes the stored backup information and
updates its state to ‘removed-permanent’. On recipient of message (j),
B2 verifies the signature, and checks freshness by comparing N4 with the
value sent in (f). If the verifications succeed, B2 updates its state to
‘active-backup’.
The integrity of the above protocol is ensured as follows. Only a single backup
device is active at any time. In addition, there is always at least one valid copy
of the domain backup information at all times. This protects domain credentials
against a hardware failure of M whilst performing any of the above steps. For
example, if M failed between steps 2–6, the status of the old backup device can
be reset to ‘active-backup’.
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7.4 Controlling Domain Membership
Controlling domain membership is described in section 6.6.2. The scheme de-
scribed in this chapter provides additional protection to help prevent illicit con-
tent proliferation. The only way in which a domain owner can transfer the
content protection key to another user’s device is by adding the device to the
domain. Whilst possible in principle, such a procedure is unlikely to be at-
tractive to the domain owner, as it means that the other user’s device would
become part of the domain controlled by the master control device, which would
mean that fewer of the domain owner’s own devices could be added to the do-
main. Most importantly, devices which have joined the domain are not able
to re-transfer the domain key, as only the master control device can transfer
the domain key, and this will only take place after it has authenticated the
domain owner. Section 7.7 describes possible options for the means to be used
to authenticate the domain owner, some of which could further increase the
restrictions on content piracy.
7.5 Security Analysis
We now considers the security threats, services, and mechanisms that apply to
the storage, execution, transmission, backup and recovery of the digital content
and the domain credentials. The domain credentials, as defined above, consist
of the public keys of all the devices that are members of the domain, KD, the
authentication credential, and the counters cT and cC .
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7.5.1 Security Threats
The main goal of the proposed scheme is to prevent the transfer of the means
for accessing content (i.e. the domain-specific key KD) to unauthorised devices
using physical or digital means. This is achieved by ensuring that this key is
transferred to a device only after the domain owner has been authenticated, the
values of both domain counters have been incremented, and the trustworthiness
of the device has been verified. Hence, only devices which are part of a domain
can access the domain content. Devices can only be added to a domain if the
domain owner is personally involved, as ensured by authenticating the domain
owner. This system has the following requirements.
• The master control device must securely generate, process and store the
domain-specific credential, so that it is not available in the clear even to
domain owner. This process is vulnerable to the following security threats:
(1) unauthorised manipulation of the domain credentials during use in the
master control device; and (2) unauthorised manipulation of the domain
credentials whilst stored in the master control device.
• The master control device must securely send the key KD to a device J
joining the domain. Such a procedure is exposed to the following security
threats: (3) unauthorised reading or alteration of KD whilst in transit; (4)
the master control device unwittingly sending KD to a malicious entity;
(5) J unwittingly receiving KD from a malicious master control device;
and (6) replay of communications between the master control device and
J .
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The above requirements ensure that the domain key (i.e. the means for accessing
content) is securely generated, protected, and distributed to domain devices.
The next step is to protect a piece of content C and the associated rights object
R when it is stored, executed and transferred between domain devices. Security
threats to the transfer of C and R between domain devices are:
(7) unauthorised reading or alteration of C, and unauthorised alteration
of R, while in transit; and (8) transfer of C and R to an unauthorised
entity.
Security threats to the storage and execution of C and R in domain devices are:
(9) unauthorised reading or updating of C, and unauthorised updating
of R, whilst stored in a domain device; and (10) unauthorised reading or
updating of C, and unauthorised updating of R while being accessed on
a domain device.
Security threats to the backup and recovery of the domain credentials, including
KD, cT , cC , A and D, are:
(11) unauthorised reading or alteration of domain credentials whilst in
transit; (12) unauthorised reading or alteration of domain credentials
whilst stored in the backup device; (13) the master control device unwit-
tingly sending domain credentials to a malicious entity; (14) the backup
device unwittingly receiving domain credentials from a malicious master
control device; and (15) replay of communications between the master
control device and the backup device.
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In addition to the above threats, there is a special type of threat associated
with dynamic rights objects, i.e. backing up a dynamic rights object and then
restoring it at a later time to reuse an expired licence. As we discussed in section
6.5.4, there is no solution to this threat in authorised domains. In this thesis we
do not address this problem, and it remains a possible topic for future research.
7.5.2 Security Services and Mechanisms
The security services required to counteract threats 1, 2, 4, 9, 10, 12, and 13
(listed above) can be provided using trusted platform functionality, as discussed
in section 6.2. In section 7.6 we describe how such trusted platform functional-
ity can be implemented using a platform conforming to the TCG specifications.
Threats 3, 5–8, 11, 14 and 15 are addressed using standard cryptographic mech-
anisms. A direct mapping exists between the threats outlined above and the
list of services and mechanisms given below.
1. Confidentiality and integrity of the domain credentials during execution on
a master control device. Providing this service requires process isolation
techniques, which provide protection for a message against being read or
altered by an unauthorised entity whilst being executed [34]. This service
can be provided using trusted computing technology, discussed in chapter
3.
2. Confidentiality and integrity of domain credentials whilst stored in a mas-
ter control device. Providing this service requires protected storage, typ-
ically by storing domain credentials inside a tamper-resistant module, as
discussed in section 6.2.
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3. Confidentiality and integrity of KD whilst in transit. This service is pro-
vided by the use of asymmetric encryption and a digital signature — see
section 7.3.2.
4. Entity authentication of a joining device J to a master control device.
The provision of this service is implementation-dependent, and involves
a protocol exchange between J and the master control device; see, for
example, section 7.6. It is initiated when the master control device and
J mutually authenticate each other — see section 7.3.2. This mutual
authentication attests to the DRM agent execution status, i.e. SJ , and
whether the platform is trusted, as discussed in section 6.2.
5. KD origin authentication. The joining device J checks the origin ofKD by
checking the master control device’s signature on the received encrypted
value of KD — see section 7.3.2.
6. Prevention of replay of communications between a master control device
and a device. This is provided by the inclusion of nonces in protocol
messages — see section 7.3.2.
7. Confidentiality and integrity protection of content C, and and integrity
protection of rights object R whilst in transit. This service is provided by
encrypting C and KT using an authenticated encryption technique, and
signing R; see section 7.3.4.
8. Entity authentication of the destination device Vd whilst transferring con-
tent C and rights object R. The source device Vs validates Vd’s public
key to make sure it has not been revoked, and then encrypts R and the
encrypted KT using Vd’s public key — see section 7.3.4. Vs does not need
to verify whether Vd is trusted, because the transferred KT is protected
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using KD, which is known only by devices in the same domain and is
revealed only in a trusted environment, as discussed in section 6.2.
9. Confidentiality and integrity of content C, and integrity of rights object R
in domain devices. The integrity of R is protected using a digital signature.
C is encrypted using the secret key KT that is itself encrypted using a
secret key KD. As described in section 7.3.4, the symmetric encryption
technique in use is assumed to provide authenticated encryption — see
section 7.3.4. Also, the encryption keyKD is bound to the device’s trusted
environment, as discussed in section 6.2.
10. Confidentiality and integrity of content, and integrity of rights object dur-
ing execution is provided exactly as discussed in (1) above.
11. Confidentiality and integrity of domain credentials whilst in transit is pro-
vided exactly as discussed in (3) above.
12. Confidentiality and integrity of domain credentials whilst stored in a backup
device is provided exactly as discussed in (2) above.
13. Entity authentication of a backup device to a master control device is pro-
vided exactly as discussed in (4) above.
14. Domain credentials origin authentication is provided exactly as discussed
in (5) above.
15. Prevention of replay of communications between a master control device
and a backup device is provided exactly as discussed in (6) above.
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7.6 Implementing the Protocols Using Trusted
Computing
We described in section 6.3 how a system conforming to the TCG specifications
[92, 93, 94] can satisfy the requirements described in section 6.2. In this section
we consider how security requirements 1, 2, 4, 9, 10, 12, and 13, discussed in
section 7.5, can be met using functionality in the TCG specifications. In this
section we do not discuss practical problems associated with TCG specification,
as these have been discussed in section 3.8.
1. Confidentiality and integrity of domain credentials during execution. A
challenger can verify that a platform is trustworthy by validating the plat-
form integrity metrics. The TP measures the integrity of software executed
from platform start-up and stores the result in the platform’s PCRs; this
provides assurance to the challenger that the expected version of the OS,
and of any other measured software, is running on the platform. The pri-
vate key that is needed to decrypt the user domain credentials will only
be released to the DRM software agent if the PCR values are as expected.
The system assumes that if the OS and the application are as expected,
then the integrity and secrecy of data is subsequently guaranteed.
2. Confidentiality and integrity of domain credentials whilst stored in domain
devices. The use of asymmetric encryption provides the confidentiality
service. When stored in a domain device, domain credentials are encrypted
using a non-migratable key that is bound to the domain device TPM, and
only released when the domain device integrity metrics are in a state
that matches the values stored with the key. Integrity is provided by
inserting an authorisation value into the key object (under the assumption
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that the method of encryption used has appropriate properties) that must
be provided in order to reveal the key. If the encrypted key object has
been altered, the decrypted authorisation value will not match the stored
authorisation value.
4. Entity authentication of a device J to a master control device. This ser-
vice is achieved using the TCG challenge-response authentication proto-
col. This is initiated when the master control device generates a nonce
N1 and sends it in an integrity challenge to J . J replies with an integrity
response that includes the master control device’s identity, N1, and J ’s
integrity metrics, i.e. SJ , all signed by J ’s TPM. In addition, it pro-
vides the measured software logs from the Trusted Platform Measurement
Store (TPMS), as well as certificates for the measured software. The soft-
ware measurements and the certificates enable the master control device
to verify the current state of J [34]. The master control device verifies the
signature and checks that the necessary properties hold for the platform
associated with the identity.
9. Confidentiality and integrity of content C, and integrity of rights object
R in a domain device V . The integrity of R is protected using a digital
signature. C is encrypted using the secret key KT that is itself encrypted
using a secret key KD. As described in section 7.3.4, the symmetric en-
cryption technique in use is assumed to provide authenticated encryption.
The key KD is protected using a non-migratable key that is bound to V ’s
TPM and access control information. The protected storage mechanism
is used to ensure that the non-migratable key is only accessed when the
device’s execution environment state matches that associated with this
key.
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10. Confidentiality and integrity of C, and integrity of rights object during
execution is provided exactly as discussed in (1) above.
12. Confidentiality and integrity of domain credentials whilst stored in a backup
device is provided exactly as discussed in (2) above.
13. Entity authentication of a backup device to a master control device is pro-
vided exactly as discussed in (4) above.
7.7 Methods of User Authentication
In the system described in section 7.3, users are subject to two-factor authentica-
tion that involves “Something the user has”, i.e. the master control device, that
binds devices joining the domain to itself using the domain keyKD, as described
in section 7.2, and either “something the user is”, i.e. biometric verification, or
“something the user knows”, i.e. a password or PIN. The authentication cre-
dential, which is kept in the protected storage of the master control device and
is associated with the domain key, will thus be either a biometric reference
template or a password/PIN. The authentication credential binds the master
control device and its domain to a single owner. In the remainder of this section
we present the pros and cons of the two approaches to user authentications and
possible countermeasures to the identified vulnerabilities.
Using biometric authentication ensures that adding a device to a domain re-
quires the physical presence of the domain owner, which imposes more stringent
restrictions on content piracy than use of a password/PIN. Using biometric au-
thentication has the following advantages: biometric features are bound to a
person, they cannot be shared, and there is no password to lose or forget. How-
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ever, the following possible problems (and possible countermeasures specific to
the proposed scheme) are associated with biometric technology.
• Biometric authentication requires biometric samples captured from a live
user to be matched against a stored biometric reference template. The
processing required to perform this matching might slow down the au-
thentication process; however, in the proposed scheme, biometric authen-
tication is required only when creating a domain and when a device joins or
leaves the domain. These are likely to be relatively infrequent events, and
hence the use of biometrics will not affect the overall system performance.
• Biometric characteristics are not secret, and can be copied and used to
create fake artifacts to gain access to the system. Biometric characteristics
can be copied from a variety of sources, such as detached real fingers,
collecting fingerprints from surfaces, iris pictures, face pictures, masks,
videos, voice recorders, etc. In addition, biometric samples could be copied
whilst being transferred from a biometric sensor to a processing device
[68, 90]. Two measures need to be implemented to reduce the effect of
these problems:
1. Biometric liveness detection, which cannot be achieved using cryp-
tographic mechanisms, can be achieved using one of the following
three techniques: the intrinsic properties of a living body, e.g. phys-
ical properties, electrical properties, visual properties, etc; involun-
tary signs of a living body, e.g. blood pressure, perspiration, brain
wave signals, etc; and bodily responses to external stimuli, e.g. blink-
ing, smiling, pupil dilation, etc. For more information about these
techniques, see, for example, [90].
2. Protecting captured biometric samples whilst being transferred from
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the biometric sensor to the signal processing subsystem (in the pro-
posed scheme the latter is part of the master control device). This
can be implemented using cryptographic techniques; see, for example,
[21]. In addition, the biometric reference template needs to be pro-
tected inside the master control device. These points are addressed
in the proposed scheme, as discussed in section 7.5.
• The extracted biometric samples will vary, even for the same user, so an
exact match between extracted features and a stored biometric template
cannot be expected. This means that a feature-matching algorithm has
associated tolerance settings, so that a sample is considered valid if the
difference between the sample and the template is within the tolerance
bounds. More relaxed tolerance settings will result in a higher False Ac-
ceptance Rate (FAR), and a lower False Rejection Rate (FRR), while
stricter tolerance settings will result in a lower FAR and a higher FRR.
Moreover, some biometric schemes possess a degree of uncertainty. For
example, fingerprint biometric accuracy depends on the position of the
finger on the reader, changes in external finger conditions, etc. Very high
accuracy in biometric identification typically requires relatively expensive
biometric readers such as retina or iris biometric measurement systems;
more information can be found in [63, 65].
In our scheme, the use of more relaxed tolerance settings reduces the effect
of FRR problems without raising serious problems because of the higher
FAR. This is because the master control device is associated with a single
owner and a single domain, and the domain key cannot be replicated
on multiple master control devices. These factors reduce the risk that a
master control device will be exposed to multiple users, and hence reduce
the risks associated with a relatively high FAR.
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Using a password/PIN as a method of authentication has the following ad-
vantages: it is used directly for user authentication, its verification is a simple
process, it does not require excessive storage, and it is the most widely used user
authentication method. However, the following possible problems (and possible
countermeasures specific to the proposed scheme) are associated with the use
of passwords/PINs.
• It can be shared with others. This does not affect our scheme because
each password/PIN is bound to a single master control device, within
which the domain key is stored. Consequently, sharing the password/PIN
does not enable devices to be added to the associated domain without
also sharing the associated master control device. This is relatively hard
to accomplish, and a master control device owner is not likely to wish to
hand over his/her master control device.
• It is not bound to a person. In our scheme, the password/PIN is bound to
a single master control device, reducing the significance of this problem.
• It can be forgotten. A password needs to be long and complex to protect
against dictionary analysis or brute force attacks, which makes it hard
to remember [97]. There are approaches that can be used to help solve
this problem, such as implementing a password reminder, implementing
a graphical password system [97, 98], implementing a challenge-response
scheme, etc. In addition, a challenge-response scheme can be used to help
protect against the shoulder surfing problem [98].
• It is subject to both oﬄine and online attacks, as described by Pinkas
and Sander [78]. These can be counteracted by: preventing access to
the password file, implementing delayed responses, and account locking
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that locks a user account for a fixed period after a limited number of
unsuccessful login attempts. These measures prevent an attacker from
checking a large number of passwords in a reasonable time.
7.8 Summary
This chapter contains a description of an implementation of the authorised do-
main DRM framework given in chapter 6. In this scheme, domain owners are
authenticated using two-factor authentication, involving “something the domain
owner has”, i.e. a master control device that controls and manages consumers do-
mains, and binds devices joining a domain to itself, and “something the domain
owner is or knows”, i.e. a biometric or password/PIN authentication mechanism
that is implemented by the master control device. These measures establish a
one-to-many relationship between the master control device and domain de-
vices, and a one-to-one relationship between domain owners and their master
control devices, ensuring that a single consumer owns each domain. This helps
to prevent illicit content proliferation.
In addition, we have presented the pros and cons of the two approaches to user
authentication, as well as possible countermeasures to the issues identified with
these approaches.
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In this chapter we describe an implementation of the generic authorised do-
main DRM framework given in chapter 6. This scheme involves managing an
authorised domain using a trusted authority which supports: authentication of
a domain owner using the domain owner payment cards; domain establishment;
adding devices to and removing devices from a domain; and backing up and
recovering domain credentials. The system security requirements, threats, and
services are analysed. Finally, how the proposed scheme counteracts the main
content piracy threats is also discussed..
8.1 Introduction
The system described in this chapter is an implementation of the generic autho-
rised domain DRM framework given in chapter 6. The proposed system works
by binding the unique domain key KD (introduced in section 6.5) to one of the
domain owner’s payment cards. The domain-specific key is generated automat-
ically by a trusted third party referred to as the trusted authority (TA). Before
the TA transfers the domain-specific key to a device being added to a domain, it
must authenticate the domain owner and ensure that the joining device belongs
to the domain owner. This is achieved by validating the owner’s payment card;
this involves the TA’s Acquirer bank, which contacts the payment card issuer
bank to ensure that the payment card used when adding a device to the domain
belongs to the creator of the domain.
In addition, the TA ensures that a joining device is in close proximity to another
device already in the domain. The existing domain device could be portable,
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which provides flexibility to enable devices to be added to the domain at multiple
locations (wherever the domain owner with the portable device is physically
present). If the domain owner is authenticated successfully, the TA releases the
domain key to the joining device. The domain key is then securely stored by
the joining device, as described in section 6.5.2. These mechanisms bind the
domain key to the domain owner.
One advantage of authenticating domain owners using payment cards is that
cardholders typically do not trust other users with their payment card details,
which helps to ensure that only a domain owner can authorise devices to join
the domain. The use of a physical proximity check with another device already
a member of the domain helps to prevent the domain key from spreading via
the Internet. However, our proposed scheme does not stop legitimate controlled
content sharing or the downloading of digital content from a remote location,
as outlined in section 8.3.4.
The system is designed in such a way that payment cards and user identities are
not revealed to the TA, which helps to protect consumer privacy. The participat-
ing banks and the payment network provider, which have agreed that payment
cards and the authorisation network can be used to support this scheme, might
wish to charge for this service; however, the banks and the payment network
provider are only required when creating a domain and when devices join the
domain, and hence the cost impact of a modest charge should be manageable.
The extra costs in implementing the solution could be covered from the expected
reduction in piracy.
This chapter is organised as follows. Sections 8.2 and 8.3 describe the system
and the process workflow. Section 8.4 describes how the scheme controls domain
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membership. Section 8.5 analyses the system security requirements, threats, and
services. Section 8.6 described how these security requirements can be met using
TCG functionality. Section 8.7 discusses alternative methods to implement the
proposed scheme. Section 8.8 discusses the main differences between our scheme
and other schemes using electronic payment systems for user authentication, and
section 8.9 provides conclusions.
8.2 System Model
In addition to the entities identified in chapter 6, the system model includes
TAs, payment cards and Banks.
8.2.1 Trusted Authority
The scheme relies on the existence of a TA, a trusted third party that provides
the trusted domain controller functionality. We assume the TA has a reliable
backup and recovery strategy. Each TA must have an associated Acquiring
bank, which it must trust for the purpose of verifying payment card details.
Also, each TA has a private signing key used for entity authentication, that is
securely stored by the TA. The corresponding public key is certified by the
scheme-specific CA (introduced in section 6.4), and the certificate contains a
general description of the TA and its security properties. In addition, each TA
is assumed to possess an encryption key pair certified by the TA itself using its
signing key. Both certificates must be known to all domain devices in domains
which the TA supports, and the certificate for the public signature verification
key must be known to the TA’s Acquirer bank.
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A TA is in charge of creating, maintaining and controlling consumer domains.
It creates and maintains an identifier (U) and the secret key (KD) for each
domain, which it installs on every device joining that domain. These two values
are referred to collectively as the domain credentials. In addition, it controls
domain membership by tracking devices joining and leaving a domain, and
verifying devices joining a domain. For each domain, the TA maintains the
two sequentially incremented domain counters introduced in section 6.5, both
of which are initially set to one.
8.2.2 Payment Cards and Banks
For the purposes of this chapter, a payment card can be either a credit or a
debit card. Every payment card has a unique number (typically of 16 decimal
digits). A domain owner can use multiple payment cards as long as they all
belong to him/her. This enables the system to cope with changes in card use.
Debit and credit cards are very widely used for e-commerce. The workflow for
a traditional web-based electronic card payment is as follows. A customer first
provides his/her payment card number to a merchant via an SSL connection.
The merchant then sends the transaction details and the card number to an
Acquirer bank for authorisation, through an Acquirer payment gateway. The
Acquirer payment gateway contacts the card Issuer bank for authorisation, us-
ing the inter-bank private network (e.g. VisaNet or BankNet). The Issuer bank
verifies the card number, checks the availability of funds, and then sends an
authorisation response back to the Acquirer bank. The Acquirer bank forwards
the authorisation response to the merchant. If the Issuer authorises the trans-
action, the merchant can supply the ordered goods/services to the customer,
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and present the charges to the Acquirer bank, which sends a settlement request
to the Issuer bank. The Issuer bank then puts the money into an inter-bank
settlement account and charges the transaction value to the customer account.
More information about electronic payment systems can be found, for example,
in [39, 73].
In the scheme described in this chapter, the verification of a domain owner’s
payment card is performed in a similar way to the electronic payment process
described above. This should help ease implementation issues, and increase the
acceptability of the scheme.
In addition to the keys it uses for secure payments, each participating Acquirer
bank is assumed to have a private signing key used for entity authentication,
that it securely stores. The corresponding public key is certified by the scheme-
specific CA. This certificate contains a general description of the Acquirer bank
and its security properties. In addition, each Acquirer bank is assumed to
possess a unique encryption key pair that is certified by the Acquirer bank
itself, using its signing key. Also, each domain device needs a trusted copy of
both certificates, which could, for example, be obtained from the TA website,
the URL for which we assume is listed in the TA certificate. Finally, each card
issuing bank participating in the scheme is assumed to know the date of birth
and full name of its cardholders, and to have the permission of its cardholders
to use this information to support this scheme.
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Figure 8.1: Domain Establishment Workflow
8.3 Process Workflow
We now describe in detail how the five phases of the system workflow, as in-
troduced in section 6.5, are implemented. Domain establishment and adding
devices into a domain involve interactions between a TA T , an Acquirer bank
B, and the DRM software agent running in both a joining device J and an
existing domain device V .
8.3.1 Domain Establishment
The domain establishment phase, as described in section 6.5.1, is implemented
as follows. This procedure is followed when a consumer wishes to create a
domain (and simultaneously add a first device J to this domain). The process
workflow is summarised in Figure 8.1. J instructs the domain owner to provide
his/her payment card number PCD1. J then sends a Create Domain request
to T to establish a domain. The request has the form:
(1) J → T : PJ ||SJ ||N1||AT ||CertIJ ||SignJ(PJ ||SJ ||N1||AT )||M1
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whereM1 = ePB (PCD1||h(PJ)) (all other symbols are as defined in section 7.3).
Next, T verifies CertIJ , extracts IJ from CertIJ , and checks that IJ has not
been revoked, e.g. by querying an OCSP service. T then verifies J ’s signature
using IJ , verifies AT to ensure that it is the intended recipient, and verifies that
the DRM agent is running correctly in J by checking the value of SJ . How this
verification occurs is implementation dependent; see, for example, section 8.6.
T then generates a nonce N2, and sends the following message to J :
(2) T → J : AJ ||N1||N2||SignT (AJ ||N1||N2)
J verifies T ’s signature (joining devices have T ’s certificate, as stated in section
8.2.1), verifies AJ to ensure that it is the intended recipient, and verifies message
freshness by comparing N1 with the value sent in (1). J then sends the following
reply to T :
(3) J → T : N2||N3||SignJ(N2||N3).
T verifies J ’s signature and checks message freshness by comparing N2 with the
value sent in (2). Steps 1–3 conform to the three-pass mutual authentication
protocol described in [46].
Subsequently, T sends the following Authentication Request to B to request the
verification of PCD1:
(4) T → B: M1||SignT (PJ)
B decrypts M1, and then verifies SignT (PJ) using the value of h(PJ) recovered
from M1. This ensures that M1 was created in the same device that sent the
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Create Domain request, preventingM1 from becoming a global password. If T ’s
signature is verified successfully, B then sends the following Verification Request
to the card issuer, via the inter-bank private network, to request the verification
of PCD1:
(5) B → PCD1 Issuer: PCD1
The card Issuer verifies that PCD1 is a currently valid card number, but is not
required to verify the name of the card owner. This is because T , for privacy
reasons, does not identify the domain by the owner name; T , via its Acquirer
bank, ensures that all devices in the domain are owned by the owner of PCD1
without needing to know the PCD number and owner name, as explained in the
next section. The card issuer informs B whether the verification has succeeded
by sending the following message:
(6) PCD1 Issuer → B: Verification Result||PCD1.
B verifies PCD1 equals the value sent in (5). If so, B signs the Verifica-
tion Result and M1, and sends the following message to T :
(7) B → T : Verification Result||M1||SignB(Verification Result||M1).
T checks B’s signature, the Verification Result, and that M1 equals the value
sent in (4); if the checks succeed, T generates the domain-specific secret key
KD and a domain identifier U , and initialises the two counters cT and cC to
1, as defined in section 6.5.1. The domain-specific values KD, U , cT , cC , PJ
and M1 are securely stored by T . Subsequently, T sends back to J the domain
credentials, as follows:
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(8) T → J : ePJ (U ||KD)||N3||SignT (ePJ (U ||KD)||N3).
When J receives this message, it verifies message freshness by comparing N3
with the value sent in (3). J verifies T ’s signature and then decrypts ePJ (U ||KD).
The key KD and U are securely stored by J , as described in section 6.5.2. U is
used both as a domain identifier and to ensure that joining devices are in close
proximity to any domain device before joining a domain, as explained in the
next section.
8.3.2 Adding a Device to a Domain
This phase, defined in section 6.5.2, is implemented as follows. In order for
a device J to join a domain, it must communicate with T using an existing
domain device V as a proxy, as illustrated in Figure 8.2. J instructs the domain
owner to provide his/her payment card number. Once the domain owner has
provided this number, PCD2 say, J sends a Join Domain request to V . The
request has the form:
(1) J → V : PJ ||SJ ||N1||AT ||CertIJ ||SignJ(PJ ||SJ ||N1||AT )||M2
where M2 = ePB (PCD2||h(PJ)). Next, V checks that J is in close proximity
to itself, e.g. by using the Near Field Communication (NFC) protocol, or by
measuring the Round-Trip Time (RTT) between V and J , see, for example,
[36, 42, 49]. V then creates the string ePT (U ||h(PJ)), associates it with J ’s
request, and forwards it to T as follows:
(2) V → T : PJ ||SJ ||N1||AT ||CertIJ ||SignJ(PJ ||SJ ||N1||AT )||M2||ePT (U || h(PJ))
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Figure 8.2: Joining Devices Workflow
On receipt of this message, T first decrypts ePT (U ||h(PJ)) and verifies that U
identifies a valid domain. Because U is securely stored by T , and by devices that
are members of U ’s domain, it is not available even to the domain owner, and it
can only be revealed by the trusted DRM software agent. This ensures that the
join request is coming via an existing domain device that is trusted to check the
physical proximity of J . T then computes h(PJ) from the value of PJ sent in (2)
and compares it with the value recovered from ePT (U ||h(PJ)). Subsequently,
T verifies the state of J , and T and J mutually authenticate each other, as
described in steps 1–3 of section 8.3.1. If these processes complete successfully,
T checks whether the public key of J is already a member of the domain (a device
might need to rejoin a domain, for example, in case of hardware/software failure,
as discussed in section 8.3.5). If the public key of J is not in the domain, T
temporarily increments the values of cT and cC (it does not store the new values
at this stage). If both counters do not exceed the maximum value specified by
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T for U ’s domain, T sends an Authentication Request to B, to ask B to verify
that the owner of PCD2 is the same as the owner of PCD1, as used to create
the domain. The request has the form:
(3) T → B: M1||M2||SignT (PJ)
B decrypts M2, and then verifies SignT (PJ) using the value of h(PJ) recov-
ered from M2. This ensures that M2 was created in the same device that sent
the Join Domain request, preventing M2 from becoming a global password. If
T ’s signature is verified successfully, B then sends, via the inter-bank private
network, a Verification Request including PCD2 to the card issuer, in the form:
(4) B → PCD2 Issuer: PCD2
The card issuer verifies that PCD2 is a valid card number, and retrieves the
name and the date of birth of the card owner. It then sends to B the following
message:
(5) PCD2 Issuer → B: Verification Result||PCD2||h(PCD2 Owner details).
where PCD2 Owner details contains the name of the owner of the payment card
with number PCD2 and his/her date of birth. If PCD2 equals the value sent
in (4) and the Verification Result indicates success, B decrypts M1, and then
sends, via the inter-bank private network, a Compare Owner request message,
including PCD1 and h(PCD2 Owner details), to the issuer of the card with
number PCD1 as follows:
(6) B → PCD1 Issuer: PCD1||h(PCD2 Owner details)
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The card issuer retrieves the name and the date of birth of the owner of the card
with number PCD1, and compares their hash output with h(PCD2 Owner details).
It then informs B whether or not they match in the following message:
(7) PCD1 Issuer → B: Verification Result||PCD1.
B verifies that PCD1 equals the value sent in (6). If so, B signs the Verifica-
tion Result and M2, using its signing key, and sends the following message to
T :
(8) B → T : Verification Result||M2||SignB(Verification Result||M2).
On receipt of this message, T checks B’s signature, the Verification Result, and
that M2 equals the value sent in (3). If the checks succeed, then it replaces its
stored copy of M1 with M2, in order to link the domain to the most recently
used payment card, stores PJ , the updated cC and cT values, and releases the
domain credentials to J via V as follows:
(9) T → V → J : ePJ (U ||KD)||SignT (ePJ (U ||KD)).
When J receives this message, it verifies T ’s signature and then decrypts ePJ (U ||KD).
The keyKD and the identifier U are securely stored by J , as described in section
8.3.1.
8.3.3 Removing a Device from a Domain
This phase is exactly as described in section 6.5.3.
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8.3.4 Exchanging Content
This phase is exactly as discussed in section 7.3.4.
8.3.5 Backup and Recovery Procedure
The backup and recovery phase, as described in section 6.5.5, is implemented
as follows. There are two options for this phase, where the first is applied if no
domain devices can be recovered. We assume that the TA has a backup and
recovery strategy, allowing U and KD to be restored to a domain device. The
TA releases the secure domain key KD and the identifier U to one device in the
domain, once the TA is satisfied with the domain owner identity. Subsequently,
other devices in the domain must rejoin the domain as described in section 8.3.2.
The second possibility applies when at least one domain device does not require
recovery. In this case, the recovery procedure for other domain devices simply
involves re-adding them to the domain.
As described in section 8.3.2, before the TA increments the values of the domain
counter it checks whether the joining device public key is already a member of
the domain; if so, it does not increment the domain counters.
8.4 Controlling Domain Membership
Controlling domain membership is described in section 6.6.2. The scheme de-
scribed in this chapter provides additional protection to help prevent illicit con-
tent proliferation, as it imposes more stringent restrictions on piracy. The do-
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main key KD, which is used to encrypt content encryption keys, is securely
stored inside the TA, is not available in the clear, and can only be transferred
from the TA to other devices after their physical proximity has been checked.
That is, the physical location check, in conjunction with the use of counters (cC
and cT ), addresses the Root Distribution problem.
The only way in which a domain owner could transfer the content protection
key to another user’s device is by transferring the encrypted domain content, an
existing domain device, and the domain owner’s payment card details. Whilst
possible in principle, such a procedure is unlikely to be attractive to the domain
owner. Such a process would also mean that the other user’s device would
become part of the domain owned by payment card owner, which would mean
that fewer of the domain owner’s devices could be added to the domain. Most
importantly, devices which have joined this domain would not be able to re-
transfer the domain key (only the TA can transfer this key to other devices).
8.5 Security Analysis
We now consider the security threats, services, and mechanisms that apply to
the storage, execution and transmission of KD, U , the payment card number,
and digital content. The security threats, services, and mechanisms that apply
to the transmission of content and rights objects between domain devices, and
the security threats, services, and mechanisms that apply to the storage and
execution of content and rights objects in domain devices, were discussed in
sections 7.5 and 7.6.
Note that in this thesis we do not consider the security threats that applies to
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a traditional web-based electronic card payment. Security threats of this type
are addressed elsewhere; see, for example, [73]. Following are some examples of
such security threats: lack of user authentication resulting in card not present
problem, card detail are only protected during transmission making them sub-
ject to attack whilst being processed/stored at a merchant server, merchant has
clear access to consumer payment card details enabling the merchant to link
separate transactions bought using the same card details, which raises a serious
privacy concerns.
8.5.1 Security Threats
The main goal of the proposed scheme is to prevent transferring the means
for accessing content (i.e. the domain-specific key KD) to unauthorised devices
using physical or digital means. This is achieved by ensuring that this key is
transferred to a device only after the domain owner has been authenticated, the
values of both domain counters have been incremented, and the trustworthiness
of the device has been verified. Hence, only devices which are part of a domain
can access the domain content. Devices can only be added to a domain if the
domain owner is personally involved, as ensured by authenticating the domain
owner. This system has the following requirements.
• The domain owner payment card number PCD1 should only be accessible
to authorised banks, and it should not leak to unauthorised parties, such as
the scheme specific TA or content distributors/rights issuers. Therefore,
transferring PCD1 from a joining device J to an Acquirer bank B is
vulnerable to the following security threats: (1) unauthorised reading of
PCD1 while being processed on J ; and (2) unauthorised reading and
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alteration of PCD1 while in transit.
• The TA must securely sends KD/U to a device J whilst joining the do-
main. Such a procedure is exposed to the following security threats: (3) J
unwittingly receiving KD and/or U from a malicious TA T , or an existing
domain device unwittingly sending U to a malicious T ; (4) unauthorised
reading and alteration of KD/U while in transit; (5) unauthorised manip-
ulation of KD/U while stored in J ; and (6) T unwittingly sending KD
and/or U to a malicious entity.
In addition to the above threats, there is a special type of threat associated
with dynamic rights objects, i.e. backing up a dynamic rights object and then
restoring it at a later time to reuse an expired licence. As we discussed in section
6.5.4, there is no solution to this threat in authorised domains. In this thesis we
do not address this problem, and it remains a possible topic for future research.
8.5.2 Security Services and Mechanisms
The security services required to counteract threats 1, 5 and 6 (listed above)
can be provided using trusted platform functionality, as discussed in section
6.2. In section 8.6 we illustrate how such trusted platform functionality can be
implemented using a platform conforming to the TCG specifications. Threats 2–
4, are addressed using standard cryptographic mechanisms. A direct mapping
exists between the threats outlined above and the services and mechanisms
outlined below:
1. Confidentiality and integrity of PCD1 during use. Providing this service
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requires process isolation techniques, which provide protection for a mes-
sage against being read or altered by an unauthorised entity whilst being
executed [34]. This service can be provided using trusted computing tech-
nology, discussed in chapter 3.
2. Confidentiality and Integrity of PCD1 while in transit. This service is
provided by encrypting PCD1 using an asymmetric encryption technique
that provides non-malleability — see section 8.3.4.
3. KD origin authentication, and U destination verification. The joining
device J checks the origin of KD by checking the TA’s signature on the
received encrypted value ofKD — see sections 8.3.1 and 8.3.2. In addition,
encrypting U using the TA public key ensures that only the TA can extract
U — see section 8.3.2.
4. Confidentiality and integrity of KD/U while in transit. This service is
provided by the use of asymmetric encryption and a digital signature —
see sections 8.3.1 and 8.3.2.
5. Confidentiality and integrity of KD/U whilst stored in a domain device V .
Providing this service requires protected storage, as discussed in section
6.2.
6. Entity authentication of a joining device J to a TA T . The provision of
this service is implementation-dependent, and involves a protocol exchange
between J and T ; see, for example, section 8.6. It is initiated when T and
J mutually authenticate each other — see sections 8.3.1 and 8.3.2. This
mutual authentication attests to the DRM agent execution status, i.e. SJ ,
and whether the platform is trusted, as discussed in section 6.2.
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8.6 Implementing the Protocols Using Trusted
Computing
We described in section 6.3 how a system conforming to the TCG specifications
[92, 93, 94] can satisfy the requirements described in section 6.2. In this section
we consider how security requirements 1, 5 and 6, discussed in section 8.5, can
be met using TCG functionality. In this section we do not discuss practical
problems associated with TCG specification, as these have been discussed in
section 3.8.
1. Confidentiality and integrity of a PCD number PCD1 during execution is
provided exactly as discussed in point 1, section 7.6.
5. Confidentiality and integrity of KD/U whilst stored in a domain device is
provided exactly as discussed in point 2, section 7.6.
6. Entity authentication of a joining device J to the TA T is provided exactly
as discussed in point 4, section 7.6.
8.7 Alternative Implementations
Current ‘cardholder not present’ card payment systems lack user authentication.
This has been the main motivation behind the development of two mechanisms
supporting payment card owner authentication, namely Verified by Visa (VbV)
[95], and the MasterCard Secure Payment Application (SPA) [67]. The method
used to authenticate users is not constrained by these schemes, and could be
password-based or involve a user token of some kind. These schemes address
fraud problems resulting from misuse of payment card numbers by parties other
159
8. Authorised Domain Management Using an Electronic Payment System
than the cardholder. It would be desirable to integrate one of these two mech-
anisms into the scheme described above, as they help to bind a payment card
number to its owner. Such an integration could be achieved with either of the
two payment schemes. If either SPA or VbV is to be used, extra steps are needed
to authenticate the payment card owner to the payment card Issuer bank, as
described in [67, 95].
8.8 Related Work
There are other schemes that use payment cards for user authentication in
a somewhat different context to that of the scheme discussed above; see, for
example, [53, 76]. These two systems differ from the scheme proposed in this
thesis in the following ways.
• The schemes described in [53, 76] require the use of payment cards con-
forming to the EMV1 industry standard, and also require consumers to
possess a card reader that is able to interact with an EMV-compatible
card. The payment card authenticates the cardholder using a PIN, and
the payment card then vouches for the identity of the cardholder to a third
party. The scheme provided in this chapter does not require an EMV
compatible payment card, and it also does not require a card reader. The
owner provides the payment card details directly to the joining device,
which encrypts the card details using the Acquirer back public key.
• The scheme presented here protects consumer privacy, as only an Acquirer
bank can access payment card details, unlike the schemes in [53, 76] in
which third parties have access to payment card details.
1http://www.emvco.com
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• The schemes described in [53, 76] involve authenticating users for every
transaction. The scheme described in this chapter only involves authenti-
cating a user when a device is added to a domain, and does not require user
authentication for downloading and exchanging content between devices.
8.9 Summary
This chapter contains a description of an implementation of the authorised
domain DRM framework given in chapter 6. Domain owners are authenticated
using their payment cards. This authentication process is implemented using a
message flow analogous to that employed in existing electronic payment systems.
The scheme ensures that the name and date of birth of a domain creator are
the same for all devices joining a domain.
The proposed scheme helps to protect consumers’ privacy; domain owner au-
thentication is only required for managing domain membership, and is not re-
quired for creating, downloading or exchanging content. In addition, unlike in
the payment system with which the cards are routinely used, the card details
are not revealed to third parties.
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In this chapter we describe an implementation of the generic authorised do-
main DRM framework given in chapter 6. This scheme involves managing an
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authorised domain using a mobile network operator. This scheme supports: au-
thentication of a domain owner using a domain-specific mobile phone and the
general authentication architecture provided by the mobile phone network op-
erator; domain establishment; adding devices to and removing devices from a
domain; and backing up and recovering domain credentials. The system secu-
rity requirements, threats, and services are analysed. Finally, how the proposed
scheme counteracts the main content piracy threats is also discussed. Most of
the material in this chapter has previously been published in [11].
9.1 Introduction
The system described in this chapter is an implementation of the generic au-
thorised domain management framework given in chapter 6. The authorised
domain is managed by a mobile network operator using a domain-specific mo-
bile phone owned by the domain owner. The domain-specific mobile phone
generates the unique domain key KD (introduced in section 6.5). Before the
mobile phone transfers the domain-specific key to devices joining the domain,
it authenticates the domain owner using a shared secret, e.g. a PIN, and the
mobile phone and the mobile network operator are then mutually authenticated
using the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP1) Authentication and Key
Agreement protocol.
This mutual authentication procedure establishes secret session keys between
the mobile phone and the mobile network operator. These session keys are later
fetched by a Network Application Function, which maintains and manages con-
sumer domains. The Network Application Function is provided by the mobile
1http://www.3gpp.org
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network operator as part of its General Authentication Architecture mechanism.
Next, the mobile phone ensures a joining device is in close proximity to itself,
to prevent devices joining a domain via the Internet.
If the above procedures succeed, the mobile phone releases the domain key to
the joining device, which securely protects it as described in chapter 6.5. Only
the domain-specific mobile phone can release the domain key to other devices,
and this will only take place after authenticating the domain owner. This binds
the domain key to the domain owner.
One major advantage of using mobile phones as domain controllers is that mobile
phones are personalised, portable (enabling a domain owner to add devices
wherever he/she is physically present) and ubiquitous. In addition, the existing
mobile network infrastructure enables the authentication of subscribers, and
is capable of providing a Network Application Function service as part of the
3GPP General Authentication Architecture; we employ this infrastructure as
a means of managing consumer domains. The participating network operators
might want to charge for their service; however, network operator support is
only required when creating a domain, and when devices join the domain, and
hence the cost impact of a modest charge should be manageable. The extra costs
in implementing the solution could be covered from the expected reduction in
piracy.
This chapter is organised as follows. Section 9.2 describes the 3GPP General
Authentication Architecture. Sections 9.3 and 9.4 describe the proposed solution
and the process workflow. Section 9.5 discusses controlling domain membership.
Section 9.6 analyses the system security requirements, threats, and services.
Section 9.7 described how these security requirements can be met using TCG
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Figure 9.1: The 3GPP General Authentication Architecture
functionality. Section 9.8 discusses the main differences between our scheme
and other schemes which use GSM and UMTS user authentication, and section
9.9 provides conclusions.
9.2 General Authentication Architecture
The scheme we propose relies on the mobile network operator supporting the
3GPP General Authentication Architecture (GAA) [6, 7]. Specifically we use
the General Bootstrapping Architecture mechanism that builds upon the secret
keyK shared by the UMTS IC Card (UICC) in the mobile phone and the mobile
network operator’s Home Subscriber Server (HSS). The General Bootstrapping
Architecture incorporates two network elements, known as the Bootstrapping
Server Function (BSF) and the Network Application Function (NAF). Figure
9.1 summarises the GAA workflow.
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The Bootstrapping Server Function has an interface with the Home Subscriber
Server and with the Network Application Function, and is part of the mobile
network operator. The Bootstrapping Server Function acts as an intermediary
between the mobile phone, the Home Subscriber Server and the Network Appli-
cation Function. The mobile phone and the Bootstrapping Server Function are
mutually authenticated using the 3GPP Authentication and Key Agreement
(AKA) protocol [6, 72]. This mutual authentication procedure establishes a
secure session that is later fetched by the Network Application Function from
the Bootstrapping Server Function, and is then used to secure communications
between the Network Application Function and the mobile phone. Communica-
tions between the Network Application Function and the Bootstrapping Server
Function, and between the Bootstrapping Server Function and the Home Sub-
scriber Server, are beyond the scope of this chapter; details can be found in
[6].
The 3GPP Authentication and Key Agreement protocol works as follows. The
mobile phone sends an authentication request to the Bootstrapping Server Func-
tion, which then contacts the Home Subscriber Server and retrieves the sub-
scriber security settings and an authentication vector RAND||AUTN||XRES||ke||ki.
This vector is calculated using the mobile-specific secret key K, a random chal-
lenge RAND, and a set of functions shared by Home Subscriber Server and the
mobile phone. XRES is the “expected response”, used later to authenticate the
mobile phone, ke is the session Cipher Key, ki is the session Integrity Key, and
AUTN is equal to SQN⊕AK||AMF||MAC, where SQN is a sequence number, AK
is the Anonymity key, AMF is the Authentication management field, and MAC
is a Message Authentication Code for the string SQN||RAND||AMF, computed
using the key K.
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Next, the Bootstrapping Server Function forwards AUTN and the challenge
(RAND) to the mobile phone, which uses its UICC to calculate ki, ke, RES,
and AK, and recover AMF and MAC from AUTN. The UICC then recovers
SQN from the calculated AK and the received SQN⊕AK, and uses this recov-
ered value to verify the freshness of the received message. The UICC calculates
the MAC, and then compares it with the MAC recovered from AUTN. If they
are equal, then the mobile phone has successfully checked the validity of the
network. Subsequently, the mobile phone sends an Authentication and Key
Agreement Digest calculated using RES, to the Bootstrapping Server Function.
The Bootstrapping Server Function recomputes the Digest, using XRES, and
deems the mobile phone authenticated if this recomputed value equals the re-
ceived value.
The Bootstrapping Server Function and the mobile phone use the session keys ke
and ki to establish a secure channel that protects messages exchanged between
them, and between the mobile phone and the Network Application Function.
The secure channel is implemented using a stream cipher and a MAC function.
9.3 System Model
In addition to the entities identified in chapter 6, the system model includes
Mobile Phones and Mobile Network Operators. The Mobile Phone, which pro-
vides the trusted domain controller functionality, must have the TP features
described in section 6.2 and must satisfy the domain device assumptions de-
scribed in section 6.4. The Mobile Network Operator provides the trusted au-
thority functionality.
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Our DRM scheme requires that the domain-specific mobile phone which acts as
the trusted domain controller is owned by the domain owner, is registered by
the mobile network operator and is equipped with a special application. The
domain-specific mobile phone should be compatible with the 3GPP specifica-
tions [6], and is responsible for: authenticating the domain owner using a shared
secret, e.g. a PIN; mutually authenticating itself with the mobile network oper-
ator; creating and maintaining the domain unique secret key KD introduced in
section 6.5; and authorising devices to join its domain by ensuring that they in
physical proximity to itself, and that their processing environment is trusted.
The key KD is not available in the clear, and only the mobile phone acting as
the trusted domain controller is able to copy this key to a device joining the
domain.
The mobile phone acting as the trusted domain controller maintains the two
counters cT and cC (as introduced in section 6.5.1), both of which are initially
set to one. Both counters have domain-specific limits, denoted by LT and LC
(for cT and cC , respectively).
For the purposes of our scheme we assume the Network Application Function
provides the following functions: initialising and maintaining domain-specific
limits, i.e. LT and LC , and backup and recovery of the domain-specific secrets,
KD, cC and cT . The phone obtains LT and LC from the Network Applica-
tion Function. Both limits can be increased by the mobile network operator.
Consumers could be charged more for higher maximum values.
168
9. Authorised Domain Management Using a Mobile Phone
9.4 Process Workflow
We now describe in detail how the five phases of the system workflow, as intro-
duced in section 6.5, are implemented. Before performing any of these processes,
an initialisation procedure must be performed between the mobile network op-
erator and the mobile phone. We now describe each of these processes.
9.4.1 Initialisation Procedure
The initialisation of a mobile phone by a mobile network operator involves
the authentication of the phone and the establishment of a secret session key
between the phone and the Network Application Function. Before creating
a domain, or adding or removing devices from a domain, the domain-specific
mobile phone M authenticates the domain owner by instructing the domain
owner to provide a secret key, e.g. a PIN, shared by the domain owner and
M . Once the domain owner has been authenticated, M and the Bootstrapping
Server Function perform mutual authentication. As described in section 9.2,
this process establishes session keys ke and ki, later fetched by the Network
Application Function F from the Bootstrapping Server Function, and used to
secure communications between F and M .
9.4.2 Domain Establishment
The domain establishment phase, as described in section 6.5.1, is implemented
as follows. This phase applies when a consumer wishes to create a domain (and
simultaneously add the domain-specific mobile phone M to the domain). We
assume the initialisation procedure described in section 9.4.1 has already been
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Figure 9.2: DRM System Workflow
performed. M securely generates the domain-specific secret key KD using a
random number generator, and initialises counters cC and cT to one. M then
sends a Create Domain request to the Network Application Function F , via the
pre-established secure session, to establish a domain. The request has the form:
(1) M → F : gke(KD||IMSI)||mki(gke(KD||IMSI))
where gke(Y ) denotes the symmetric encryption of data Y using key ke, mki(Y )
denotes a MAC computed on data Y using key ki, and IMSI is the International
Mobile Subscriber Identity that is used to uniquely identify the domain. When
a user changes his/her IMSI, e.g. if the user changes his/her network operator,
the new network operator obtains the user domain information from the old
network operator (how this occurs is likely to be network operator specific).
Next, F verifies the integrity of the received message and decrypts it, and then
initialises the domain, i.e. sets the domain limits LC and LT , securely associates
them with KD and IMSI, and stores them in its protected storage. F then
transfer these limits to M in the following message:
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(2) F →M : gke(LC ||LT )||mki(gke(LC ||LT )).
M verifies the integrity of the received message and decrypts it, and then se-
curely associates LC and LT with KD, cC , and cT , and stores them in its
protected storage.
9.4.3 Adding a Device to a Domain
This phase, defined in section 6.5.2, is implemented as follows. We assume
that the procedures described in sections 9.4.1 and 9.4.2 have already been
performed. In order for a device J to join a domain, it must communicate with
the domain-specific mobile phone M , as shown in Figure 9.2. J first sends a
Join Domain request to M . The request has the form:
(1) J →M : PJ ||SJ ||N1||CertIJ ||SignJ(PJ ||SJ ||N1)
Next, M checks that J is in physical proximity to itself, e.g. by using the Near
Field Communication (NFC) protocol or by measuring the Round-Trip Time
(RTT) between M and J , see, for example, [36, 42, 49]. M verifies CertIJ ,
extracts IJ , and checks that it has not been revoked, e.g. by querying an OCSP
server. M then verifies J ’s signature using IJ , and verifies that the DRM agent is
running correctly in J by checking the value of SJ . How this verification occurs
is implementation-dependent, see, for example, section 6.3. M then generates
a nonce N2, and sends the following message to J :
(2) M → J : AJ ||N1||N2||SM ||CertIM ||SignM (AJ ||N1||N2||SM )
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J verifies CertIM , extracts IM from CertIM and verifies that it has not been
revoked, e.g. by querying an OCSP service. J then verifies M ’s signature by
using IM , verifies AJ to ensure that it is the intended recipient, and verifies
message freshness by comparing N1 with the value sent in (1). J then verifies
that the DRM agent is running correctly in M by checking the value of SM . As
above, how this verification occurs is implementation-dependent. J then sends
the following reply to M :
(3) J →M : N2||N3||AM ||SignJ(N2||N2||AM )
M verifies J ’s signature, verifies AM to ensure that it is the intended recipient,
and checks message freshness by comparing N2 with the value sent in (2). Steps
1–3 conform to the three-pass mutual authentication protocol described in [46].
M temporarily increments the values of both cT and cC . If they are greater
than the maximum permitted value (LT and LC , respectively) held by M , then
the agent running on M exits with an appropriate error message. M now sends
F the following backup request for the values of cT , cC and PJ :
(4) M → F : gke(cT ||cC ||PJ ||IMSI)||mki(gke(cT ||cC ||PJ ||IMSI))
F verifies the integrity of the received message and decrypts it, and then securely
associates the new values with the domain identified by IMSI. Subsequently, F
sends an acknowledgment back to M as follows:
(5) F →M : gke(Result||cT ||cC)||mki(gke(Result||cT ||cC))
M verifies the integrity of the received message and decrypts it. M checks
message freshness by comparing cC and cT with the values sent in (4). M then
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check the value of Result, that can be set to either success or fail. If it indicates
success, M stores the cT and cC values in its trusted storage, and sends the key
KD to J in the following message:
(6) M → J : ePJ (KD)||N3||SignM (ePJ (KD)||N3)
When J receives this message, it verifies the signature, and then checks message
freshness by comparing N3 with the value sent in (3). J then decrypts ePJ (KD).
The key KD is then securely stored by J , as described in section 9.4.2.
9.4.4 Removing a Device from a Domain
This phase is exactly as described in section 6.5.3.
9.4.5 Exchanging Content
This part is exactly as discussed in section 7.3.4.
9.4.6 Backup and Recovery Procedure
The backup and recovery phase, as described in section 6.5.5, is implemented as
follows. The domain-specific mobile phone M is required to communicate with
the Network Application Function regularly, as described in section 9.4.3, and
backup KD, cT and cC .
If the mobile phone M cannot be recovered, for example, because it has been
lost or stolen, the domain owner must inform the mobile network operator. The
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mobile network operator will blacklist both M and the UICC, and then issue
a new UICC. The replacement mobile phone will need to contact the Network
Application Function and restore the domain settings stored by the Network
Application Function. The Network Application Function then releases KD,
cC , cT , LC and LT , to the new domain-specific mobile phone. Subsequently,
other devices in the domain that cannot recover KD must re-join the domain,
as described in section 9.4.3 (before M increments the values of the domain
counters it checks with the Network Application Function whether the joining
device public key is already a member of the domain; if so it does not increment
the counters).
9.5 Controlling Domain Membership
The domain-specific mobile phone M controls domain membership in the same
way as described in section 6.6.2. In addition, it imposes stringent restrictions
on piracy using digital media such as the Internet. This is because, as described
in section 9.3, the content protection key KD is securely stored inside M , is
not available in the clear, and can only be transferred from M to other devices
after their physical proximity has been checked. That is, the physical proximity
check, in conjunction with the use of counters, addresses the Root Distribution
problem.
Our solution stops illicit content proliferation; the only way in which a domain
owner could transfer the content protection key to another user’s device is by
transferring the encrypted domain content, the domain-specific mobile phone
M , and the domain owner’s authentication credential forM , e.g. a PIN. Whilst
possible in principle, such a procedure is unlikely to be attractive to the domain
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owner. Such a process would also mean that the other user’s device would
become part of the domain controlled by M , which would mean that fewer of
the domain owner’s devices could be added to the domain. Most importantly,
devices which have joined this domain using M would not be able to re-transfer
the domain key (as described above, only M can transfer this key to other
devices).
9.6 Security Analysis
We now consider the security threats, services, and mechanisms that apply to the
storage, execution and transmission of KD, cT , cC , LT , LC , and digital content.
In addition, we address the security threats, services, and mechanisms that apply
to communications between the mobile device and the Network Application
Function; however, we do not address threats to the 3G security system itself.
Security threats of this type are addressed elsewhere; see, for example, [2, 3, 4].
Following are few examples of threats in a 3G security system: man-in-the-
middle-attack impersonating a genuine GSM user to the BSF, attacks on the
terminal and UICC/USIM (e.g. use of a stolen terminal and UICC, manipulation
of the identity of the terminal, manipulation of data on the UICC-terminal
interface), and attacks on the radio interface (e.g. eavesdropping user traffic,
passive/active traffic analysis, masquerading as another user).
The security threats, services, and mechanisms that apply to the transmission
of content and rights objects between domain devices, and the security threats,
services, and mechanisms that apply to the storage and execution of content
and rights objects in domain devices, are covered in section 7.5 and 7.6.
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9.6.1 Security Threats
The main goal of the proposed scheme is to prevent transferring the means
for accessing content (i.e. the domain-specific key KD) to unauthorised devices
using physical or digital means. This is achieved by ensuring that this key is
transferred to a device only after the domain owner has been authenticated, the
values of both domain counters have been incremented, and the trustworthiness
of the device has been verified. Hence, only devices which are part of a domain
can access the domain content. Devices can only be added to a domain if the
domain owner is personally involved, as ensured by authenticating the domain
owner. This system has the following requirements.
• The domain-specific mobile phone M must securely processes and stores
the domain-specific values KD, cT , cC , LT and LC , so that it is not avail-
able in the clear even to domain owner. This process is vulnerable to the
following security threats: (1) unauthorised manipulation of the domain-
specific values during use in M ; and (2) unauthorised manipulation of the
domain-specific values whilst stored in M .
• M must securely sends the key KD to a device J whilst joining the do-
main. Such a procedure is exposed to the following security threats: (3)
unauthorised reading or updating of KD whilst in transit; (4) M unwit-
tingly sending KD to a malicious entity; (5) J unwittingly receiving KD
from a malicious M ; and (6) replay of communications between M and J .
• Security threats related to the exchange of messages between a mobile
phone M and the Network Application Function F are: (7) unknowingly,
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M communicating with a malicious entity, or F communicating with a
malicious entity; (8) replay of communication between M and F ; and (9)
unauthorised reading or updating of exchanged messages.
In addition to the above threats, there is a special type of threat associated
with dynamic rights objects, i.e. backing up a dynamic rights object and then
restoring it at a later time to reuse an expired licence. As we discussed in section
6.5.4, there is no solution to this threat in authorised domains. In this thesis we
do not address this problem, and it remains a possible topic for future research.
9.6.2 Security Services and Mechanisms
The security services required to counteract threats 1, 2, and 4 (listed above)
can be provided using trusted platform functionality, as discussed in section
6.2. In section 9.7 we illustrate how such trusted platform functionality can be
implemented using a platform conforming to the TCG specifications. Threats 3
and 5–9 are addressed using standard cryptographic mechanisms. A direct map-
ping exists between the threats outlined above and the services and potential
mechanisms outlined below:
1. Confidentiality and integrity of the domain-specific values during execu-
tion on M . Providing this service requires process isolation techniques,
which provide protection for a message against being read or altered by
an unauthorised entity whilst being executed [34]. This service can be
provided using trusted computing technology, discussed in chapter 3.
2. Confidentiality and integrity of the domain-specific values whilst stored in
M . Providing this service requires protected storage, typically by stor-
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ing domain credentials inside a tamper-resistant module, as discussed in
section 6.2.
3. Confidentiality and integrity of KD whilst in transit. This service is pro-
vided by the use of symmetric encryption and a MAC, see section 9.4.2,
or asymmetric encryption and a digital signature, see section 9.4.3.
4. Entity authentication of a joining device J to the domain-specific mobile
phone M . The provision of this service is implementation-dependent, and
involves a protocol exchange between J and M ; see, for example, section
6.3. It is initiated when M and J mutually authenticate each other —
see section 9.4.3. This mutual authentication attests to the DRM agent
execution status, i.e. SJ , and whether the platform is trusted, as discussed
in section 6.2.
5. KD origin authentication. The joining device J checks the origin of KD
by checking M ’s signature on the received encrypted value of KD — see
section 9.4.3.
6. Prevention of replay of communications between M and a device. This is
provided by the inclusion of nonces in messages — see section 9.4.3.
7–9. These threats are counteracted by the use of the secure session established
between M and F , as described in section 9.2; mutual authentication
between M and F counteracts threat 11; threat 12 is counteracted by the
inclusion of nonces — see section 9.4.3; and threat 13 is counteracted by
the use of symmetric encryption and a MAC — see section 9.4.2 and 9.4.3.
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9.7 Implementing the Protocols Using Trusted
Computing
We described in section 6.3 how a system conforming to the TCG specifications
[92, 93, 94] can satisfy the requirements described in section 6.2. In this section
we consider how security requirements 1, 2, and 4, discussed in section 9.6, can
be met using TCG functionality. In this section we do not discuss practical
problems associated with TCG specification, as these have been discussed in
section 3.8.
1. Confidentiality and integrity of KD, cT , cC , LC and LT during execution
is provided exactly as discussed in point 1, section 7.6.
2. Confidentiality and integrity of KD, cT , cC , LC and LT whilst stored in
domain devices is provided exactly as discussed in point 2, section 7.6.
4. Entity authentication of a device J to the domain-specific mobile phone
M is provided exactly as discussed in point 4, section 7.6.
9.8 Related Work
Schemes have previously been proposed that exploit the GSM and UMTS user
authentication schemes in other applications — see, for example, [54, 55, 75].
However, not only are the proposed application domains rather different to that
applying here, but the protocols themselves have significant differences.
• The schemes described in [54, 55, 75] require a mobile phone to directly
communicate with a user device, which then communicates with a veri-
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fier; i.e. the user device acts as an intermediary between the mobile phone
and a verifier. The verifier validates the identity of the user by sending
messages to the mobile phone, and then validates the responses to these
messages provided by the mobile phone by communicating with the mobile
phone network operator. However, our scheme does not require the user
to directly prove his/her identity to the verifier, as the user communicates
directly with the mobile network operator using GAA. This protects con-
sumer privacy, as users are authenticated directly by the mobile network
operator itself.
• The schemes given in [54, 55] require user verification to be performed
for every system transaction. However, the system described here does
not require verifiers to authenticate a user every time a transaction is
processed, as a user is authenticated only when a device is added to the
domain.
9.9 Summary
This chapter focuses on the problem of preventing illegal copying of digital assets
without jeopardising the right of legitimate licence holders to transfer content
between their own devices, where these devices make up a user domain. The
scheme proposed here involves the use of a domain-specific mobile phone and the
mobile phone network operator to authenticate the domain owner before devices
can join a domain. This binds devices in a domain to a single owner, that, in
turn, enables the binding of domain licences to the domain owner. In addition,
the way in which we control domain membership, and the use of the domain-
specific mobile phone that enables a domain owner to add devices wherever
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he/she is physically present, ensures that devices joining the domain are in
physical proximity to the mobile phone, preventing illicit content proliferation.
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In this chapter we describe an implementation of the generic authorised domain
DRM framework given in chapter 6. This scheme involves managing an autho-
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rised domain using a trusted authority. This scheme supports: authentication
of a domain owner using Location Based Services, ensuring that devices, when
joining a consumer domain, are located in physical proximity to the domain reg-
istered addresses; domain establishment; adding devices to and removing devices
from a domain; and backing up and recovering domain credentials. The system
security requirements, threats, and services are analysed. Finally, how the pro-
posed scheme counteracts the main content piracy threats is also discussed. Most
of the material in this chapter has previously been published in [9].
10.1 Introduction
The system described in this chapter is an implementation of the generic autho-
rised domain management framework given in chapter 6. The authorised do-
main is managed by a special-purpose third party known as a Trusted Authority
(TA), which generates the unique domain key KD (introduced in section 6.5)
and binds it to the domain owner’s registered geographical addresses. Before
the TA transfers the domain-specific key to devices joining a domain, it must
ensure that the joining device belongs to the domain owner. This is achieved
by ensuring that the joining device is located close to one of the domain owner
registered addresses. This is enforced by requiring the joining device to commu-
nicate with the TA either directly or via another device already in the domain
as a proxy.
In the first case the joining device must be able to determine its own location,
e.g. by incorporating a Global Positioning Satellite (GPS) receiver, or be capable
of having its location determined by a third party, e.g. as is the case for mobile
phones. In the second case the joining device does not need to be able to
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determine its location, and a device already in the domain (which is capable of
determining its location or of having its location determined) acts as a proxy.
The proxy device must ensure that the joining device is in physical proximity to
itself. The TA authenticates the domain owner using a password, and verifies
that the joining device (or the proxy device) is close to the location of one of
the domain registered addresses.
If the above procedure succeeds, the TA releases the domain key to the joining
device, which is then protected by the device, as described in chapter 6.5. Only
the TA can release the domain key to other devices, and this will only occur after
it has authenticated the domain owner. These mechanisms bind the domain key
to the domain owner.
The physical proximity check prevents devices joining a domain via the Inter-
net. However, the proposed scheme does not stop legitimate controlled content
sharing or downloading of digital content from a remote location; location-based
service is only required for managing domain membership, and is not required
for creating, downloading or exchanging content (these issues are discussed fur-
ther in section 10.4.4).
This chapter is organised as follows. Section 10.2 briefly describes the IETF
Geopriv protocol. Sections 10.3 and 10.4 describe the proposed solution and its
process workflow. Section 10.5 describes how to control domain membership.
Section 10.6 analyses the system security requirements, threats, and services.
Section 10.7 described how these security requirements can be met using TCG
functionality. Section 10.8 discusses an alternative implementation using 3GPP1
Location Based Services. Section 10.9 discusses the main differences between
1http://www.3gpp.org
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Figure 10.1: The Geopriv Protocol Workflow
our scheme and other schemes that use Location Based Services for user au-
thentication, and section 10.10 provides conclusions.
10.2 The Geopriv Protocol
The scheme we describe in this chapter is based on the IETF Geographic loca-
tion/privacy protocol (Geopriv) [23] (in section 10.8 we describe an alternative
implementation of the scheme using the 3GPP Location Based Service (LBS)).
The Geopriv model involves the following main entities: Location Generator,
Location Server, Location Recipient (which corresponds to the TA in the DRM
scheme), Rule Maker (which acts as the domain owner in the DRM scheme),
and Rule Holder. The Geopriv protocol requires the Location Server and the
Location Recipient, the Location Server and the Rule Holder, the Location
Server and the Location Generator, and the Mobile Device and the Location
Generator, to mutually authenticate each other.
185
10. Authorised Domain Management Using Location Based Services
The Mobile Device is owned by the Rule Maker, and should be able to calculate
its own position or be capable of being located, e.g. by being equipped with a
radio receiver able to receive Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) signals.
The Rule Maker defines privacy protection rules and filters, which are stored
by the Rule Holder. These rules and filters are used to determine whether a
Location Recipient can be sent the location of the Mobile Device, and how the
Location Server should filter any particular Location for the Location Recipient.
Filtering is the process of reducing the precision or resolution of location data.
The Location Server acts as an intermediary in communication between the
Location Recipient, the Rule Holder and the Location Generator.
When the Location Server receives a location measurement request from the
Location Recipient, it applies the privacy protection rules and filters defined
by the Rule Maker for the Location Recipient. If the Location Recipient is
authorised to retrieve the location of the Mobile Device, the Location Server
forwards the request to the Location Generator.
Next, the Location Generator obtains and/or measures the Mobile Device lo-
cation, and creates a location object describing the Mobile Device location (for
possible means of locating a Mobile Device see, for example, [5, 52, 60]). The Lo-
cation Generator then transfers the location object back to the Location Server,
which specifies whether the Location Recipient can receive the location object
and how it should be filtered for this Location Recipient.
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10.3 System Model
In addition to the entities identified in chapter 6, the system model includes TAs.
Each TA is required to have a private signing key used for entity authentication.
The corresponding public key is certified by the scheme-specific CA (as described
in section 6.4), and the certificate contains a general description of the TA and
its security properties. In addition, each TA is assumed to possess an encryption
key pair certified by the TA itself using its signing key. These certificates must
be available to all domain devices in domains which the TA supports.
10.4 System Workflow
We now describe in detail how the five phases of the system workflow, as intro-
duced in section 6.5, are implemented. We assume that the Location Server and
the TA, the Location Server and the Rule Holder, the Location Server and the
Location Generator, and the Mobile Device and the Location Generator, com-
municate via channels offering integrity and confidentiality protection. These
secure channels and their properties are implementation-dependent.
10.4.1 Domain Establishment
This phase, defined in section 6.5.1, is implemented as follows. The domain
owner must register with a TA, e.g. by connecting to the TA website over an
SSL session. During registration the domain owner completes an application
form, containing the primary domain street address and (possibly) alternative
addresses. The alternative addresses provide flexibility in cases where a domain
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has multiple locations, e.g. if the domain is owned by an organisation that has
multiple branches, or the domain owner lives in more than one place.
The TA then validates the domain owner request and applies its registration
policies, e.g. the maximum number of alternative addresses per domain, the
maximum domain size, etc. In some cases the TA might request additional cre-
dentials from the domain owner, e.g. a public key certificate for an organisation
or a proof of residence for a domain owner. The domain owner could be charged
for a larger maximum domain size, or for a larger maximum number of alter-
native locations. The system design allows the domain owner to subsequently
update these values, subject to the policy of the TA.
Next, the TA generates a domain-specific secret keyKD, a domain unique identi-
fier U , and the two counters cT and cC , as defined in section 6.5.1. Each counter
has a domain-specific limit, set and maintained by the TA. The domain-specific
values KD, U , cT , cC , and the domain addresses, are securely stored by the
TA. The TA also sends U to the domain owner; U is later used as a password
to authenticate the domain owner when adding new devices. This ensures that
devices joining the domain are authorised by the domain owner, as described
below.
10.4.2 Adding a Device to a Domain
The joining domain phase, as described in section 6.5.2, is implemented as
follows. In order for a device J to join a domain, J must communicate with
the TA T . As described earlier, this communication takes place either directly,
if J has the necessary properties, or using an appropriate domain device M as
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Figure 10.2: DRM System Workflow Using a Proxy
a proxy.
10.4.2.1 Adding a Device to a Domain Without a Proxy
This procedure is followed when a consumer wishes to add a device J to a domain
by communicating directly with the TA T (Figure 10.2 summarises the main
steps for adding a device to a domain using a proxy (the same steps apply for
adding a device without a proxy; however, in steps (b, c) J sends a join domain
request directly to the TA)). J is assumed to have a unique identifier IDJ that
is assigned by its service provider; for example, for a 3GPP LBS, IDJ would
typically be the mobile phone IMSI (International Mobile Subscriber Identity).
J sends a Join Domain request to T . The request has the form:
(1) J → T : SJ ||PJ ||IDJ ||AT ||N1||CertIJ ||SignJ(SJ ||PJ ||IDJ ||AT ||N1)
Next, T verifies CertIJ , extracts IJ , and checks that it has not been revoked, e.g.
by querying an OCSP service. T then verifies J ’s signature using IJ , verifies
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AT to ensure that it is the intended recipient (a joining device must have a
copy of T ’s certificate, as stated earlier), and verifies that the DRM agent is
running correctly on J by checking the value of SJ . How this verification occurs
is implementation-dependent, see, for example, section 10.7. T then generates
a nonce N2, and sends the following message to J :
(2) T → J : AJ ||N1||N2||SignT (AJ ||N1||N2)
J verifies T ’s signature, verifies AJ to ensure that it is the intended recipient,
and verifies message freshness by comparing N1 with the value sent in (1).
J instructs the domain owner to provide the value of U , and then sends the
following reply to T :
(3) J → T : ePT (U ||N2)||N3||SignJ(ePT (U ||N2)||N3).
T verifies the signature, decrypts ePT (U ||N2), and checks message freshness by
comparing N2 with the value sent in (2). T then verifies that U identifies a valid
domain. Steps 1–3 conform to the three-pass mutual authentication protocol
described in [46].
If the authentication protocol succeeds, T checks whether the public key of J
is already a member of the domain (a device might need to rejoin a domain,
for example, in the event of hardware/software failure, as discussed in section
10.4.5). If the public key of J is not in the domain, T temporarily increments
the value of cT and cC (it permanently stores the result at a later stage, i.e. just
before step 9). If the counters do not exceed the maximum value specified by
T for U ’s domain, T sends the following Get Location request to the Location
Server, via the pre-established secure channel:
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(4) T → Location Server: IDJ ||AT
The Location Server checks with the Rule Holder if T is authorised to retrieve
J ’s location, as follows:
(5) Location Server → Rule Holder: IDJ ||AT
The Rule Holder checks the rules associated with IDJ , and sends the result to
the Location Server, as follows:
(6) Rule Holder → Location Server: Result||IDJ
If the value of Result is positive, and IDJ equals the value sent in (5), then the
Location Server forwards the request to the Location Generator as follows:
(7) Location Server → Location Generator: IDJ
The Location Generator contacts J , as identified by IDJ , and retrieves its
location L in some way; see, for example, [5, 52, 60, 99]. The Location Generator
sends L to the Location Server, which sends it back to T as follows:
(8) Location Generator → Location Server → T : L||IDJ
Next, T checks that L represents a valid location object and that IDJ equals the
value sent in (4). If the validation succeeds, T measures the absolute distance
between L and each of the domain registered address. T uses the results to
decide whether or not location L is sufficiently close to one of the registered
addresses for this domain. If the decision is positive, T securely stores PJ and
the updated values of cC and cT , and releases KD to J , as follows:
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Figure 10.3: Adding a Device to a Domain Using a Proxy
(9) T → J : ePJ (KD)||N3||SignT (ePJ (KD)||N3).
When J receives this message, it verifies T ’s signature and checks message fresh-
ness by comparing N3 with the value sent in (3). J then decrypts ePJ (KD).
Finally, the key KD is securely stored by J , as described in section 6.5.2.
10.4.2.2 Adding a Device to a Domain Using a Proxy
This procedure is followed when a consumer wishes to add a device J to a
domain using an existing domain device M as a proxy (Figure 10.2 summarises
the main steps involved in adding a device to a domain). As above, M must
have a unique identifier IDM that is assigned by its service provider. J and
T mutually authenticate each other via M , as described in steps 1–3 of section
10.4.2.1 (see also Figure 10.3); however, IDJ is not included at step (1) as J
does not need to be capable of determining its position or having its location
determined. In addition, in step (3), before M forwards the request to T , M
checks that J is in close proximity, e.g. by using the Near Field Communication
(NFC) protocol or measuring the Round-Trip Time (RTT) between M and
J , see, for example, [36, 42, 49]. M creates the string ePT (KD||IDM ||h(PJ)),
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associates it with J ’s request, and then forwards it to T , as follows:
(3.a) J →M : ePT (U ||N2)||N3||SignJ(ePT (U ||N2)||N3)
(3.b) M → T : ePT (U ||N2)||N3||SignJ(ePT (U ||N2)||N3)||ePT (KD||IDM ||h(PJ))
Next, T decrypts ePT (U ||N2) and ePT (KD||IDM ||h(PJ)). T verifies the signa-
ture, that U identifies a valid domain, and that KD is the valid domain key.
Because KD is securely stored inside T and in devices that are already members
of U ’s domain, it is not available in the clear, and can only be revealed by the
trusted DRM software agent; this ensures that the join request comes via an
existing domain device that is trusted to check the physical proximity of J . T
then computes h(PJ) from the value of PJ sent in (1), and compares it with the
value recovered from ePT (KD||IDM ||h(PJ)), ensuring that this string is unique
per joining device. If this process succeeds, T follows the procedure described
in section 10.4.2.1, steps 4-9 (where T communicates with J via M).
10.4.3 Removing a Device from a Domain
This phase is exactly as described in section 6.5.3.
10.4.4 Exchanging Content
This phase is exactly as discussed in section 7.3.4.
193
10. Authorised Domain Management Using Location Based Services
10.4.5 Backup and Recovery Procedure
The backup and recovery phase, as described in section 6.5.5, is implemented as
follows. Domain credential backup can be performed by the TA, which recovers
the domain key by re-joining devices that require recovery as described in section
10.4.2 (before the TA increments the values of the domain counter it checks
whether the joining device public key is already a member of the domain; if so
it does not increment the counters).
10.5 Controlling Domain Membership
The TA controls domain membership in the same way as described in section
6.6.2. Thus it imposes stringent restrictions on piracy using digital media such
as the Internet, because, as described in section 10.4.1, the content protection
key KD is securely stored inside the TA, is not available in the clear, and can
only be transferred from the TA to other devices after their physical location
has been checked. That is, the physical location check, in conjunction with the
use of counters, addresses the Root Distribution problem.
The scheme addresses illicit content proliferation; the only way in which a do-
main owner could transfer the content protection key to another user’s device is
by ensuring the new device is geographically close enough to the domain owner
registered addresses. Whilst possible in principle, such a procedure is unlikely
to be attractive to the domain owner. Such a process would also mean that
the other user’s device would become part of the domain, which would mean
that fewer of the domain owner’s devices could be added to the domain. Most
importantly, devices which have joined this domain are not able to re-transfer
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the domain key (as described above, only the TA can transfer this key to other
devices).
10.6 Security Analysis
In location based services a mobile device location and a predefined privacy rules
are the two important factors that control releasing a mobile device location to
third parties. In addition, such privacy rules control the precision of released
location measurements. Note that in this thesis we do not consider the secu-
rity threats arising to communications between Geopriv components, i.e. the
TA, Location Server, Rule Holder and Location Generator, as they are beyond
the scope of this thesis. Security threats of this type are addressed elsewhere;
see, for example, [24]. In addition, we do not address threats arising to com-
munications between the Location Generator and the Mobile Device, as these
are implementation-dependent; see, for example, [4]. Following are examples
of such threats: interruption of location sensing service, altering the measured
location and/or privacy rules, stealing location-aware device, masquerading as
an intended recipient of data, eavesdropping user traffic, unauthorised access to
data stored by system entities, and denial of service attacks.
We now consider the security threats, services, and mechanisms that apply to
the storage, execution and transmission of KD, U , and digital content. The
security threats, services, and mechanisms that apply to the transmission of
content and rights objects between domain devices, and the security threats,
services, and mechanisms that apply to the storage and execution of content
and rights objects in domain devices are covered in section 7.5 and 7.6.
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10.6.1 Security Threats
The main goal of the proposed scheme is to prevent transferring the means
for accessing content (i.e. the domain-specific key KD) to unauthorised devices
using physical or digital means. This is achieved by ensuring that this key is
transferred to a device only after the domain owner has been authenticated, the
values of both domain counters have been incremented, and the trustworthiness
of the device has been verified. Hence, only devices which are part of a domain
can access the domain content. Devices can only be added to a domain if the
domain owner is personally involved, as ensured by authenticating the domain
owner. This system has the following requirements.
• The TA T must securely sends the key KD and U to a device J whilst
joining the domain. Such a procedure is exposed to the following security
threats: (1) unauthorised reading and alteration ofKD/U while in transit;
(2) T unwittingly sending KD to a malicious entity; (3) J unwittingly
receiving KD from a malicious TA T , or J unwittingly sending U to a
malicious T ; and (4) replay of communication between T and J .
• The domain specific-key KD should be securely protected inside an ex-
isting domain device V . This results in the following vulnerabilities: (5)
unauthorised manipulation of the domain-specific key during use in V ; and
(6) unauthorised manipulation of the domain-specific key whilst stored in
V .
In addition to the above threats, there is a special type of threat associated
with dynamic rights objects, i.e. backing up a dynamic rights object and then
196
10. Authorised Domain Management Using Location Based Services
restoring it at a later time to reuse an expired licence. As we discussed in section
6.5.4, there is no solution to this threat in authorised domains. In this thesis we
do not address this problem, and it remains a possible topic for future research.
10.6.2 Security Services and Mechanisms
The security services required to counteract threats 2, 5 and 6 (listed above)
can be provided using trusted platform functionality, as discussed in section 6.2.
In section 10.7 we describe how such trusted platform functionality can be im-
plemented using a platform conforming to the TCG specifications. Threats 1, 3
and 4, are addressed using standard cryptographic mechanisms. A direct map-
ping exists between the threats outlined above and the services and potential
mechanisms outlined below:
1. Confidentiality and integrity of KD/U while in transit. This service is
provided by the use of asymmetric encryption and a digital signature —
see section 10.4.2.
2. Entity authentication of a joining device J to a TA T . The provision of
this service is implementation-dependent, and involves a protocol exchange
between J and T ; see, for example, [91, 92, 93, 94]). It is initiated when
T and J mutually authenticate each other — see section 10.4.2. This
mutual authentication attests to the DRM agent execution status, i.e. SJ ,
and whether the platform is trusted, as discussed in section 6.2.
3. KD origin authentication, and U destination verification. The joining
device J checks the origin of KD by checking the TA’s signature on the
received encrypted value of KD — see section 10.4.2. In addition, encrypt-
197
10. Authorised Domain Management Using Location Based Services
ing U using the TA’s public key ensures that only the TA can extract U
— see section 10.4.2.
4. Prevention of replay of communications between T and J . This is provided
by the inclusion of nonces in protocol messages — see section 10.4.2.
5. Confidentiality and integrity of the domain-specific values KD/U during
execution in a domain device. Providing this service requires process iso-
lation techniques, which provide protection for a message against being
read or altered by an unauthorised entity whilst being executed [34]. This
service can be provided using trusted computing technology, discussed in
chapter 3.
6. Confidentiality and integrity of the domain-specific values whilst stored
in a domain device V . Providing this service requires protected storage,
typically by storing domain credentials inside a tamper-resistant module,
as discussed in section 6.2.
10.7 Implementing the Protocols Using Trusted
Computing
We described in section 6.3 how a system conforming to the TCG specifications
[92, 93, 94] can satisfy the requirements described in section 6.2. In this section
we consider how security requirements 1, 2 and 4, discussed in section 10.6, can
be met using TCG functionality. In this section we do not discuss practical
problems associated with TCG specification, as these have been discussed in
section 3.8.
2. Entity authentication of a device J to the TA T is provided exactly as
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discussed in point 4, section 7.6.
5. Confidentiality and integrity of KD and U during execution is provided
exactly as discussed in point 1, section 7.6.
6. Confidentiality and integrity of KD and U whilst stored in domain devices
is provided exactly as discussed in point 2, section 7.6.
10.8 Alternative Implementation
In this section we describe how our scheme can be implemented using the 3GPP
LBS. The benefits of using 3GPP LBS include the following: 3G mobile net-
works have global coverage; the 3G mobile network infrastructure is secure and
satisfies all the Geopriv requirements described in [24]; 3G mobile handsets
are ubiquitous; and the existing mobile network infrastructure enables the au-
thentication of subscribers. In addition, 3G mobile networks can be used to
authenticate the domain owner to a Network Application Function as part of
the 3GPP General Authentication Architecture (GAA) mechanism [6, 7]. The
Network Application Function needs to provide the services provided by the TA,
as described in this thesis. The Network Application Function could be hosted
either as part of the mobile network operator, or by a third party trusted by
the mobile network operator.
Assuming the Network Application Function service is provided by an exter-
nal authority trusted by the mobile network operator, the Network Application
Function sends a message to the 3GPP GMLC (Global Mobile Location Center),
i.e. the Location Server in the proposed scheme, requesting the current location
of the Mobile Device. The GMLC verifies the Network Application Function is
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registered for this service and then sends a request to the PPR (Privacy Profile
Register), i.e. the Rule Holder in the proposed scheme, to check if the Network
Application Function is authorised to query the Mobile Device location. The
PPR performs the privacy check based on the target Mobile Device’s privacy
profile, which contains privacy rules; for example, the Mobile Device might only
allow its location information to be given to the Network Application Function
when it is located in certain areas. The result of the privacy check is sent to
GMLC. If the Network Application Function is authorised to query the Mobile
Device location, the GMLC sends a “Provide Subscriber Location” message
to the location sensing components in the 3GPP infrastructure, i.e. the Loca-
tion Generator, which calculates the Mobile Device position and then returns
the result to the GMLC. The GMLC forwards the result back to the Network
Application Function.
Alternatively, if the Network Application Function service is provided by the
mobile network operator, the above procedure can again be used with the excep-
tion that the Network Application Function can send the “Provide Subscriber
Location” request directly to the location-sensing components in the 3GPP in-
frastructure, i.e. it can bypass the communication with the GMLC. For detailed
information regarding 3GPP LBS, see, for example, [5].
10.9 Related Work
A variety of schemes have been proposed that involve authenticating a user
based on the user’s geographical location or physical proximity to an object;
see, for example, [15, 25, 71]. However, these schemes apply to a somewhat
different context to that of the scheme discussed above.
200
10. Authorised Domain Management Using Location Based Services
The system described in [15] requires each user to possess a physical token,
where a user is authenticated to a device if the token is in physical proximity to
the device. In addition, it requires each user to possess a smart card, and each
device to posses a smart card reader. The smart card is used as an alternative
method for user authentication, if location information cannot be established.
The scheme described in [71] uses location based services to ensure that data
can only be accessed in a predefined location. This system require each device
to have an attached dongle, which is capable of calculating its geographical
location by communicating with a base station. The dongle regularly monitors
its location by ensuring that it is located close to a base station. If so, it
authorises the device attached to it to decrypt data.
These systems differ from the scheme proposed in this thesis in the following
ways.
• The scheme described in [15] does not measure the device’s geographical
location, but it requires the device to check that it is in physical proximity
to a physical token owned by the user. However, the scheme described in
this chapter requires a device to be at a predefined location, and does not
require users to possess tokens.
• The scheme described in [71] requires each device to be capable of calcu-
lating its position, which increases the overall cost. However, the scheme
proposed in this chapter requires only one device per domain to be capable
of determining its location.
• The scheme described in [71] solves problems relating to the theft of ‘pro-
tected’ data outside a certain location, e.g. stealing notebooks or hard
drives. It allows data to be decrypted only at a predefined location; once
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the data is decrypted the scheme does not prevent data from being trans-
ferred elsewhere using digital or physical means. However, the scheme in
this chapter solves problems associated with uncontrolled transferring of
protected data to others.
• The scheme described in [71] involves authenticating users (by measuring
their geographical location) for every transaction. In addition, if the don-
gle cannot calculate its location, e.g. due to weak reception of GPS signals,
or hardware problems in the dongle itself or the base station, authorised
individuals would not be capable of accessing their data. The scheme
described in [15] involves authenticating users (measuring physical prox-
imity) every time a user logs in to a device. In addition, if a device cannot
be certain whether it is in physical proximity to the token possessed by
the device owner, the device can authenticate the user using a different
authentication technique. This undermines location based authentication.
The scheme described in this chapter only involves authenticating a user
(by measuring the user’s geographical location) when a device is added to
a domain, and does not require user authentication for downloading and
exchanging content between devices.
10.10 Summary
This chapter contains a description of an implementation of the authorised
domain DRM framework given in chapter 6. This scheme uses location-based
services to ensure that devices joining a consumer domain are located in physical
proximity to the registered addresses for this domain. This restricts domain
membership to devices in predefined geographical locations, helping to ensure
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that a single consumer owns and manages each domain. In addition, the scheme
helps to protect consumer privacy; the location-based service is only required for
managing domain membership, and not for creating, downloading or exchanging
content. The scheme uses the Geopriv protocol, which enables domain owners to
control the precision or resolution of location data, and when, in which location,
and by whom their location can be retrieved.
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In this chapter we analyse the general DRM framework presented in chapter 6,
and the four different schemes for authorised domain management presented in
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chapters 7–10. The framework and the schemes are evaluated using the ideal list
of DRM requirements given in chapter 4. We then discuss deployment issues
for the proposed schemes, and compare the pros and cons of the four schemes.
The chapter concludes with a comparison of the proposed schemes with other
schemes.
11.1 Introduction
This chapter contains an evaluation of the generic framework and the four pro-
posed implementations using the ideal list of DRM requirements given in chapter
4. We then discuss possible deployment issues for these schemes, and compare
the pros and cons of the four implementations of the general framework. Finally,
we compare the proposed schemes with other authorised domain management
schemes, which are discussed in chapter 5.
11.2 General Framework
We analyse the general framework described in chapter 6 using the list of re-
quirements given in section 4.5.
1. Minimum cost. The framework requires participating domain devices to
have Trusted Platform properties. A TCG1 compliant platform has these
properties, as discussed in section 6.3. TCG compliant platforms are not
expensive, and are currently available from a range of PC manufacturers,
including Dell, Fujitsu, HP, Intel and Toshiba [35]. Many challenges still
1www.trustedcomputinggroup.org
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remain to be solved in the TCG specifications in order for them to be
practical for today’s devices, applications and operating systems.
2. Ease of use. The framework has five main stages. The first, second, third
and fifth phases involve initialising the consumer domain, adding devices
to a domain, removing devices from a domain, and backing up and recov-
ering domain credentials. The details of these phases are implementation-
dependent. The fourth stage involves exchanging content between devices.
The framework does not specify how this is achieved.
3. Performance. The performance of the domain management functions of a
scheme compliant with the framework (i.e. covering domain establishment,
and adding devices to and removing devices from a domain) is implemen-
tation dependent. The framework requires content to be encrypted using
a symmetric technique, and also for the secret content encryption key to
be encrypted using a symmetric algorithm. Symmetric encryption tech-
niques are simple and fast to compute by comparison with asymmetric
techniques. Also, the domain-specific key does not change during the life
of the domain, which avoids the need to track each content-specific rights
object in order to re-encrypt it. Many DRM schemes fail to address this
requirement, as discussed in chapter 5.
4. Content mobility. The domain-specific key, which is used to protect do-
main content, is shared amongst all domain devices. Hence all domain
content can run in all domain devices, as discussed in section 6.6.1.
5. Lack of dependence on network infrastructure. This is implementation
dependent.
6. Lack of dependence on a secure clock. This is implementation dependent.
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7. Cryptographic robustness. Neither the framework nor the four instantia-
tions of the framework require the use of specific cryptographic techniques
(or any techniques with unusual properties). ‘Standard’ methods can thus
be employed, i.e. there is no bar to using the most robust currently avail-
able technology.
8. Ease of recovery. The backup and recovery method for network keys and
content is implementation dependent. The framework requires each device
to have its own private and public key pair, protected using a tamper-
resistant module. If one system is hacked, and as a result its private key
is revealed, then this does not affect other domains because domain keys
are independently selected. However, such an attack would reveal the
domain-specific key, as used to encrypt content encryption keys, which
might enable abuse of the content in that domain.
9. Robust content protection. Piracy is restricted by controlling domain mem-
bership, as described in section 6.6.2.
10. Flexible rights structure. The framework involves content providers con-
trolling digital asset consumption using rights objects, i.e. files associated
with content.
11. Simple key management. This is implementation dependent.
12. Flexible Revocation Mechanism. This is implementation dependent.
13. Access and Usage of Content. This point is not fully addressed; in par-
ticular, fair use is not addressed explicitly. However, the framework is
designed to allow users to access content on all their devices in a sim-
ple and transparent way; as a result it would appear likely to cover most
possible interpretations of the notion of ’fair use’.
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14. Consumer Privacy. In the proposed scheme, the creation and ongoing
management of an authorised domain is controlled by a domain controller,
which is trusted by rights issuers and content distributors. The nature of
the domain controller is implementation-dependent. Also, collaboration
between domain controllers and content distributors might enable them
to discover the public keys of devices in a domain. However, such col-
laboration would not necessarily allow content distributors to learn other
information about the domain, such as the precise content present in a
domain. This issue is implementation-dependent, as it depends on the
nature of the trusted domain controller.
15. Interoperability. The framework does not require use of a particular device
type. Content can run on any device in a domain, as long as it satisfies the
trusted platform properties described in section 6.2. This functionality is
available in many new PCs and some wireless devices; however, it is not
yet provided in other types of device, e.g. TVs, radios, and CD Players.
TCG technology is emerging into the market; it will probably take some
time until it is available in all device types. Many challenges still remain
to be solved in the TCG specifications.
16. Security and Hardware Issues. The framework does not limit the use of
other protection software.
11.3 Authorised Domain Management Using a
Master Control Device
We analyse the scheme described in chapter 7 using the list of requirements
given in section 4.5.
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1. Minimum cost. This is exactly as described in section 11.2, point (1).
2. Ease of use. The system has five main stages. The first involves initialis-
ing the master control device by generating a domain unique key that is
then bound to the domain owner’s authentication credential and the two
domain limits. This process should be simple for a user to initiate, and is
carried out once in the domain’s lifetime. The second and third involve
adding a device to a domain and removing a device from a domain. These
processes are straightforward and are carried out once when a device joins
or leaves a domain. The fourth stage covers the exchange of content, which
is exactly as described in section 11.2, point (2). The last stage provides
for the backup and recovery of domain credentials. Domain credentials
are backed up transparently to the end user, and the recovery procedure
is a straightforward process.
3. Performance. Properly assessing the performance of the domain manage-
ment process requires prototyping, which is planned future work. How-
ever, use of the domain management procedure (which covers initialising a
domain, and adding and removing devices from a domain) is likely to oc-
cur relatively infrequently, and so the performance impact on the system
is minimal. Performance issues associated with protecting and exchanging
content are discussed in section 11.2, point (3).
4. Content mobility. This is exactly as described in section 11.2, point (4).
5. Lack of dependence on network infrastructure. As outlined in section 7.3.4,
content can be transferred between domain devices either directly, if the
devices have a direct connection, or using a portable storage device, for
example, a USB memory stick.
6. Lack of dependence on a secure clock. The scheme does not use timestamps;
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nonces are used for establishing message freshness.
7. Cryptographic robustness. This is exactly as described in section 11.2,
point (7).
8. Ease of recovery. A backup and recovery procedure for network keys and
content is proposed in section 7.3.5. As discussed in section 11.2 point (8),
attacking a device might compromise the domain-specific key; this could
enable misuse of content belonging to that domain, but will have no effect
on the operation of other domains.
9. Robust content protection. This is exactly as described in section 7.4, and
11.2 point (9).
10. Flexible rights structure. This is exactly as described in section 11.2, point
(10).
11. Simple key management. The key management scheme operates transpar-
ently to end users.
12. Flexible Revocation Mechanism. Revoked keys are stored in a revocation
list that can be queried, for example, via an OCSP service. There is no
need for all devices to be connected at the same time in order to revoke
keys.
13. Access and Usage of Content. This is exactly as described in section 11.2,
point (13).
14. Consumer Privacy. The scheme protects consumer privacy; content dis-
tributors/rights issuers do not need to monitor user content consumption;
instead, a domain-specific master control device, certified by a Certifica-
tion Authority trusted by content distributors and rights issuers, is used
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to control domain membership. In addition, to prevent content distribu-
tors and rights issuers from identifying individuals and monitoring domain
owners content usage, a privacy Certification Authority (privacy-CA) or
Direct Anonymous Attestation technique could be implemented. More-
over, the master control device is managed by the domain owner, which
prevents content distributors/rights issuers from collaborating with it to
learn what content is present in a domain, or to identify the devices in a
domain.
15. Interoperability. This is exactly as described in section 11.2, point (15).
16. Security and Hardware Issues. This is exactly as described in section 11.2,
point (16).
11.4 Authorised Domain Management Using an
Electronic Payment System
We now analyse the Authorised Domain Management Using an Electronic Pay-
ment System scheme described in chapter 8, using the list of requirements given
in section 4.5.
1. Minimum cost. This scheme requires the implementation of a TA to con-
trol and manage consumer domains. This increases the overall cost of
implementing the system; however, the TA could be established by an
existing trusted third party, e.g. a bank, which should reduce the over-
all cost. In addition, the participating banks and the payment network
provider, which have agreed that payment cards and the authorisation
network can be used to support this scheme, might wish to charge for
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this service. However, the participating banks and the payment network
provider are only involved in domain creation and in adding devices to a
domain, and hence the cost impact of a modest charge should be man-
ageable. Also, as discussed in section 11.2 point (1), the scheme requires
participating domain devices to have Trusted Platform properties. The
(modest) additional costs of implementing such a solution in every device
could be offset by the content owners, e.g. through lower licence costs,
since the content owners will benefit from reduced piracy.
2. Ease of use. The system has five main stages. The first involves contacting
a TA, which initialises the domain by generating a domain unique key and
a domain identifier; these are then bound to the domain owner’s payment
card details and the two domain limits. This process should be simple for
a user to initiate, and is carried out once in the domain’s lifetime. The
second involves adding a device to a domain. This involves contacting
the TA, which verifies that the domain owner payment card details match
those associated with the domain, and ensures that the joining device is in
physical proximity to a device already in this domain. This process should
be simple for a user to initiate, and is carried out once when a device joins
a domain. The third involves removing a device from a domain, which is
similar to the process of adding a device to a domain, without requiring the
measurement of physical proximity. The fourth stage covers the exchange
of content, which is exactly as described in section 11.2, point (2). The last
stage provides for the backup and recovery of domain credentials. This is
carried out by the TA, and is transparent to the end user.
3. Performance. This is exactly as described in section 11.3, point (3).
4. Content mobility. This is exactly as described in section 11.2, point (4).
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5. Lack of dependence on network infrastructure. This is exactly as described
in section 11.3, point (5).
6. Lack of dependence on a secure clock. This is exactly as described in
section 11.3, point (6).
7. Cryptographic robustness. This is exactly as described in section 11.2,
point (7).
8. Ease of recovery. A backup and recovery procedure for network keys and
content is proposed in section 8.3.5. As discussed in section 11.2 point
(8), attacking a device might compromise the domain-specific key; this
could enable misuse of content belonging to that domain, but will have no
effect on the operation of other domains. In this particular scheme, the
domain unique identifier could also be compromised; however, this would
not enable unauthorised devices to be added to a domain unless domain
owner payment card details are also available to the attacker.
9. Robust content protection. This is exactly as described in section 8.4, and
11.2 point(9).
10. Flexible rights structure. This is exactly as described in section 11.2, point
(10).
11. Simple key management. This is exactly as described in section 11.3, point
(11).
12. Flexible Revocation Mechanism. This is exactly as described in section
11.3, point (12).
13. Access and Usage of Content. This is exactly as described in section 11.2,
point (13).
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14. Consumer Privacy. This scheme protects consumer privacy; payment card
details are not available to the TA, thereby protecting consumer privacy.
In addition, to prevent the TA, content distributor, and rights issuer from
identifying individuals and monitoring owner content usage patterns, a
privacy-CA or Direct Anonymous Attestation technique could be imple-
mented. A TA and the participating banks might collaborate with a con-
tent distributor/rights issuer to reveal the domain owner payment card
details, which are used to manage the domain. This would allow the
content distributor/rights issuer to identify domains and monitor content
usage patterns. However, such a situation, which seems unlikely, can be
avoided by using two payment cards, one for managing the domain and
the other for buying content.
15. Interoperability. This is exactly as described in section 11.2, point (15).
16. Security and Hardware Issues. This is exactly as described in section 11.2,
point (16).
11.5 Authorised Domain Management Using a
Mobile Phone
We now analyse the Authorised Domain Management Using a Mobile Phone
scheme described in chapter 9, using the list of requirements given in section
4.5.
1. Minimum cost. This scheme requires a mobile phone network operator
to provide the network application function service, part of the GAA. A
participating network operator might wish to charge for providing such a
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service; however, the service is only required when creating a domain and
when devices join a domain, and hence the cost impact of a modest charge
should be manageable. Also, as discussed in section 11.2 point (1), the
scheme requires participating domain devices to have Trusted Platform
properties. The extra implementation costs could be covered from the
expected reduction in piracy.
2. Ease of use. The system has five main stages. The first involves initialising
a domain-specific mobile phone; this phone communicates with a network
application function service, which initialises the domain and sets the do-
main limits. This process should be simple for a user to initiate, and is
carried out once in the lifetime of a domain. The second and third in-
volve adding a device to a domain and removing a device from a domain,
during which the domain owner is authenticated to the domain-specific
mobile phone, and the mobile phone and the network application func-
tion service are mutually authenticated. This process is straightforward,
and is carried out once when a device joins a domain or leaves a domain.
The fourth stage covers the exchange of content, which is exactly as de-
scribed in section 11.2, point (2). The last stage provides for the backup
and recovery of domain credentials. This is carried out by the network
application function, and is transparent to the end user.
3. Performance. This is exactly as described in section 11.3, point (3).
4. Content mobility. This is exactly as described in section 11.2, point (4).
5. Lack of dependence on network infrastructure. This is exactly as described
in section 11.3, point (5).
6. Lack of dependence on a secure clock. This is exactly as described in
section 11.3, point (6).
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7. Cryptographic robustness. This is exactly as described in section 11.2,
point (7).
8. Ease of recovery. A backup and recovery procedure for network keys and
content is proposed in section 9.4.6. As discussed in section 11.3 point (8),
attacking a device might compromise the domain-specific key; this could
enable misuse of content belonging to that domain, but will have no effect
on the operation of other domains.
If a domain device is hacked it will not compromise content in other do-
mains, as described in section 11.3, point (8).
9. Robust content protection. This is exactly as described in section 9.5, and
11.2 point(9).
10. Flexible rights structure. This is exactly as described in section 11.2, point
(10).
11. Simple key management. This is exactly as described in section 11.3, point
(11).
12. Flexible Revocation Mechanism. This is exactly as described in section
11.3, point (12).
13. Access and Usage of Content. This is exactly as described in section 11.2,
point (13).
14. Consumer Privacy. This scheme protects consumer privacy; content dis-
tributors and rights issuers do not need to monitor domain content con-
sumption or profile users, as each domain is managed by a trusted domain-
specific mobile phone. To prevent content distributors and rights issuers
from identifying domain owners and monitoring their content usage pat-
terns, a privacy-CA or Direct Anonymous Attestation technique could be
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implemented. Moreover, if a content distributor/rights issuer collaborates
with the mobile phone provider, they will not be able to identify domain
content except if the consumer uses his mobile phone to buy content.
In this case content providers, by collaborating with the mobile phone
provider, could identify a domain using the domain-specific mobile phone
IMSI. This would enable content distributors to identify content down-
loaded using the domain-specific mobile phone. However, such a case can
be avoided by using a different domain device (which could be another
mobile phone) for downloading content.
15. Interoperability. This is exactly as described in section 11.2, point (15).
16. Security and Hardware Issues. This is exactly as described in section 11.2,
point (16).
11.6 Authorised Domain Management Using Lo-
cation Based Services
We now analyse the Authorised Domain Management Using Location Based
Services scheme described in chapter 10, using the list of requirements given in
section 4.5.
1. Minimum cost. This scheme requires the establishment of a TA to manage
consumer domains. This authority could be a mobile phone network op-
erator, which should reduce the overall costs. Also, as discussed in section
11.2 point (1), the scheme requires participating domain devices to have
Trusted Platform properties. The (modest) additional costs of implement-
ing such a solution in every device could be offset by the content owners,
217
11. Assessment and Analysis
e.g. through lower licence costs, since the content owners will benefit from
reduced piracy.
2. Ease of use. The system has five main stages. The first involves contacting
a TA, which initialises a domain by generating a domain unique key and
domain identifier; These are bound to the domain owner’s geographical
addresses and the two domain limits. This process should be simple for
a user to initiate, and is carried out once in the domain’s lifetime. The
second involves adding a device to a domain. This involves contacting the
TA, which verifies that the joining device is located in physical proximity
to the domain registered addresses. This process is straightforward and
is carried out just once. The third involves removing a device from a
domain, in which the domain owner is authenticated to the TA. This
process is straightforward and is carried out once when a device leaves a
domain. The fourth stage covers the exchange of content, which is exactly
as described in section 11.2, point (2). The last stage provides for the
backup and recovery of domain credentials. This is carried out by the TA,
and is transparent to the end user.
3. Performance. This is exactly as described in section 11.3, point (3).
4. Content mobility. This is exactly as described in section 11.2, point (4).
5. Lack of dependence on network infrastructure. This is exactly as described
in section 11.3, point (5).
6. Lack of dependence on a secure clock. This is exactly as described in
section 11.3, point (6).
7. Cryptographic robustness. This is exactly as described in section 11.2,
point (7).
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8. Ease of recovery. A backup and recovery procedure for network keys and
content is proposed in section 10.4.5. As discussed in section 11.2 point
(8), attacking a device might compromise the domain-specific key; this
could enable misuse of content belonging to that domain, but will have no
effect on the operation of other domains.
9. Robust content protection. This is exactly as described in section 10.5,
and 11.2 point(9).
10. Flexible rights structure. This is exactly as described in section 11.2, point
(10).
11. Simple key management. This is exactly as described in section 11.3, point
(11).
12. Flexible Revocation Mechanism. This is exactly as described in section
11.3, point (12).
13. Access and Usage of Content. This is exactly as described in section 11.2,
point (13).
14. Consumer Privacy. Each domain owner can define privacy and filtering
rules that specify which entity can query its location, and to what level of
detail. A TA will learn the location and identities of the domain owner,
which might raise a privacy concern; however, a TA service is only required
to change domain membership, and is not capable of monitoring content
consumption. This protects consumer privacy. To prevent the content dis-
tributor and rights issuer from identifying domain owners and monitoring
their content usage patterns, a privacy-CA or Direct Anonymous Attesta-
tion technique could be implemented. If a content distributor/rights issuer
collaborates with the TA, then they will not be able to identify domain
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content except if the consumer buys content using a mobile device from a
domain registered address. This scheme uses the Geopriv protocol, which
enables a domain owner to define privacy rules identifying the entities that
can query a device location, and also to specify the precision of the re-
trieved location. In addition, this case can be avoided by using a specific
mobile device to act as a proxy with the TA for domain management.
In this case the TA can only query the location of this particular device,
and hence collaboration between the TA and the content distributor will
not enable them to learn what domain content is downloaded via other
domain devices.
15. Interoperability. This is exactly as described in section 11.2, point (15).
16. Security and Hardware Issues. This is exactly as described in section 11.2,
point (16).
11.7 Deployment Issues for the Four Schemes
In this section we consider the main challenges that raise when deploying the
four proposed schemes.
All the proposed schemes require devices to be TPs with certain properties in
order to protect the means for accessing domain content. As discussed in section
6, the TCG specifications satisfy all required properties. We also discussed the
main practical challenges to the implementation of TCG compliant platforms.
These challenges are the subject of ongoing research, and seems likely that it
take some time to address all these challenges. Hence we have discussed the pos-
sibilities for relaxing the TP security assumptions, and use existing techniques
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for protecting the means for accessing content. There are always trade-offs be-
tween security and cost, and security and usability. Therefore, strengthening or
relaxing the security requirements needs to be carefully considered based on the
context of the intended application and the environment in which the proposed
authorised domain schemes will be integrated. For example, if the proposed
authorised domain management schemes are used in an enterprise environment,
then the TP security requirements should be seriously considered, as the sensi-
tivity of content in enterprises is likely to be a major concern. Also, enterprises
are typically willing to spend more money on security assurance than owners
of personal networks. In addition, opposed to the devices used in a personal
network, enterprise devices are typically PCs and servers that already have a
TPM chip integrated in their motherboard.
All the proposed schemes require a trusted domain controller. The nature of the
domain controller and how it can be realised in practical life is DRM scheme-
specific. In the Authorised Domain Management using a Master Control Device
schemem, the domain controller is a master control device that does not need
to be a dedicated device; it could be a laptop that has a specific software appli-
cation to implement the master control device functionality. Thus, this scheme
is the easiest to implement and imposes the minimum cost. Moreover, the mas-
ter control device is managed by the domain owner, which prevents content
distributors/rights issuers from collaborating with the master control device to
learn content usage information. In all other schemes the domain controller is
a trusted authority of a specific nature. We now discuss deployment issues for
the other three schemes.
In the Authorised Domain Management Using an Electronic Payment System
scheme, the domain controller is a TA, which could be established by a bank to
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reduce the overall cost. Banks might be reluctant to use their infrastructure for
DRM applications in personal network, as their existing infrastructure is mainly
for facilitating electronic payment to collect revenue. One might think that this
point is enough to make banks reluctant in considering the proposed scheme.
However, in the proposed scheme the verification of a domain owner’s payment
card is performed in a similar way to the electronic payment process. This
should help ease implementation issues, and increase the acceptability of the
scheme. Also, and most importantly, the payment infrastructure is mainly used
whenever a device is added/removed from a domain, and not for buying content.
Hence, the performance impact is minimal. In addition, the participating banks
and the payment network provider, which have agreed that payment cards and
the authorisation network can be used to support this scheme, might charge the
consumers for this service. However, the participating banks and the payment
network provider are only involved in domain creation and in adding devices to
a domain, and hence the cost impact of a modest charge should be manageable.
The (modest) additional costs of implementing this scheme could be offset by the
content owners, e.g. through lower licence costs, since the content owners will
benefit from reduced piracy. Moreover, a TA and the participating banks might
collaborate with a content distributor/rights issuer to reveal the domain owner
payment card details, which are used to manage the domain. This would allow
the content distributor/rights issuer to identify domains and monitor content
usage patterns. However, such a situation, which seems unlikely, can be avoided
by using two payment cards, one for managing the domain and the other for
buying content.
In the Authorised Domain Management using a Mobile phone scheme, the do-
main controller is a combination of the domain-specific mobile phone and the
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network application function, which is provided by the mobile network operator
as part of the GAA. Mobile network operators have an established infrastruc-
ture for authenticating their subscribers. This should help ease implementation.
However, mobile network operators might be worried for using their infrastruc-
ture to support such a service, as it might have an effect on the network per-
formance and, in addition, on the maintenance cost; however, their service is
only required when creating a domain and when devices join a domain, and
hence the performance impact is minimal. Also, mobile network operators will
be interested if they will gain profit, for example, today’s mobile networks are
not only used to make phone calls, it is also used for other purposes such as
buying content. Participating network operators’ charge for providing such a
service is expected to be minimal, as the service is only required when creating a
domain and when devices join a domain, and hence the cost impact of a modest
charge should be manageable. In this scheme, if a content distributor/rights
issuer collaborates with the mobile phone provider, they will not be able to
identify domain content except if the consumer uses his mobile phone to buy
content. In this case content providers, by collaborating with the mobile phone
provider, could identify a domain using the domain-specific mobile phone IMSI.
This would enable content distributors to identify content downloaded using the
domain-specific mobile phone. However, such a case can be avoided by using a
different domain device (which could be another mobile phone) for downloading
content.
In the authorised domain management using location-based services scheme,
the domain controller is a TA, which could be a mobile network operator. The
benefits of using a mobile network LBS include the following: Mobile networks
have global coverage; the 3G mobile network infrastructure is secure; Mobile
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handsets are ubiquitous; and the existing mobile network infrastructure enables
the authentication of subscribers. The deployment analyses for the authorised
domain management using a mobile phone equally applies for the deployment of
this scheme. If a content distributor/rights issuer collaborates with the TA, then
they will not be able to identify domain content except if the consumer buys
content using a mobile device from a domain registered address. This scheme
uses the Geopriv protocol, which enables a domain owner to define privacy rules
identifying the entities that can query a device location, and also to specify the
precision of the retrieved location. In addition, this case can be avoided by using
a specific mobile device to act as a proxy with the TA for domain management.
In this case the TA can only query the location of this particular device, and
hence collaboration between the TA and the content distributor will not enable
them to learn what domain content is downloaded via other domain devices.
11.8 Comparing the Four Schemes
The main differences between the four schemes are as follows.
• Identifying Domain ownership. In the Authorised Domain Management
using a Master Control Device scheme, domain owners are authenticated
using two-factor authentication, which involves “something the domain
owner has”, i.e. a master control device, and “something the domain owner
is or knows”, i.e. a biometric or password/PIN authentication mechanism
that is implemented by the master control device. In the Authorised Do-
main Management using an Electronic Payment System scheme, domain
owners are authenticated using their payment cards, building on the ex-
isting electronic payment system by ensuring that the name and the date
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of birth of a domain creator are the same for all devices joining a domain.
The Authorised Domain Management using a Mobile Phone scheme in-
volves the use of a domain-specific mobile phone and the mobile phone net-
work operator to authenticate the domain owner before devices can join
a domain. The Authorised Domain Management using Location Based
Services scheme ensures that devices being added to consumer domains
are located in physical proximity to the domain registered addresses. This
restricts domain membership to devices in predefined geographical loca-
tions, helping to ensure that a single consumer owns and manages each
domain.
• Implementation Cost. The Authorised Domain Management using a Mas-
ter Control Device scheme would appear likely to be the least expensive
scheme to implement, as domain management is provided by a master
control device, which does not need to be a dedicated device, i.e. it could
be part of another domain device. The Authorised Domain Management
using an Electronic Payment System scheme is likely to be the most ex-
pensive scheme to implement, as it requires a (small) modification to the
existing electronic payment infrastructure (to encrypt card details so that
they can only be decrypted by authorised banks). In addition, it requires
the establishment of a TA to manage consumer domains; however, this ser-
vice could be provided by an established bank, which should reduce the
overall costs. The participating banks and the payment network provider,
which have agreed that payment cards and the authorisation network can
be used to support this scheme, might want to charge for the provision
of this service; however, their services are only required when creating a
domain, and when devices join the domain, and hence the cost impact of
a modest charge should be manageable. The Authorised Domain Man-
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agement using a Mobile Phone and the Authorised Domain Management
using Location Based Services scheme do not require major changes to
existing mobile network operator infrastructures. The participating net-
work operators might wish to charge for their service; however, such a
service is only required when creating a domain, and when devices join
the domain, and hence the cost impact of a modest charge should be man-
ageable. The extra costs in implementing the schemes could be recovered
from the expected reduction in piracy.
• Trusted Domain Controller. The trusted domain controller in the Au-
thorised Domain Management using a Master Control Device scheme is a
domain-specific master control device. In the Authorised Domain Man-
agement using an Electronic Payment System scheme the trusted domain
controller is a TA. In the Authorised Domain Management using a Mo-
bile Phone scheme the trusted domain controller is a combination of the
domain-specific mobile phone and the network application function, which
is provided by the mobile network operator as part of the GAA. In the Au-
thorised Domain Management using Location Based Services scheme the
trusted domain controller is a TA that provides Location Based Services,
which could be a mobile network operator.
• Domains covering multiple locations. This might be a requirement for
organisations that have offices in multiple locations, or for mobile con-
sumers. The Authorised Domain Management using a Master Control
Device scheme requires the master control device to be a portable device
to enable ease of movement between different locations. The Authorised
Domain Management using an Electronic Payment System scheme can
be adapted to allow domain expansion in multiple locations; however, it
would require a domain device that is already a member of the domain to
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be portable. This is required because adding devices into a domain should
be performed using a device already in the domain acting as a proxy. The
Authorised Domain Management using a Mobile Phone scheme can sup-
port domain expansion at multiple locations, because of the portability
of mobile phones. The Authorised Domain Management using Location
Based Services scheme is the best solution for supporting a domain span-
ning multiple widely separated locations. Also the latter scheme imposes
more stringent restrictions on physical piracy than the other schemes, as
it ensures all joining devices are located within the physical proximity of
a domain registered address.
• Convenience for personal networks. All four schemes are designed for do-
mains owned by a single owner; however, the Authorised Domain Manage-
ment using a Master Control Device scheme and the Authorised Domain
Management using a Mobile Phone scheme could be more practical for
consumer domains. This is because the former imposes minimal addi-
tional costs, while the latter is not expensive to implement, and the use of
a mobile phone gives consumers greater flexibility and convenience, since
mobile phones are personalised, portable and ubiquitous.
• Suitability for Enterprise DRM. In addition to the above comments on do-
mains covering multiple locations, the Authorised Domain Management
using a Mobile phone scheme and the Authorised Domain Management
using an Electronic Payment System scheme are not suitable for use by a
large organisation. This is because both solutions bind domain ownership
to personal devices (payment cards or mobile phones), and it would not be
convenient for an organisation to use a personal mobile device or payment
card to add devices to its domain. The Authorised Domain Management
using Location Based Services scheme would appear to be the most ap-
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propriate for corporate use; this is because organisations typically have
multiple sites, and a corporate domain is, typically, managed by a group
of system and security administrators, who might need to manage domain
membership at each domain location. In addition, since corporate loca-
tions do not change frequently, this reduces TA management costs. The
authorised domain management using a Master Control Device scheme
requires slight modifications to its design in order to work effectively in
a corporate setting. For example, the master control device needs to be
physically bound to organisation premises, so that it cannot be taken else-
where.
11.9 Comparing the Proposed Schemes with Other
Schemes
In this section we compare the four proposed schemes with the schemes discussed
in chapter 5.
11.9.1 OMA DRM
In this section we compare the four proposed implementations with the OMA
scheme analysed in section 5.1.1. The main differences are as follows.
• In the OMA scheme adding a device into a domain requires the joining
device to send a request to the rights issuer managing the domain. The
request contains the domain identifier. This domain identifier can be
shared with others. Hence leaf distribution arises. Our proposed schemes
address this problem by strongly binding devices joining a domain to the
228
11. Assessment and Analysis
domain owner.
• In the OMA scheme each device needs to securely store the domain keys,
domain identifiers and domain expiry time provided by the rights issuer
for each domain that it joins. Extra secure storage is needed to store these
keys, which potentially increases the cost and complexity of a device. Also,
devices that have restricted storage can join a limited number of domains.
The proposed schemes requires each device to securely stores a dynamic
domain-specific key.
• In the OMA scheme each rights issuer is required to define domains, man-
age domain keys, and control which and how many devices are included
in a domain. This in turn increases the overall complexity and mainte-
nance costs imposed on rights issuers. Our proposed schemes the domain
controller is a single entity, which manages consumers domains.
• Based on the OMA scheme domain devices must join all the relevant
rights issuers to use all content in a domain. This is not user friendly, and
makes administration complex from the user’s perspective. Our schemes
require devices to join a domain only once. In addition, rights issuers is
not involved in domain management in our schemes.
• In the OMA scheme if a device in a domain is hacked, new domain keys
are generated by all rights issuers from whom content has been obtained.
These keys must be transferred to all registered domain devices (except,
of course, for revoked devices). This means that the domain owner must
update the keys on all devices for all rights issuers, which is not user
friendly. In our schemes the domain-specific key does not change even if
the device is hacked, as we use different policy to handle this issue, which
is described early on in this chapter.
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• In the OMA scheme all rights issuers store sensitive information about
consumer domains, such as device public keys and digital content usage.
This enables rights issuers to track the usage patterns of domain owners,
which potentially raises major privacy concerns. Our schemes does not
involve rights issuer in creating consumer domains. Our schemes is based
on the assumptions that rights issuers and content distributors trust the
domain manager to operate as expected. Thus, they no longer need to
monitor content consumption.
11.9.2 eXtensible Content Protection (xCP)
In this section we compare the four proposed implementations with the xCP
scheme analysed in section 5.1.2. The main differences are as follows.
• In the xCP scheme there is no binding between the content protection
key and a domain owner. This means that any device can obtain the
means for accessing content, as long as this device has not been revoked
and the maximum number of devices in the domain has not exceeded a
pre-specified limit. Hence leaf distribution arises. Our proposed schemes
address this problem by strongly binding devices joining a domain to the
domain owner.
• The xCP scheme is based on the broadcast encryption protocol, which
requires a licensing agency to produce the MKB and assign device keys.
The nature of the licensing agency and how it can be realised in real life
is not discussed in xCP scheme. In addition, devices must be capable of
processing the MKB to produce the domain key. The MKB is a large data
structure, and hence moving it between devices and using it to generate
230
11. Assessment and Analysis
the media key imposes a significant overhead, especially on devices that
have limited capabilities. The proposed schemes require a trusted domain
controller. The nature of the domain controller and how it can be realised
in practical life is discussed in each scheme. In addition, the proposed
schemes only require devices to be TP with certain properties. As de-
scribed in this chapter TCG compliant platforms can satisfy the required
properties.
• The xCP scheme each device in a domain requires tamper-resistant storage
to store the domain key and the set of keys assigned by licensed media
manufacturers. The proposed schemes only require devices to store a
single a symmetric key.
• The xCP scheme does not allow increasing the number of devices that
can be in a domain, which makes the system less flexible for consumers.
In our porposed schemes the number of devices that can be in a domain
is controlled by a trusted authority. The authority decides the default
number of devices that can be in a domain. This, for example, would de-
pends on the country (different countries have different (average) number
of members in a family). In addition, this number could be customised on
individual bases with extra charges.
• In the xCP scheme every time the domain membership changes or a new
MKB is released, the domain key must be changed. Consequently, the
content encryption keys will need to be re-encrypted with the new domain
key, which means that all content and associated encryption keys must
be tracked. This could result in a significant overhead if the number
of items of content is large. The proposed schemes do not change the
domain specific key; leaving devices must communicate with the domain
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controller that ensures a device removes the domain key before it updates
the domain-specific counters. This stops the domain owners abusing the
system by adding devices and then removing them to use domain content
in unauthorised way.
• In the xCP scheme all devices must be online to obtain a new domain key if
a device joins or leaves the domain, or if a device is hacked. It is potentially
difficult for some devices to be online (e.g., a car CD Player). The proposed
schemes does not require devices to be continuously connected.
11.9.3 Apple Fairplay
In this section we compare the four proposed implementations with the Apple
Fairplay scheme analysed in section 5.1.4. The main differences are as follows.
• The Apple Fairplay scheme fails to bind devices in a domain to the domain
owner. Adding a device to a domain simply requires the domain owner
to be authenticated using an Apple-ID and password that can be shared
with others. Hence leaf distribution raises. Our proposed schemes address
this problem by strongly binding devices joining a domain to the domain
owner.
• The domain key in Apple Fairplay scheme is protected using software
techniques only. The software protection has been hacked many times. In
addition, content can be backed up to a standard CD in unencrypted form,
or transported elsewhere via email or FTP, enabling content proliferation.
The proposed schemes protects a domain key using hardware measures.
Also, we proposed secure ways for backing up and recovering of domain
credentials.
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• In the Apple Fairplay the domain size is restricted to five computers. Our
proposed schemes the domain size is dynamic and can be changed based
on consumers need, as discussed in section 11.9.2.
• In the Apple Fairplay key management is based on sharing a list of secret
keys between all devices in a domain. Every time a consumer buys new
content, a user key is generated to protect the added content. This key is
also transferred to the Apple server so that it can be used by other devices
in the same domain. This requires all devices to be online to retrieve the
new key. In addition, if the number of pieces of content is large, this
might cause a key management problem. Our proposed schemes require
a domain specific-key to protect domain content. This key is transfered
to a device only once when joining the domain, and it does not change
when membership of a domain changes. Hence our schemes do not require
devices to be continually available. Our proposed scheme use different
measures for protecting domain content when a device joins or leaves a
domain, as discussed earlier this chapter.
• The Apple server and iTMS could jointly track consumer content usage,
and this raises a potentially major privacy issue. Our proposed schemes
the content distributors and rights issuers do not get involved in domain
creation and they do not require tracking content consumptions. How-
ever, three of the proposed schemes require a trusted authority to con-
trol domain membership (i.e. the ones that authenticate domain owners a
payment card, a mobile phone and location based services) if the domain
controller collaborate with a content distributor, and if the domain owner
uses a device in the domain that is used to control domain membership
or a payment card that is used to create or add devices into a domain.
Then the content distributor would know all content bought from the same
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distributor for the domain.
• Only iPod devices and platforms running Mac OS X or Microsoft Windows
can join a domain in the Apple Fairplay scheme, limiting interoperability.
As stated by Rowell [75], ”Apple Fairplay is allowing Apple to lock iPod
owners into its proprietary store”. Our proposed scheme does not require
a specific device type of a special operating system.
11.9.4 SmartRight
In this section we compare the four proposed implementations with the Smar-
tRight scheme analysed in section 5.1.3. The main differences are as follows.
• In the SmartRight scheme there is no binding between the domain key and
the domain owner. This means that any device can obtain the means for
accessing domain content, as long as the device has not been revoked and
the value of the PPN counter is not zero. This raises the leaf distribution
problem. Our proposed schemes address this problem by strongly binding
devices joining a domain to the domain owner.
• In order for a device to join a PPN, it must be SmartRight device com-
patible (in particular it must possess a smart card reader) and needs to be
equipped with a Terminal module smart card and/or a Converter module
smart card. These requirements increase the total system cost especially
the costs of using and maintaining smart cards. Moreover, it may be
inconvenient to add smart card readers to small devices. The proposed
schemes only require devices to have Trusted Platform properties that can
be met using TCG compliant devices, as discussed in this chapter.
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• In the SmartRight scheme if the system is hacked, the current smart cards
must be replaced, which is a potentially expensive and time-consuming
process. In the proposed scheme hacking a device does not affect other
domains, and the hacked device cannot receive content by eavesdropping
on network as content protection keys is transferred encrypted using the
destination device public encryption key.
• In the SmartRight scheme the network key is stored on the Terminal card.
If all the Terminal cards are lost or fail, then all existing content will be
unusable, and will need to be downloaded again from content distributor
sites. The proposed schemes propose a secure way to backup and recover
domain keys.
• In the SmartRight scheme the network key must be transferred by the
Terminal card that most recently joined the network. If the end user
forgets which Terminal card most recently joined the domain, then he/she
must try all Terminal cards. This could pose a serious usability issue in
networks with a large number of Terminal cards. Also, If this Terminal
card is lost or stolen, then no devices can be added to the network. All
proposed schemes do not have these restriction.
• In the SmartRight scheme a user must have converter smart card(s) in
order to add new content to the PPN. In addition, he/she needs to have
multiple Terminal smart card(s) to render digital content on a SmartRight
device. It may not be convenient for a user to manage a smart card for each
device he/she owns. All proposed schemes do not have such restriction.
• In the SmartRight scheme limiting the number of Terminal cards that can
be added to a domain using the PPN counter makes the system inflexible
for consumers. In addition, once the value of the PPN counter reaches
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zero, it cannot be increased, and the only means of adding devices to the
PPN is by reinitialising the domain. This would mean that all currently
held content, encrypted with the old network key, would need to be re-
downloaded, and a new network key generated. Our proposed schemes
the domain size is dynamic and can be changed based on consumers need,
as discussed in section 11.9.2.
• In the SmartRight scheme all the existing LECM keys are changed every
time a Terminal card joins or leaves the network. Therefore, the greater
the number of items of content in a domain, the longer it will take to en-
crypt all the new LECM keys with the network key. The proposed schemes
do not change the domain specific key; leaving devices must communicate
with the domain controller that ensures a device removes the domain key
before it updates the domain-specific counters. This stops the domain
owners abusing the system by adding devices and then removing them for
using domain content in an unauthorised way.
• In the SmartRight scheme a backup and recovery policy for network keys
and content has not been proposed. All proposed schemes propose differ-
ent methods for backing up and recovering domain credentials.
11.9.5 DRM in a 3G Mobile Phone and Beyond
In this section we compare the four proposed implementations with the DRM
in a 3G Mobile Phone and Beyond scheme analysed in section 5.1.5. The main
differences are as follows.
• In the 3G Mobile Phone scheme adding a device into a domain requires
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the joining device to send a request to the domain authority. The request
contains a password. This password can be shared with others. Hence
leaf distribution arises. Our proposed schemes address this problem by
strongly binding devices joining a domain to the domain owner.
• In the 3G Mobile Phone scheme a domain is protected against abuse in two
ways (a) The frequency with which a device is added to or removed from
domains is monitored. This requires a potentially complex and sophisti-
cated infrastructure, that processes and records potentially huge numbers
of events. Moreover, before authorising a device to join a domain, the
domain authority must parse the history log files to ensure the device is
not abusing the system. This is likely to adversely affect system perfor-
mance. (b) Domain creation is bound to owner private information or the
ability to spend money. One major problem with this approach is user
privacy, as the domain authority must hold confidential user information.
In addition, point (b) does not prevent abuse of the system, as owner,
for example, can use payment cards with lower limit or cancel his/her
payment card after creating the domain.
• In the 3G Mobile Phone scheme the use of a domain authority requires the
establishment and maintenance of a complex infrastructure that increases
the overall cost and complexity of the system. The scheme does not discuss
how such a domain authority can be realised. Three proposed schemes re-
quire a trusted authority to manage consumer domains. We described who
could act and play the role of the trusted authority, i.e. banks can play the
role of a trusted authority for the authorised domain management using
an electronic payment system scheme, and a mobile network provider can
play the role of a trusted authority for the authorised domain manage-
ment using a mobile phone and the authorised domain management using
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location based services.
• In the 3G Mobile Phone scheme every time a device is revoked or removed
from a domain, the domain-specific key pair has to be changed, which
requires the user to connect all devices to the Internet in order to install
the new domain key. Moreover, all domain content licence keys must be
re-encrypted with the new domain key. Users are likely to find such a
procedure inconvenient. All domain content licence keys are stored within
domain devices, and must therefore be tracked. This results in a significant
overhead if a large quantity of content is present. Our proposed schemes
do not require the domain specific-key to be changed when membership
of a domain changes. Hence our schemes do not require devices to be
continually available. Our proposed scheme use different measures for
protecting domain content when a device joins or leaves a domain, or if a
device is hacked, as discussed earlier this chapter.
11.9.6 DRM Security Architecture for Home Networks
In this section we compare the four proposed implementations with the DRM
Security Architecture for Home Networks scheme analysed in section 5.1.6. The
main differences are as follows.
• In the DRM Security Architecture for Home Networks scheme adding a
device into a domain requires the joining device to send a request to the
domain manager. The request contains the domain manager unique iden-
tifier. This identifier can be shared with others. Hence leaf distribution
arises. Our proposed schemes address this problem by strongly binding
devices joining a domain to the domain owner.
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• In the DRM Security Architecture for Home Networks scheme the global
revocation list, GDRL, is associated with every downloaded item of con-
tent, which has a serious impact on the overall system performance. The
size of the GDRL increases as more devices are revoked. This causes the
time to download content to increase. In addition, the local revocation
list, LRL, is very difficult to maintain, because it is associated with every
item of content inside the authorised domain rather than being stored in
a central location. All proposed schemes use a standard service for revo-
cation, also revoked keys are stored in a centralised location and can be
queried using an OCSP service.
• In the DRM Security Architecture for Home Networks scheme if the sys-
tem is hacked, the authorised domain must be re-initialised and all domain
content re-encrypted. In addition, a backup and recovery policy has not
been proposed for domain keys and content. As discussed before, in our
schemes the domain key is fixed and a secure backup and recovery mech-
anism is proposed for each DRM scheme.
• The DRM Security Architecture for Home Networks scheme is not flex-
ible in that the authorised domain size is fixed. The maximum number
of devices that can join an AD depends on hardware factors. These fac-
tors include the storage available for storing secure domain information,
i.e. the credential set and the device master key on the least capable de-
vice that is expected to join the AD. This is potentially inconvenient for
users, especially corporate users. Our proposed schemes the domain size
is dynamic and can be changed based on consumers need, as discussed in
section 11.9.2.
• The DRM Security Architecture for Home Networks scheme requires de-
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vices to possess a processor, memory, and protected storage to store se-
cret domain information. Also, it requires a dedicated domain manager
device. These increases the total costs. In addition, before devices can
join a domain they must know the domain manager’s GDI. This means
joining devices must possess an I/O component to insert the manager GDI
value. All proposd schemes require participating devices to have a Trusted
Platform properties that can be met using TCG compliant devices, as dis-
cussed in this chapter. Also, all proposed schemes require devices to store
a single domain-specific key.
11.9.7 Schemes Summary
Figure 11.1 summarises the analysis of the four schemes discussed in this chap-
ter with respect to the ideal DRM requirements list defined in chapter 4. By
comparing figure 11.1 against figure 5.2 in chapter 5, we conclude that all the
schemes proposed in this chapter satisfy many more requirements than the pre-
viously proposed schemes.
11.10 Summary
This chapter contains an analysis of the general DRM framework presented in
chapter 6, and the four schemes implementing the general framework. From
this analysis we have concluded that all these schemes address the fundamental
threats underlying content piracy, in addition to satisfying most of the defined
DRM requirements. In addition, we have observed that the four schemes have
differences in the following respects: the means used to identify domain own-
ership, the implementation costs, the nature of the trusted domain controller,
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Figure 11.1: Summary of the Analysis of the Four Schemes Proposed in this
Thesis.
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support for domains in multiple locations, convenience for personal networks,
and suitability for enterprise DRM.
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This chapter summarises the primary contributions of this thesis and gives some
directions for further research.
12.1 Main Contributions
This thesis focuses on a fundamental consumer, content owner and copyright
law requirement, namely how to allow content to be freely used by all devices
owned by an individual, and simultaneously stop content from being illegally
transferred to other devices. Current DRM schemes do not satisfy many user,
content owner, and/or copyright law acceptance criteria for digital content pro-
tection and consumption; a system will fail if consumers or content providers
243
12. Conclusions and Directions for Further Research
do not accept it. In addition, recent research has demonstrated that billions
of dollars are lost as a result of piracy every year [17, 19, 45]. These issues
underline the importance of finding an acceptable DRM solution in the near
future.
We started by defining an ideal list of DRM requirements from the points of view
of users, content providers and copyright law. We then developed an approach
for assessing DRM systems based on the defined DRM requirements; we used
this approach to analyse six of the most widely discussed DRM schemes incorpo-
rating the authorised domain concept. We found that the analysed schemes do
not satisfy many user, content owner, and/or copyright law acceptance criteria.
Studying the shortcomings of these schemes helped us to isolate the main issues
underlying content piracy, i.e. Root Distribution and Leaf Distribution. In ad-
dition, we observed that software only mechanisms do not fully protect domain
credentials, since such mechanisms have been hacked many times. Most of the
analysed schemes require the addition of a hardware module to protect domain
credentials and/or to enforce usage rules.
These observations led to a fundamental requirement underlying the model we
propose, that is we require domain devices to be trusted platforms with certain
properties. We showed that devices meeting the TCG specifications satisfy
most of the properties we require of a device. TCG compliant devices are not
expensive, and are now emerging into the marketplace; however, it will take
some time until TCG functionality is integrated into all types of device, e.g. car
CD players, TVs, etc. Also, many challenges still remain to be solved in TCG
specifications and are subject of ongoing research.
We then gave a general framework for DRM systems, that involves creating
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a domain owned by a single owner, where all devices joining a domain are
bound to the domain owner. Each domain has a domain-specific secret key
that is securely generated and protected by a trusted domain controller. This
key is not available even to the domain owner, is shared by all devices in the
domain, cannot be copied between devices, and is used to encrypt individual
content encryption keys. The domain key is transferred from the trusted domain
controller to a device joining a domain after the controller has authenticated the
domain owner. In addition, each domain has two associated limits maintained
and controlled by a trusted authority, one to control the number of devices that
can simultaneously access domain content, and the other to control the total
number of devices that can join a domain. Subsequently, we illustrated how the
proposed framework allows content to be freely exchanged between devices in
the same domain, and also allows controlled content sharing between devices in
multiple domains. In addition, we illustrated how schemes conforming to the
framework prevent illicit content proliferation.
Next, we described four implementations of the general framework. Each of
these schemes uses a different means for identifying the ownership of domain
devices, i.e. for binding a domain to a single owner to ensure that only a single
consumer owns and manages each domain. In addition, each of these schemes
uses a different type of trusted domain controller, the functionality of which
relates closely to the method used to identify domain ownership. The four
schemes are as follows.
• In the Authorised Domain Management using a Master Control Device
scheme, the trusted domain controller is a master control device, and the
domain owner is authenticated using two-factor authentication, which in-
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volves “something the domain owner has”, i.e. a master control device,
and “something the domain owner is or knows”, i.e. a biometric or pass-
word/PIN authentication mechanism that is implemented by the master
control device.
• In the Authorised Domain Management using an Electronic Payment Sys-
tem scheme, the trusted domain controller is a third party TA, and the
domain owner is authenticated using a payment card, building on the ex-
isting electronic payment system by ensuring that the name and the date
of birth associated with the payment card are the same for all devices
joining a domain.
• The Authorised Domain Management using a Mobile Phone scheme in-
volves the use of a domain-specific mobile phone and a mobile phone
network operator acting as the trusted domain controller. This network
operator must authenticate the domain owner before a device is permitted
to join a domain.
• The Authorised Domain Management using Location Based Services scheme
uses a third party TA as the trusted domain controller. This TA ensures
that devices joining a consumer domain are located in physical proximity
to one of the domain registered addresses. This restricts domain mem-
bership to devices in predefined geographical locations, helping to ensure
that a single consumer owns and manages each domain.
The general approaches of these implementations could also be useful in various
other applications requiring strong authentication, because they all strongly
bind a domain to its owner.
We then assessed the general framework and the four schemes using the defined
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list of requirements. From this analysis we concluded that all these schemes
address the fundamental threats underlying content piracy, in addition to sat-
isfying most of the defined DRM requirements, including: Ease of use, Content
mobility, Performance, Ease of recovery, Robust content protection, Privacy
and Interoperability. Finally, we compared the schemes and noted differences
in the following respects: the means used to identify domain ownership, the
implementation costs, the nature of the trusted domain controller, support for
domains in multiple locations, convenience for personal networks, and suitability
for enterprise DRM.
12.2 Future Research
We conclude this thesis by noting some areas for further research. One im-
portant issue that is not addressed in the four discussed schemes is meeting
copyright law requirements. The proposed schemes satisfy many copyright law
requirements; however, some requirements have not been fully analysed, e.g. fair
use. One important issue that is not addressed in the four discussed schemes
is meeting copyright law requirements. The next step is to make any necessary
modifications to the schemes so that they satisfy all relevant legal requirements,
including copyright law requirements.
More work is needed on in Digital Rights Management for corporate use of
content. Large organisations are likely to have requirements which differ from
those applying in the personal network environment. As a result, the schemes
proposed in this thesis may not be appropriate for corporate use; for example,
organisations are likely to have larger domains covering multiple locations, more
than one person might manage a corporate domain, etc. It would therefore be
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helpful to consider how the framework itself, and the four implementations,
might be modified to address the particular needs of large organisations.
In this thesis we do not address the problem of dynamic licensing (which is
sometimes also referred to as stateful licensing). The next step is to make any
necessary modifications to the schemes so that they address the problem of
stateful licensing within an authorised domain.
The proposed protocols have only been subjected to informal, ad hoc, analysis,
and security vulnerabilities may remain. Therefore, a more formal security
analysis of the security protocols would be highly desirable.
The four schemes have not been implemented. Prototyping would enable the
practicality of the schemes to be tested, and would also enable an assessment
of their performance characteristics.
Finally, a detailed analysis of the specifications due to be released in the near
future by the Mobile Phone Working Group (of the TCG) would be helpful, in
particular to see if these specifications provide all the functionality required by
trusted platforms, as defined in this thesis.
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